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1. INTRODUCTION
The use of law in international institutions is witnessing a
recent revival.' This Article contributes to the exploration of this
revival by closely and analytically examining the foreign affairs
trade doctrine in the context of the domestic incorporation of
international anti-dumping rules. The primary finding concludes
that the domestic incorporation of international anti-dumping
rules is not driven by a desire to establish a tight-fit system that
comports domestic anti-dumping law to match the obligations of
the United States (or "U.S.") under international anti-dumping
rules; but that rather, domestic incorporation of international anti-
dumping rules is best described as constituting international legal
minimalism.
This international legal minimalism is characterized by the
following elements. First, there is decreased attention to matching
domestic implementing legislation to formally reflect international
rules in a rigorously formal manner. Second, the attention given to
policy considerations counterbalances the attention given to the
formal clarity of rules. Third, there is some ambivalence regarding
the normative authority of international law in the sense that the
U.S. foreign trade doctrine is very accommodating of relative
degrees of bindingness as opposed to a formal approach of
characterizing U.S. obligations under international anti-dumping
rules as strictly categorical. Fourth, for these reasons,
adjudications in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute
settlement body ("DSB") are often unpredictable. Ultimately the
implementation of the DSB recommendations is not entirely driven
by compliance to the extent that it provides room for negotiation,
compromise and accommodation arising from implementation
difficulties within a WTO member's legal system.
* Assistant Professor, Albany Law School, SJD (Harvard). I would like to
thank Gregory C. Shaffer, Timothy Lytton, Stephen Clark, James Redwood, and
Peter Halewood for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also
like to thank my hardworking research assistants, Kohei Higo, Harumi Fujino and
Oko Akwei. To Carol, Mikey, and Ethan, thanks for all your unwavering
encouragement and loving support! This Article was supported by a generous
Albany Law School summer research grant. An earlier version of this Article was
presented to a faculty workshop at Albany Law School in February, 2003.
1 Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L
ORG. 385, 388 (2000).
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MINIMALISM
This account of the foreign trade power differs from a
predominant discourse that analyzes U.S. foreign trade policy
particularly in the anti-dumping area along two dominant axes:
the first theory proposes that U.S. anti-dumping law is simply a
good case of U.S. protectionism; 2 while the second theory contends
that the international anti-dumping rules of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the WTO are
criticized as being invasive of, and therefore leading to, the loss of
U.S. sovereignty to a supranational organization inconsistently
with domestic constitutional requirements. By contrast, in the
alternative or new account traced in detail and at length in this
Article, it is far more accurate to examine the incorporation of rules
of international anti-dumping law into U.S. law as a case of
international legal minimalism. International legal minimalism is
facilitated by the interlocking domestic and international anti-
dumping legal regimes as follows.
On the domestic side are U.S. constitutional and legal rules.
The various distinctive features of this regime are a significant
mediating backdrop against which U.S. incorporation of
international trade norms occurs. 3  Specifically, this legal
framework incorporates international trade norms into U.S. law
only to the extent that international trade norms are consistent with
U.S. policy considerations. The foreign trade power involves a
2 GARY C. HUFBAUER, ANALYZING THE EFFEcTS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY
INSTRUMENTS 6 (1981). See also infra Sections 3.1-3.2.
3 For example, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (the
"Constitution") presupposes legislative authority before a rule of international
law can alter domestic legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. As Justice
Holmes opined in In re Western Maid,
In deciding this question, we must realize that however ancient may be
the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which
it has been drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from its
having been accepted and adopted by the United States. There is no mystic
over-law to which even the United States must bow. When a case is said
to be governed by foreign law or by general maritime law that is only a
short way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign power takes up a
rule suggested from without and makes it part of its own rules.
In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (emphasis added). The involvement
of the U.S. Congress ("Congress") in treaty-authorization in turn injects domestic
policy considerations into the Executive's role of negotiating treaties. David M.
Golove defines this as the nationalist conception of the treaty power. See generally
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); infra Section
2004]
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balance between competing policy goals mandated by the U.S.
Congress ("Congress"), on the one hand, as against those
embodied in international legal trading norms embraced by the
U.S., on the other. Hence, the commitment to a global free trade
regime4 is often in tension with the imperative to ensure the
continued viability of strategic U.S. industries and domestic labor
in the face of foreign competition.5 In the debate running up to the
4 The first goal has been a primary objective of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/World Trade Organization ("WNTO") regime to
which the United States (or "U.S.") has remained an integral member. The second
has been a primary objective of the Congress particularly in the period after the
formation of GATT. While opening markets around the world has been achieved
through lowering tariffs particularly in the first several decades of GATT, the
imperative to ensure the continued viability of strategic U.S. industries such as
steel has been achieved through both domestic trade remedy laws such as
countervailing and anti-dumping duty laws. This tension has spawned other axes
of conflict regarding the sharing of authority between congress and the executive
branch (see infra Section 3.3) as well as between perspectives based on fairness
versus those based on efficiency (see infra Sections 3.1 and 3.2). The high
watermark of the efficiency perspective in trade remedy laws is best exemplified
in the Supreme Court decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 589-95 (1986) (quoting several antitrust articles authored by Frank H.
Easterbrook and Robert H. Bork, scholars who are leading examples of the
efficiency perspective of the Chicago School of Law and Economics). See generally
Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 268 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26-
27 (1984); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
145 (1978).
5 As Robert Kuttner notes:
Americans are not sure how much the state should interfere with the
private economy domestically, but the confusion about the appropriate
roles for the state and the market is most muddled in thinking about the
desirable norms for the international trading system .... The confusion
is worst in the United States, because the United States, as guarantor of
the global trading system and purveyor of the ideal of liberal trade, is
unsure how to reconcile those goals with its own national interest as an
economy.
ROBERT KUTrNER, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: NATIONAL PURPOSE AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY AFTER THE COLD WAR 122 (1991). Similarly, Jeffrey E. Garten wrote:
In abandoning the rhetoric of Adam Smith, President Clinton only
recognized the reality that totally free markets are a myth. But without
the kind of clear ideological direction that free market theory provides,
actions will often seem inconsistent and subject to the political winds of
the moment. President Reagan could exalt the "magic of the
marketplace" while protecting automobiles, steel and machine tools, and
still appear consistent. President Bush's image as charter member of the
friends-of-GATr club allowed his chief trade negotiator, Carla Hills, to
brandish a crowbar at America's trade partners with nowhere near the
outcry that has greeted Clinton's get-tough message.
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Trade Act of 2002,6 this tension was perhaps best demonstrated by
the desire to empower the President to enter into new free trade
agreements, while at the same time a growing sense that domestic
labor and the environment ought to be protected from foreign
investors in the United States. Yet, there was a simultaneous desire
to ensure that U.S. investors would not have to be encumbered by
similar limitations abroad.
At the international level, international legal minimalism is
facilitated by the plasticity or the possibility of ascribing multiple
permissible interpretations of U.S.7 and international anti-dumping
rules and their interrelationship. 8 This plasticity in the rules and in
adjudications arising from the rules, provides legal legitimacy to
the administration of the anti-dumping rules consistently - albeit
not always-with the U.S.'s priority of balancing international
trade commitments and domestic policy priorities. By plasticity
here, it is suggested that international anti-dumping rules are not a
seamless legal regime that fits tightly onto U.S. implementing
legislation.9  In many respects, the rules are negotiated
Jeffrey E. Garten, Clinton's Emerging Trade Policy: Act One, Scene One, 72 FOREIGN
AFF., 182, 185 (1993).
6 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
7 The existence of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in domestic legislation and
treaties is widely acknowledged. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997); Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage:
Transcending "Trade and ... , " 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 88 (2002).
8 In this sense therefore, it is suggested that GATI/WTO rules are as
legislative as they are contractual. In other words, they lay down broad rules of
conduct for states generally. Even strictly construing GATT/WTO rules as being
contractual and therefore creating only binding legal obligations as between
GATT/WTO parties does not in and of itself resolve ambiguities, gaps and
conflicts in the rules. In fact, Oscar Schachter noted that unlike multilateral
treaties that proclaim rules of international law that virtually all states in principle
agree upon, bargained-for compromise treaties such as those involving trade that
do not readily admit an inference of opinio juris (that states are acquiescing to
some prescribed conduct because it is legally binding) cannot easily be inferred.
See Oscar Schachter, Recent Trends in International Law Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 1, 7 (1988-1989). Kenneth Dam has also argued that unlike in public
international law, in international economic law, "[i]t is better ... that 100
commitments should be made and that 10 should be withdrawn than that only 50
commitments should be made and that all of them should be kept." KENNETH W.
DAM, THE GAT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 80 (1970). In
other words, international trade law, unlike contract law, is not concerned with
assuring that commitments that are made are kept, but instead with the
promotion of making conunitments in the first place.
9 At times, implemented U.S. legislation takes advantage of loopholes in
international anti-dumping laws such as the ambiguities between investigations
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 5 2004
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
compromises. They are therefore often left vague, indeterminate,
and at times inconsistent with each other to accommodate
negotiating countries with differing priorities and views.10 There
are various ways in which this plasticity is demonstrable as I
illustrate with specific examples in this paper. For example, while
international anti-dumping rules permit anti-dumping actions,
they outline the substantive and procedural conditions that such
actions must take and it is upon individual countries to enact
legislation and rules to implement them. Since international anti-
dumping rules are often vague, indeterminate and at times
and review in the 1994 GATr/WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. See David W.
Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States, in,
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND, 175, 236 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes
eds., 1997). See also infra Section 4.
10 A leading classic course book in public international law alludes to
thinking of international law in terms of a broad policy of cooperation as opposed
to a regime of strict formal rules in the following terms: "[tihe United Nations, its
specialized agencies and other international organizations, some on a universal
and others on a regional level, marked the transition of international law from the
traditional system of formal rules of mutual respect and absentation to an
incipient system of organized, cooperative efforts." LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxxiv (4th ed. 2001). This theme of
the shifting locus of international law from co-existence to cooperation was
invoked in the 1960s by scholars such as Wolfgang Friedmann. See MOHAMMED
BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 125-27 (1979) (citing
Wolfgang Friedmann). See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, Droit de coexistence et
droit de cooperation: quelques observations sur la structure du droit international, Revue
Belgae du Droit International 1, 6 (1970). In the 1970s, third-world scholars also
emphasized that the New International Economic Order proposed by developing
countries indicated a shift in international law away from "exclusive field of
formal and traditional diplomatic relations" towards cooperation and solidarity
particularly in equitably addressing the concerns of the poorest of the world. See
BEDJAOUI, supra, at 125-27. Wolfgang Friedmann further espoused this move to
pragmatism from formalism in the following terms:
It is in this direction rather than in blueprints for a worldwide military
security force that the main hope lies for the development of an
international legal system that will correspond to the needs of a society
which is anachronistically divided into more than one hundred thirty
"sovereign" states, but which is, for the fateful questions of survival or
extinction, indivisible. Unless social and legal organization catches up
with the physical and technological realities of our time, the prospects
for survival are indeed slender.
Wolfgang Friedmann, The Reality of International Law -A Reappraisal, 10 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 46, 60 (1971). See also RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970) (arguing that international law ought to shift away
from being merely concerned with avoiding war to focus on improving the world
by reducing economic inequality -hence suggesting the need for more
international cooperation through international law).
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inconsistent with each other, they often provide room for a variety
of permissible interpretations consistent with treaty interpretation
principles for a country putting in place its own anti-dumping
regime.1 For that reason, U.S. implementing legislation is at times
designed to exploit this interpretive space in addition to often
embodying latent inconsistencies with international anti-dumping
law awaiting challenge by other countries. 12 Sometimes the
implementing legislation merely adopts those parts of
international anti-dumping rules that the U.S. believes to be
consistent with international anti-dumping law while leaving out
others that are believed to be inconsistent. 13 A last example will
illustrate what I mean by plasticity. The U.S. often mobilizes
informal or open-ended administrative agency praxes in
responding to attacks of formal GATT/WTO inconsistency by
other countries since GATT/WTO jurisprudence allows
discretionary authority to executive officials that might be used in
a WTO-inconsistent manner. By doing so, the U.S. is simply
mobilizing what GATT/WTO jurisprudence allows. That is to say,
that under this jurisprudence, discretionary authority given to an
executive official by legislation is not illegal even though there is a
possibility that it might be used in a manner inconsistent with
GATT/WTO rules. In essence, under this jurisprudence only
measures which mandate or require inconsistent action under
GATT/WTO rules are prohibited.
14
11 In addition, as Joel P. Trachtman notes, many WTO rules are stated in quite
general terms and have as such been often referred to as standards rather than
rules. See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 88; see also Kalypso NicolaYdis & Joel P.
Trachtman, From Policed Regulation to Managed Recognition in GATS, in GATS 2000:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 241, 241-82 (Pierre Sauv &
Robert M. Stem eds., 2000).
12 See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer et al., Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Anti-
dumping Law: In Implementation or Contravention of the Anti-dumping Agreement, 29
INT'L LAW. 483 (1995) [hereinafter Holmer] (stating that the amendments to the
U.S. anti-dumping law caused a spirited debate between U.S. producers).
13 See Leebron, supra note 9, at 234 (stating that the U.S. only took legislative
actions for laws that were blatant violations of WTO agreements, and a "wait to
see" approach for possible violations that were not as clear).
14 This mandatory-discretionary distinction was upheld in the Section 301
case. See WTO Panel Report on the United States -Sections 301-310 of the Trade
Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, paras. 7.51-.54, 7.97 n.675 (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
Section 301 Case], available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/
disp-statuse.htm. The panel also found that the question of whether legislation
that allows discretion to executive authorities is WTO-inconsistent should be
considered in its context. Id. para. 7.57.
2004]
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It is important to emphasize that this plasticity does not play
out in a vacuum. Rather, it plays out against the backdrop of a very
organized domestic-industry lobby. This lobby is experienced in
repeatedly propelling anti-dumping actions through established
mechanisms to cover as many situations that would provide them
relief from the products of foreign competitors. In a context where
consumer interests are diffused, producer interests and
congressional concerns of stemming job losses in turn drive the
U.S. government's aggressive use of anti-dumping against foreign
producers. Further, this government/public sector collaboration
has sought to exploit the open-endedness of international anti-
dumping rules through the dispute settlement process of the
GATT/WTO. The intensive use of the GATT/WTO's dispute
settlement process in seeking and defending anti-dumping actions
has transformed dispute settlement on anti-dumping into a very
specialized arena. As such, it is now heavily factually-bound,
contextualized and perhaps less rule-bound. The use of the
dispute settlement process in this respect has therefore given the
U.S. an enviable bargaining advantage over foreign producers
whose countries do not have the cumulative experience that the
U.S. has been able to garner. In addition, the sheer expense of the
dispute settlement process serves to further buttress the U.S.'s
ability to use anti-dumping actions even in cases where the use is
clearly in violation of international anti-dumping rules. After all,
the U.S. can afford to defend its actions against countries that
cannot afford to use the dispute settlement process as effectively as
it can. For countries that challenge the use of anti-dumping against
their producers by the U.S. at the WTO, the elaborate dispute
settlement process and its open-endedness gives the U.S. the
leverage to stretch the dispute out during which time the anti-
dumping actions are still effective as against the foreign
producers. 5
15 Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for
Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, 5 SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE ISSUES: ICTSD REsouRcEs PAPER (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/resources-papers/DSU-2003.pdf.
Also, the reader may refer to Shaffer's article with papers published by Victor
Mosoti and Asif Qureshi in the same volume. Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the
WTO Dispute Settlement System? SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE ISSUES: 5
ICTSD RESOURCE PAPER (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/
ictsdseries/resource-papers/DSU_ 2003.pdf; Asif Qureshi, Interpreting WTO
Agreements for the Development Objective, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE
ISSUES: 5 ICTSD RESOURCE PAPER (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/
[Vol. 25:1
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In sum, the negotiation, administration and adjudication of
trade remedy laws in the area of anti-dumping law (particularly
with reference to the steel industry which forms a major backdrop
of this study) manages the axis between the U.S.'s commitments to
international anti-dumping rules, on the one hand, and ensuring
the continued viability and competitiveness of U.S. industries and
labor against foreign competition, on the other. This is achieved
through a complex amalgam or combination of policy balancing at
the domestic level and an arena of international anti-dumping
rules and a dispute settlement system that provides a hospitable
legal environment for selective implementation of international
obligations. At the domestic level, the legislative imperative of
policy balancing is reigned in by "domestically oriented metrics of
legal and constitutional discourse," 16 which provide the mandate
and context for balancing domestic policy commitments with
international anti-dumping rules in the United States. In a sense
therefore, the policing of the domestic policy arena against the
direct effect of international rules within the U.S., leaves the open-
ended domain of GATT/WTO dispute settlement to reign in
inconsistencies with the international standards. 17  As my
discussion of dispute settlement in the extensive analysis of the
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan case in Section 4 will show, the
WTO's dispute settlement cannot withstand close scrutiny as a true
watchdog that effectively reigns in GATT/WTO inconsistencies
among all its members. The detailed analysis that follows in this
Article establishes that domestic incorporation of international
anti-dumping rules is not driven towards establishing a tight fit
that complies with international anti-dumping rules. Rather,
domestic incorporation of international anti-dumping rules is best
described as exemplifying international legal minimalism. 18
pubs/ictsd-series/resource-papers/DSU_ 2003.pdf.
16 See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIo
ST. L.J. 649 (2002). To put it in the protectionist lingo used by economists, anti-
dumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program (stating that
global standards may affect constitutional norms beyond traditional notions of
foreign relations law). See ANTI-DUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT
(Michael J. Finger ed., 1993).
17 Indeed, this is one of the advantages of WTO rules as defined by the WTO
itself. See generally The World Trade Organization Website, at http://www.
wto.org (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
18 As noted, international minimalism is an outcome conditioned by a variety
of factors, including domestic legal and constitutional imperatives as well as the
nature of GAT%/WTO norms which operate in a manner that facilitates the
2004]
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To conclude, I argue that the extent to which international anti-
dumping rules are far too blunt to reign in inconsistencies with
U.S. anti-dumping law is not simply a function of the open-
endedness of these rules. Rather, it demonstrates that international
anti-dumping rules in and of themselves do not necessarily
determine the policy of international minimalism or the free reign
the U.S. has historically had in remaining free from the arguable
constraining power of these rules, particularly with regard to the
steel industry. International anti-dumping rules are often much
too vague to reign in the U.S.'s extensive use and abuse of its anti-
dumping regime. It could very well be that the motley of
mediating devices within this open-ended framework of
international anti-dumping rules has been deployed in a manner
that maintains a shifting equilibrium favorable to the U.S. without
incorporation of rules of international trade only in so far as those rules are
consistent with the policy priorities required by the domestic legal and
constitutional imperatives. International minimalism does not therefore, refer to
the project of positivist philosophers that began in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century of justifying the existence of international law while upholding
sovereignty as a basic predicate of the international system. This project served to
suggest that international law was only law when states voluntarily consented to
be bound. Georg Jellinek, for example, accounted for international law by
developing a doctrine of "self limitation" of the state, by deciphering sovereign
consent from the body of agreements entered into by states as did Heinrich Tripel.
See, e.g., GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1905); GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO,
LEZIONI DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO (1952). John Austin rejected the validity of
international law, calling it positive morality, since it did not express the will a
definite superior and had not power of sanction. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 10 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 1998)(1832). In addition, international minimalism does not coincide with
contemporary attempts to establish the validity of international law because those
governed by a particular norm of international law believe in its legitimacy since
it has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990). Legitimacy is also established from processes that
ensure transparency, resolve ambiguity, and strengthen states' capacities to
comply with international undertakings. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 135-54 (1995). Finally, legitimacy is given strength in
the existence and development of a sense of legal obligation and the growth of a
"culture of compliance." See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-13 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). See generally THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY THE LATE JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY(Hersch Lauterpacht & C. H. M.Waldock eds., 1958). On U.S. compliance in the
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan case illustrating how the foregoing
arguments with regard to the bindingness of norms of international law in the
U.S. have been deployed over the last several years in the context of the foreign
trade power, see infra Section 4.2.
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aggressively requiring the U.S. to eliminate barriers erected by its
anti-dumping laws to other countries. In that sense, international
anti-dumping rules do not play a role independent of other
elements, such as the relative bargaining power and ability of the
U.S. to exploit spaces within international anti-dumping rules of
the WTO's dispute settlement system. Although the U.S.'s ability
to mobilize or exploit these spaces within international anti-
dumping rules camouflages the subtle ways in which the U.S.
selectively or minimally exercises its foreign trade power, it does
not independently account for the continued tension of U.S. anti-
dumping rules with international anti-dumping rules. As such,
rather than constraining U.S. sovereignty, international anti-
dumping rules seem to promote U.S. power and influence.
In addition, this extensive study of the U.S.'s history of
engagement with international anti-dumping rules reveals that
international adjudication of anti-dumping disputes manages the
tensions within the U.S. foreign trade agenda while simultaneously
foreclosing other analogous interpretations of international trading
rules especially to reign in the extensive and often questionable use
of anti-dumping remedies by the United States. This tilts
international trade favorably towards the U.S. and unfavorably
against U.S. trading partners. In addition, anti-dumping law as
applied by the relevant U.S. agencies and interpreted by U.S.
courts has provided a way through which domestic labor (and the
environment as well since the Trade Act of 2002) can be protected
from international competition. Yet, labor and the environment in
countries other than the U.S. have not, and perhaps cannot, be
protected from the effect of international trading rules in the same
way.19 This foreclosure reveals the contested ideological terrain
19 Section 2102 of the Trade Act of 2002 provides as a negotiating objective a
"no greater rights" objective that requires new trade agreements not to accord
foreign investors in the U.S. greater substantive rights (e.g., expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment, and full protection and security) with respect to
investment protections than U.S. investors in the U.S. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-210, § 2102(a), 116 Stat. 933, 994 (2002). This in effect protects
challenges to U.S. environmental protection from foreign businesses in the U.S.
unlike under the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") Investment
provisions (Chapter 11). Under the "no greater rights" negotiating objective,
foreign investors in the U.S. will not be entitled to compensation for government
actions where a similarly situated U.S. investor would be entitled to a high level of
protection "consistent with or greater than the level required by international
law." See id. § 2102(b). Section 2102(c)(5) provides that the President report to
Congress the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment, including
labor markets and to make the report public. See id § 2102(c)(5). The Trade Act of
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over the stakes of free trade on questions of distributive justice
especially with reference to labor and the environment within the
GATT/WTO framework. This foreclosure in turn raises the
question on the place of human rights and other issues thought of
as non-trade issues in the context of the free trade GATT/WTO
regime. 20 For if the U.S.'s contested regime of anti-dumping law
has survived international legal scrutiny over eight decades,
notwithstanding some of its latent inconsistencies with these rules,
why have labor and analogous issues such as environmentalism
and human rights not found similar accommodation within the
international trading regime? 21
2002 also establishes Trade Adjustment Assistance which authorizes the President
to provide relief to workers adversely affected by the reduction in production or
sales which results from international competition arising from a free trade
agreement. See id. § 113 (noting Group Eligibility Requirements of the Trade Act
of 2002). Another factor that might reign in the asymmetry of rights U.S. and
foreign investors, labor and the environment under the Trade Act of 2002 is a
recent ruling by the WTO Appellate Body ("AB") authorizing unilateral
environmental measures undertaken by the U.S. as a condition for access to its
shrimp market thereby legitimizing extraterritorial effect of U.S. environmental
legislation. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia, WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, WT/DS58/AB/RW,
para. 97 (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-status-e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); see also B.S. Chimni, WATO and
Environment: Legitimisation of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Jan.
12-18, 2002, at 133 (criticizing the WTO AB report as trampling upon sovereign
rights of states to have their own environmental protection regimes and
legitimizing green protectionism).
20 Joel P. Trachtman argues that less detailed legislative acts accord greater
discretion to tribunals to determine institutional linkages between trade and other
so-called non-trade issues and, by contrast, that specific legal rules may entail
greater political determination of the international linkage between trade and
other areas. However, the dispute settlement system in the WTO has not taken
advantage of such discretion to undertake such a balancing. See Joel P.
Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999).
For a good take on this lack of balancing, see Robert Howse & Makau Mutua,
Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade
Organization, Rights & Democracy (2000), at http://serveur.ichrdd.ca/english/
commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2004) (stating that the WTO agreement does not make free trade an end in itself,
but establishes WTO's objective as related to the fulfillment of basic human values
and that this and the GATF text have often been construed very restrictively). See
also Symposium, The Boundaries of the WVTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
21 It is noteworthy that one of the negotiating objectives under the 2002 Trade
Act includes establishing consultative mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of
U.S. trading partners to promote and respect core labor rights and to deal with
"the worst forms of child labor." See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §
2102(b)(11), (17), 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
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This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 analytically examines
treaties, Executive Agreements and Congressional Executive
Agreements with a particular focus on the exceptionalism of the
foreign affairs power in the context of establishing the status of
GATT/WTO law within the constitutional order and the federal
legal system. This Section also updates the literature in this area
by locating the foreign affairs trade doctrine in the context of the
important amendments to the 1974 Trade Act enacted by the 2002
Trade Act. Section 3 traces the strategic importance of the U.S.
steel industry and its influence on U.S. negotiations of international
anti-dumping rules as well as in shaping an emerging foreign
affairs trade doctrine in terms of the balance between congressional
and executive power over foreign commerce. Here, I argue that it
becomes apparent that U.S. anti-dumping law and policy shifted
from competition goals towards broader goals of balancing
between domestic policy goals and international competition very
early in the twentieth century when paying attention to this history
and context. Section 4 is a detailed analysis of the WTO's
Appellate Body decision in the Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan
case decided in late 2001 between the U.S. and Japan. Section 4
develops in great detail how the foreign affairs doctrine, developed
in the crucible of congressional and executive negotiation over the
direction of foreign commerce under pressure from domestic
interest groups (such as the steel industry) and trading partners
(such as Japan), has led to the emergence of the doctrine of
international legal minimalism. The issue by issue analysis of this
case, which like many anti-dumping cases flows from the history
and nature of the GATT/WTO anti-dumping rules, demonstrates
the U.S.'s ability to exploit the ambiguity of the WTO's anti-
dumping rules. The complexity of the dispute settlement system,
as well as the availability of treaty interpretation principles flexible
to accommodate challenged interpretations of U.S. implementing
legislation or the application of the legislation as being inconsistent
with the WTO's anti-dumping rules, contributes to the
phenomenon of international legal minimalism. Section 4
therefore ties together Sections 2 and 3 by showing how
domestically oriented metrics of legal and constitutional discourse
serve to reign in the effect of international anti-dumping rules
consistently with U.S. interests and policy preferences. Ultimately,
this study demonstrates that neither the sovereignty critics nor the
supporters of U.S. participation in the WTO are entirely correct.
Rather, the WTO's anti-dumping rules, treaty interpretation
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 13 2004
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
principles, as well as domestic constitutional and legal constraints
impose requirements that almost invariably ensure that decisions
adverse to the U.S. are not automatically implemented or rejected.
While this is a delicate balance, it is my contention that should the
U.S. consistently tilt the balance too much in the direction of
maximizing its interests22 without counterbalancing them with
maintaining integrity in the effectiveness of the WTO's dispute
settlement process in reigning in divergences from its anti-
dumping rules, the utility and credibility of the WTO as a
framework built on the rule of law will erode substantially. Hence,
while the uncertainty in the international anti-dumping legal
regime has played a role in enhancing the U.S.'s incentives to
bargain particularly with Japan in the context of steel, this has
involved high transaction costs for Japan in a manner that
questions the efficacy of the WTO as a true watchdog that reigns-in
departures from treaty commitments among all its members.
The approach pursued throughout this paper is a richly
contextual one that is particularly attentive to legal doctrine,
historical background, and policy considerations both within the
domestic foreign affairs trade doctrine, as well as within the
GATT/WTO treaty framework. The analytical style borrows from
various approaches including legal realism, post-realism, and
critical analysis. This is also an interdisciplinary study that
combines legal, as well as economic analysis, and countervailing
public policy considerations in the domestic and international
domains of international trading relations. It is in this rich crucible
that international legal minimalism has been forged and will
continue to thrive.
22 For example, section 2102(c)(6) of the 2002 Trade Act requires that the
President, in negotiating trade agreements, "take into account . . . legitimate
Unites States domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of
legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer interests and the law
and regulations related thereto ...... Id. Section 2102(c)(6). Also, Section
2102(b)(14)(A) provides that:
[The President is required] to preserve the ability of the United States to
enforce rigorously its trade laws, including anti-dumping, countervailing
duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements . . . that lessen the
effectiveness of domestic and international safeguard provisions, in
order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and
firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal
trade concessions ....
Id. Section 2102(b)(14)(A).
[Vol. 25:1
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2. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRADE DOCTRINE
2.1. Treaties, Executive Agreements and Congressional-Executive
Agreements
There are at least four ways through which the U.S. can commit
itself to international legal obligations: a treaty, as provided under
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (the
"Constitution"); a solo Executive Agreement; an Executive
Agreement pursuant to treaty; and a U.S. Congressional-Executive
Agreement.2 3 Each of these forms goes through a different process
to become legally effective both within the U.S. and the
international legal system. However, once the commitment is
made, there is "no significant difference" in the legal effect of the
23 See Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 479, 482-83 (1990). Article I,
Section 10, Clauses 1 and 3 of the U.S. Constitution recognize different forms of
international agreements: treaties, alliances, confederations, agreements, and
compacts. However, Article I creates an unencumbered power to the extent that it
does not provide how the U.S. may enter into international agreements that do
not require Senate ratification as under Article II. As the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., "[tihe broad statement that the federal
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into
effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our own
internal affairs powers." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
315-16. But see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 212-13 (3d
ed. 2000) (refuting this position). John H. Jackson proposes five forms through
which international agreements become part of U.S. law: treaties, Congressional
previously authorized Executive Agreements, Congressional subsequently
approved Executive Agreement, Presidential Executive Agreement, and Treaty-
authorized Executive Agreement. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT
AND THE WTO 297-301 (2000). The State Department, however, uses a four-part
classification: treaties, agreements pursuant to a treaty, agreements pursuant to
legislation, and agreements pursuant to the constitutional authority of the
President. See Circular 175, Foreign Affairs Manual, Vol. XI, Ch. 700, U.S. Dept. of
State, Digest of the United States Practice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (1974).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW provides four categories of
international agreements and the mode through which they become part of U.S.
law. Where the Agreement: (1) is accompanied by the advice and consent of the
Senate (a treaty), (2) is authorized or approved by Congress and the matter falls
within the constitutional authority of Congress (a Congressional-Executive
Agreement), (3) is authorized by a prior treaty which received the advice and
consent of the Senate (an executive agreement pursuant to treaty), or (4) is based
on the President's own constitutional authority (a solo executive agreement). See 1
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 (1987) (providing
authority to make international agreements subject to U.S. laws).
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 15 2004
16 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
form that the commitment to the international obligation takes
under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution.24 In
other words, the ratified treaties/agreements will supersede any
conflicting state laws to the extent of their inconsistency.
The first of these routes of domesticating international legal
commitments is embodied in Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides that the President "shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the [U.S.] Senate
["Senate"], to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur."25 To the Supreme Court, a treaty is the legal
equivalent of a federal statute.26 Therefore, where there is a conflict
between a valid treaty and a valid statute handed down by
Congress, the one enacted later supercedes the former because "the
last expression of the sovereign will must control." 27 However,
there is authority for the proposition that where there is a conflict
between a U.S. law and a GATT provision, the U.S. law must
prevail.28
24 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (stating that a treaty is a
"Law of the Land" under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 284 (1997);
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
801, 805 (1995) ("[T]here is no significant difference between the legal effect of a
Congressional-executive agreement and the classical treaty approved by two-
thirds of the Senate.").
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
26 In Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888), the Supreme Court
explained:
If the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing... they have
the force and effect of a legislative enactment .... By the Constitution, a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an
act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme
law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.
See also TRIBE, supra note 23, at 643-45.
27 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). But see Whitney, 124 U.S. at
194 ("[I]f there be any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the
requirements of the law, the latter must control.").
28 See Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (1989) (citing 19
U.S.C. § 2504(a)); In Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that a statutory provision should be read consistently with
the obligations of the United States as a signatory of GATT and reasoned that:
[E]ven if... [the] Commerce [Department's] interpretation conflicts with
the GAT1 . . . the GATT is not controlling. While we acknowledge
Congress's interest in complying with U.S. responsibilities under the
GATT, we are bound not by what we think Congress should or perhaps
wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did. The GATT does not
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The second method of incorporating international legal
commitments onto domestic law is through a solo executive
agreement. A solo executive agreement, unlike an Article II treaty,
"is an agreement between the U.S. and a foreign country that is
effective when signed by the President and the head of the other
government." 29 In other words, the President does not need a
super-majority Senate ratification to make a solo executive
agreement as he is required to do in order to conclude a treaty
under Article II, Section 2.30 Moreover, although the constitution
expressly mentions an Article II treaty in its text, it does not refer to
solo executive agreements.31 Rather, the President's authority to
make a solo executive agreement comes from his "inherent foreign
affairs power" in Article II, as for example embodied in his power
as the Commander-in-Chief. 32 Therefore, the Supreme Court has
in the past regarded solo executive agreements as constitutionally
valid. In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to declare a solo
executive agreement as unconstitutional on the basis that it
trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue here are
inconsistent with GATT, it is a matter for Congress and not this court to
decide and remedy.
966 F.2d 660, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
29 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 271.
30 Id.
31 Id. However, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution makes a
distinction between "treaties" which states cannot enter into, and other types of
foreign "agreements," which states may enter with congressional approval. See
Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean By
"Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1936) (giving a historical analysis
of treaties).
32 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 648-51. Tribe argues that the "President is
empowered to employ executive agreements within the penumbras of
enumerated presidential power .... Id. at 648. Philip B. Kurland argues against
two extra-constitutional bases of the President's foreign affairs powers: that the
President alone is the sole spokesperson for all American people which he finds
hard to justify, and that the President alone has all the information necessary to
make an appropriate foreign policy decision which reflects a decline in the
authority Congress has to keep itself informed and involved in foreign policy
matters. See Philip B. Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 622-
23 (1968). Kurland summarizes the extent to which Congress has lost much of its
legislative authority to the Executive in the following terms: "Congressional
oversight is more a myth than a reality .... This is the sorry state to which
Congress has been reduced. Its legislative power has been all but restricted to a
veto function. Its duty of oversight has been mostly ignored." Id. at 632-33
(noting that the Supreme Court has granted the President the power to negotiate
executive agreements that include major foreign policy commitments).
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constitutes a usurpation of the senate's treaty-approving function.33
The third manner in which the U.S. could become bound by
rules of international law is through an executive agreement
pursuant to treaty. This type of an executive agreement is made
where an agreement is necessary to implement the terms of a
treaty that the U.S. is already party to and the terms of the treaty
contemplate such an agreement. 34 Such an agreement may be
necessary to clarify certain "lacunae" or to "develop specific
applications" of the treaty.35 A solo executive agreement and an
executive agreement pursuant to treaty are subject to some
restrictions, and therefore they are not equivalent in their legal
effect as treaties entered into under Article II of the Constitution.
Hence, although in United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court held
that executive agreements have the same legal validity as if they
proceeded from the legislature under the supremacy clause 36 and
that they supercede any conflicting state laws, 37 unlike Article II
33 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 273. Tribe argues that the Presidency is
the most representative office in the United States. See Phillip R. Trimble, Foreign
Affairs Law and Democracy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (1991).
34 See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. f (1986)
("An executive agreement may be made by the President pursuant to a treaty...
when the executive agreement can fairly be seen as implementing the treaty,
especially if the treaty contemplated implementation by international
agreement.").
35 JACKSON, supra note 23, at 300.
36 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 64).
37 In Unites States. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937), the Court held that "in
case of all international compacts and agreements .. .complete power over
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject
to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). Quincy Wright suggests that executive
agreements stand on the same footing as treaties. See Quincy Wright, The U.S. and
International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348 (1948). But Laurence Tribe is
doubtful of Wright's reading of Belmont. See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 649.
It is unclear if there is any difference between a solo executive agreement
and an executive agreement pursuant to treaty regarding its superiority
over conflicting state law. John H. Jackson seems to deal with this issue
by collapsing the distinction between a solo executive agreement and an
executive agreement pursuant to a treaty by treating both as executive
agreements in his discussion of the superiority of executive agreements
over state laws.
See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 320. The only source that refers to particular
characteristics of an executive agreement pursuant to treaty is the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) which provides that an executive agreement pursuant
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treaties they "cannot override a prior act of Congress." 38
Finally, the U.S. makes international legal commitments part of
domestic law through Congressional-Executive Agreements.
Congressional-Executive Agreements become effective after being
"negotiated by the President and submitted to both houses of
Congress for simple-majority approval, rather than to the Senate
for two-thirds approval." 39  Although they are called
Congressional-Executive "Agreements," they are treated "as the
equivalent of the treaty form with respect to supremacy over state
or prior federal law." 40  Since 1934, the U.S. has favored
Congressional-Executive Agreements over Article II treaties as a
way of making trade agreements, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the WTO.41  In fact,
Congressional-Executive Agreements, as opposed to ratification as
required by Article II, Section 2, have been the preferred form of
entering into international trade commitments.42  The
constitutional propriety of Congressional-Executive Agreements
relies on Article I, Section 8, "the broad reach of Congress' power
to a treaty "has the same effect and validity as the treaty itself."
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 303 cmt. (f) (1986). In Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, a case that did not involve executive agreements, the
Supreme Court, under the Supremacy Clause, preempted the Massachusetts
Burma Law, which contradicted the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
38 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 648 (citing United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,
204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)). In Guy W.
Capps, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals invalidated an Executive Agreement with
Canada that restricted the importation of potatoes because the agreement
conflicted with a prior congressional enactment that fell under its authority to
regulate foreign commerce. Id. at 658-59. It is noteworthy that while Laurence
Tribe argues that Guy W Capps, Inc. supports the proposition that an executive
agreement cannot override a prior congressional enactment, John H. Jackson
seems to take a different view. According to Jackson, while holding that the
agreement could not override a prior congressional enactment, the court "refused
to consider the question of hierarchy, thus weakening the Guy W Capps, Inc.
precedential effect." JACKSON, supra note 23, at 320.
39 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 652.
40 Id. See also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 805 ("[T]here is no
significant difference between the legal effect of a congressional-executive
agreement and the classic treaty .... ").
41 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 652.
42 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 146 n.7 (1992) (explaining the use of executive agreements).
For a fuller discussion, see infra Section 3.3.3.
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over foreign commerce, combined with its authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause."43  An alternative viewpoint
questions the constitutional propriety of Congressional-Executive
Agreements and argues that "structural considerations outside of
Article I, § 8 limit congressional authority." 44 For example, while
the constitution does not expressly mention any role for the House
of Representatives in approving international agreements to which
the U.S. is a party, Professor Tribe argues:
the Constitution's enumeration of other instances in which
Congress may give bicameral consent to conduct
implicating the nation's foreign relations-is powerful
evidence that the Treaty Clause is not simply an optional
alternative to treaty approval by Legislation. Indeed, even
where § 10 of Article I grants Congress the power to
approve a specifically identified category of agreements
and compacts -between or among the different states, or
between states and foreign governments -Congress'
approval power extends only to state agreements that do not
qualify as "treaties. "45
43 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 653 (footnotes omitted); ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra
note 24, at 908-09, 913-14. For a contrary opinion, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); David Golove, Against Free-Form
Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998). Section 303 cmt. (e) of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW of the U.S. notes that:
[S]ince any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive
Agreement could also be concluded by treaty... either method may be
used in many cases. The prevailing view is that the Congressional-
Executive Agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method
in every instance. Which procedure should be used is a political
judgment, made in the first instance by the President, subject to the
possibility that the Senate might refuse to consider a joint resolution of
Congress to approve an agreement, insisting that the President submit
the agreement as a treaty.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 303 cmt. (e) (1986).
44 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 653-54 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
45 Id. at 655 (footnotes omitted). Tribe further challenges Ackerman and
Golove's contention that congressional executive agreements legitimately arose in
the 1940s as an international agreement was shifted by involving both Houses
rather than following the requirements of Article II of the Constitution. This shift,
in Ackerman and Golove's view, represented an extraordinary moment of
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By contrast, Ackerman and Golove trace the appropriateness of
the role of the House of Representatives to a self-conscious
moment of constitutional transformation of Article II of the
Constitution in international agreement-making in the 1940s from
requiring supermajority support in the senate to requiring
approval of both houses of Congress. This post- World War II
transformation occurred through a strong national consensus in
favoring innovations in the structure of the federal government
particularly in light of American support for internationalism. This
support is reflected in the U.S. signing of the Charter of the United
Nations and its participation in the Bretton Woods institutions and
GATT.46  Ackerman and Golove further justified this
transformation in view of the House's power over appropriations
under Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 and its taxing power under the
origination clause, Article I, Section 7, Clause 1 of the
Constitution.47 Another commentator on executive agreements
traces the expanded role of the Executive in the realm of foreign
relations at the expense of the Congress and the judiciary to a new
method of interpreting the President's powers broadly in
responding to geopolitical circumstances. 48 In an earlier exposition
constitutional change such as that associated with the New Deal that justified
changing the Constitutional requirement of Article II without a formal
Constitutional amendment as required by Article V. See id. at 653 (describing
Ackerman's and Golov's thesis). In a later article, David Golove argues that his
original article with Ackerman (Ackerman & Golove, supra note 23, at 24) argues
that there was a much narrower basis for the transformed meaning of Article II
than the theory of higher law-making associated with extraordinary moments of
constitutional change. See Golove, supra note 43. This narrower justification is
that the constitutional text is indeterminate to the extent that it can plausibly be
construed to support the constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements. See also Jack S. Weiss, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as
Congressional Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1533, 1538-57 (arguing that
the following reasons make the constitutional text indeterminate: history and
original meaning of Article II, Section 2; the framers' vision; judicial precedent;
and practice).
46 ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 24, at 873-75 (noting that the
Constitutional question dropped off Senate Committee reports as the Senate
joined the House and the President in approving money agreements).
47 Id. at 923. Tribe is uncertain of this conclusion and asserts that the
"necessary involvement of the House of Representatives or Congress as a whole
in implementing some treaties cannot support the conclusion that one might as
well replace the Senate's supermajority with a bicameral majority in the process of
approving those treaties-or others." TRIBE, supra note 23, at 654 n.55.
48 See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998). Paul's argument is not confined
to examining the Constitutional authority for the foreign relations power and as
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of the constitutionality of congressional executive agreements,
Myers McDougal and Asher Lans argued that 150 years of
constitutional history, practice, and interpretation provided an
adequate basis for Congressional-Executive Agreements as a
distinct treaty-making procedure. 49  Notwithstanding their
reservations of the consistency of the argument with the intention
of the framers5 0, McDougal and Lans further fortified their case by
arguing that treaties entered into under Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution were undemocratic. 51 They based this objection on
the fact that this procedure exclusively involved the Senate and
because of the difficulty in obtaining a super-majority vote of
approval in the Senate. 52 The expansive powers created by
Executive Agreements and Congressional-Executive Agreements
for the Executive have certainly created space for novel ways to
embrace internationalism 53 that are sensitive to domestic strategic
such, it is a much broader analysis of the U.S.'s foreign policy goals, which have
necessitated those powers in the first place.
49 Compare discussion in Myers McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of
National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 237 (1945); Edwin Borchand, Treaties and
Executive Agreements -A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 627- 64 (1945); Edwin Borchand,
Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty? 53 YALE L.J. 664, 677-80 (1944).
50 See McDougal & Lans, supra note 49, at 212-15, 290-91.
51 Louis Henkin similarly argues that to the extent the present U.S. system of
government reflects an outcome not intended by the framers (that being the fear
of direct popular government, which Henkin proposes is now largely embraced
by virtue of universal suffrage and direct elections because popular sovereignty
and representative government are the foundations of the government), this
supports the non-exclusivity of Article II, Section 2 as the only basis of treaty-
making. See Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1990). Henkin agrees with McDougal and Lans that the Senate's role in treaty-
making under Article II is undemocratic and is contrary to basic notions of
democracy and as such that congressional executive agreements "could serve...
the cause of greater democracy." Id. at 60.
52 McDougal & Lans, supra note 49, at 186-89 (discussing objections to themes
in arguments resisting the non-exclusivity of treaties).
53 Chantal Thomas argues that with the inauguration of the WTO in 1994, an
international branch of government has emerged as "a solution to a dilemma
arising from a deeply challenging economic phenomenon . . . economic
globalization." Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International
Government, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 4 (2000). However, one of Thomas's central theses
is that a branch of international governance has emerged by virtue of the fact that
Congress' delegation of power to enter into trade agreements has in turn been
delegated to international organizations like the WTO by the President. While
Thomas is agnostic that there is consensus for such a development, she argues
that the Constitution is indeterminate on whether such an outcome is
constitutionally valid. See id. at 26-32.
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and policy commitments.5 4
Therefore, Article II treaties, executive agreements, and
Congressional-Executive Agreements have different processes for
their ratification before they can become the supreme law of the
land under the supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution.
The primary difference is that while Article II treaties and
Congressional-Executive Agreements supersede prior federal
law,55 executive agreements do not.56 Substantively, these forms of
engaging in international relations have designated the foreign
affairs powers of the Executive branch of the government as
exceptional especially in relation to its domestic affairs power.57 It
is this exceptionalism in the context of international trade
agreements that I now turn to.
54 Indeed as has been noted, "the distinction between so-called 'executive
agreements' and 'treaties' is purely a constitutional one and has no international
significance." HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 667 (Supp.) (1935).
55 The similarity between Article II treaties and Congressional-Executive
agreements is emphasized by the fact that there is no pattern in practice of
distinguishing between the two. See Weiss, supra note 45, at 1548-50 (interpreting
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) to hold that the manner of agreement used
should be left to the political process).
56 See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 320-21. John Jackson argues that in view of
the Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore, the "Executive branch itself has
apparently accepted that Presidential Executive Agreements do not always
prevail over prior Congressional acts." Id. at 321. The Third Restatement of the
Law of Foreign Relations of the U.S., however, uses the authority of Dames &
Moore to the effect that the Supreme Court upheld the President's action pursuant
to a solo executive agreement that was claimed to be inconsistent with an earlier
act of Congress, the Sovereign Immunity Act. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' note 7 (1986). See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTrTUTrON 228 (1996). On a related matter, and on the
authority of Zschernig v. Miller, the President's authority in the realm of foreign
affairs, which is shared with the Senate under Article II of the Constitution, limits
the power of states to legislate in matters affecting foreign relations. Cf Zschemig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (asserting that the President's authority shared
with the Senate under Article II limits the power of states to legislate if their
legislation impairs the effective exercise of U.S. foreign policy). See also supra
notes 36-38 (discussing the effect of executive agreements and congressional
executive agreements on state law).
57 Laurence H. Tribe notes that "[djoctrines recognizing greater presidential
power in the foreign sphere rest on an increasingly dubious separation between
foreign and domestic policy and an increasingly false premise that steps taken
abroad have little impact at home and vice versa." TRIBE, supra note 23, at 637 n.2.
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2.2. The Exceptionalism of the Foreign Affairs Power: Curtiss-Wright
and Youngstown
Unlike the exercise of domestic powers, the exercise of the
foreign affairs powers is largely unconstrained by the ordinary
constitutional restraints of balance of power between the three
branches of government or even judicial review. 58 The distinction
between the foreign affairs and domestic realms is often justified
by the functional needs of the President to act decisively in dealing
with foreign leaders. 59 For example in Curtiss-Wright, Justice
58 Laurence H. Tribe, however, suggests that distinction may have once been
true in "an era gone by," suggesting that the exercise of domestic executive power
is as unbridled as in the foreign affairs realm. See id. at 637. Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. noted in relation to the distinction
between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external
affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs, "[tihat there are
differences between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may not be
doubted." U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). Justice
Sutherland continued,
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin
and their nature. The broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the
Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers
then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to
vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in the
enumeration still in the states.
Id. at 315-16.
59 The Executive Branch recently won congressional approval of the Trade
Promotion Authority, which lapsed and was not renewed for most of President
Clinton's tenure. This was accomplished partly by arguing it was important for
the President to have this power in order to give confidence to the U.S. trading
partners that the President was credibly making commitments that the United
States could keep. According to the White House, the Trade Promotion Authority
("TPA") is simply "about asserting American leadership, strengthening the
American economy, and creating American jobs." See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, Statements of Administration Policy, H.R. 3005-BIPARTISAN TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2001 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/107-1/HR3005-r.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004). Further, the White House argued that the TPA "is [g]ood
for American global leadership." See THE WHITE HOUSE, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY:
WHAT IS TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
internationaltrade/talkers.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). In Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, the Supreme Court, under the Supremacy Clause,
preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law. This law conflicted with the federal
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.
See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). In holding that the
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Sutherland noted: "[I1n this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation."60 By contrast, the "federal regulation of domestic
affairs has its constitutional origins in the people and the states,
and its initiation is allocated primarily to Congress." 61
While some scholars have noted that the role of the President in
the foreign affairs realm is merely functional,62 it is certainly clear
that there is a wide consensus favoring wide latitude of executive
action among those that favor an unconstrained Executive role in
the realm of foreign affairs. However, there are those that suggest
that there may be, or that there are, some definite constitutional
limits to this power. 63 Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown illustrate
these two different approaches of foreign affairs
Massachusetts law was unconstitutional, the Court opined that it inhibited the
"President's authority to speak for the U.S. among the world's nation to develop a
multilateral Burma Strategy," as intended by Congress. Id. at 380.
60 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (1936). Similarly, John Marshall
defended President John Adams before the House of Representatives for having
surrendered an alleged murderer to the British authorities without any judicial
process, the "President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and
its sole representative with foreign affairs." Id. (citing 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613
(1800)).
61 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 636. Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution,
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual Services
of the United States ...." U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The President may act as
Commander in Chief under two situations: in war with a congressional
declaration under Article I, Section 8 and in war without a congressional
declaration. See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 46-50. With a congressional declaration
of war, "the President has exercised full and exclusive control of the conduct of
war." Id. at 46. In the circumstance without a Congressional declaration of war,
"the President has power not merely to take measures to meet the invasion, but to
wage in full the war imposed upon the United States" such as retaliation against a
nuclear attack. Id. at 48 (asserting that most individuals assume that the President
would have the power to retaliate against a nuclear attack).
62 HENKIN, supra note 56, at 42-43.
63 Indeed, in Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court noted: "[tihe executive
power [under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution] was given in general terms,
strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and
was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed .... Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926). This contrasts with the power of Congress
which is restricted to enumerated powers. See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 39-41;
Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM.
L. REV., 53, 54 (1953) (arguing that "[tihe chief constitutional value which
overextension of presidential power threatens is, of course, the concept of a
'government of laws and not of men' - the 'Rule of Law' principle).
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constitutionalism.64  While Curtiss-Wright suggests very wide
latitude of executive action in the foreign affairs realm, Youngstown
embraces some suggestion of executive limits in some instances. 65
However, as applied by the Supreme Court in Dames Moore,
Youngstown has come to look very much like Curtiss-Wright. 66
2.2.1. Curtiss-Wright: The Foreign Affairs Power As A Plenary
and Exclusive Presidential Power Deriving From National
Sovereignty
Curtiss-Wright involved the Joint Resolution of Congress that
authorized the President to ban the sales of arms to countries
engaged in the Chaco border dispute67 after being charged for a
violation of the offences enacted under the Joint Resolution for
selling arms to Bolivia. Curtiss-Wright challenged the
constitutionality of the congressional delegation of authority to the
President under the Joint Resolution.68 A central legal issue in this
case was therefore whether the joint resolution unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power to the Executive. This issue is best
64 Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American Internment as Foreign
Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 194 (1998).
65 In Yoshida Int'l, Inc. v. United States, the Customs Court held that "neither
need nor national emergency will justify the exercise of a power by the Executive
not inherent in his office not delegated by congress." Yoshida Int'l, Inc. v. United
States, 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1175 (Cus. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
(concerning a case where President Nixon's imposition of a ten percent surcharge
on most articles imported into the U.S. was challenged). In addition, Louis
Henkin has argued that implicit in Article II, Section 2's requirement of the
Senate's advice and consent in the treaty-making power is a foreclosure to
unilateral Presidential action and as such that Congress shares in this
"unenumerated foreign affairs power." See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 64. The
appropriations power is yet another of the devices which Congress can use to
limit Presidential exercise of the foreign affairs power such as the second
Hickenlooper to the Foreign Assistance Act which required the President to
terminate foreign aid if "the government of any country has nationalized or
expropriated or seized ownership or control of property owned by any U.S.
citizen," without providing the "speedy compensation" required by international
law, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). Congress has also used its powers under Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to regulate foreign commerce by prohibiting the
President from making arms sales to countries involved international terrorism.
TRIBE, supra note 23, at 642.
66 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981).
67 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311-12, 320
(1936).
68 Sale of arms to countries involved in the Chaco Dispute was criminalized
by the President under the authority of the Joint Resolution.
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understood against the backdrop of the doctrinal climate of the
1930s, particularly given the Supreme Court's disapproval of too
much delegation of power to the Executive.69 The Supreme Court
held that this congressional delegation was proper. This in turn
made the Joint Resolution constitutional.
Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright favored the
President as the "sole organ of foreign affairs" and explained that
the President's authority for conducting foreign affairs is derived
from the national sovereignty coming from "literally and legally
outside of the Constitution." 70  This contrasts with accepted
constitutional doctrine in the context of domestic affairs where
Congress' authority is regarded to derive from the people and the
states under the Constitution.71 Justice Sutherland's views in
Curtiss-Wright reflected views he had expressed much earlier
regarding the Presidency as the ideal loci to express American
sovereignty and of the acquisition of U.S. sovereignty not from the
people and the states, but from Great Britain.72 Thus in his view,
the President's power in the realm of foreign affairs did not
necessarily emanate from the constitution, but rather from "the
inevitable incidents of a claim of sovereignty:" 73
[S]ince the states severally never possessed international
powers, such powers could not have been carved from the
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
U.S. from some other source. During the Colonial period,
those powers were possessed exclusively by and were
entirely under the control of the Crown. By the Declaration
of Independence, "the Representatives of the U.S. of
America" declared the United [not the several] Colonies to
69 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(invalidating a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934) (limiting delegation to the executive branch);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (enjoining enforcement of a federal
statute).
70 Gott, supra note 64, at 194-95 (citing Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318-19).
71 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 636.
72 See id. at 634 n.7 (citing Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the
National Government, S. Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong. (1910) (providing a discussion
regarding national powers); see also GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919).
73 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 634.
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be free and independent states, and as such to have "full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do. As a result of
the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as
a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States
of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were
a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency-
namely, the Continental Congress, composed of delegates
from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the
powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy,
and finally adopted the Declaration of Independence.74
Rulers come and go, governments end and forms of
government change, but sovereignty survives. A political
society cannot endure without a supreme will. Sovereignty
is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external
sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies
ceased, it immediately passed to the Union. That fact was
given practical application almost at once. The treaty of
peace, made on September 3, 1783, was concluded between
his Brittanic Majesty and the United States of America.75
Justice Sutherland's opinion thus traces the source of the
President's powers not merely from within, but also from outside
the Constitution-in its sovereign competence as passed down
from the British Crown and not to the colonies severally, but to
them in their collective capacity as the United States of America.
Although tracing the powers of the Executive in the foreign affairs
realm from outside the Constitution has been regarded as
74 Laurence H. Tribe summarizes Justice Sutherland's position as follows:
[b]ecause the trappings of sovereignty passed from the British Crown to
the states in their collective, rather than individual capacity, the
Constitution which merely allocates between the federal government and
the states those powers previously lodged in the separate states, should not be
deemed an exhaustive catalogue of the federal government's powers in the
realm of foreign affairs.
Id. at 634-35.
75 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17.
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controversial 76 and even as inaccurate,77 a leading international law
jurist has argued that the doctrine of the case with regard to the
foreign affairs power is not challenged by Justice Sutherland's
arguably erroneous historical account.78
Rather, the novelty of Justice Sutherland's opinion lay in
distinguishing between legislation whose "whole aim ... is to
affect a situation entirely external to the United States, and falling
within the category of foreign affairs," 79 and domestic legislation
that was subject to the tests of permissibility of delegated
legislation developed by the Court in that period. Hence, rather
than finding that the congressional delegation was valid or that
either legislative or judicial precedent permitted it, Justice
Sutherland preferred to ground his decision in the early practice as
evidencing first principles. Thus, in deriving the President's power
over foreign affairs outside the Constitution, he was not endorsing
unconstitutional action.80 However, as Charles Lofgren's excellent
analysis of Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright shows,
the best basis for tracing the foreign relations power outside the
constitution that Sutherland gave included the U.S. attributes of
sovereignty as a nation, which he argued justified this power by
maintaining "an effective control of foreign relations." 81 Even then,
perhaps what the Curtiss-Wright decision could arguably be said to
represent is a need for the President to have independent authority
to make treaties rather than that there is an extra-constitutional or
inherent basis for that power.8 2
76 These extra-constitutional sources of Presidential authority have been
contested. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
77 For example, Charles A. Lofgren argues that there was an interim period
under the Articles of Confederation where states were recognized as having
certain external powers and actually exercised them in some circumstances such
as making treaties with Indian tribes. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1973).
Lofgren also argues that Sutherland's position was inconsistent (not only with the
state sovereignty arguments), but also with the popular sovereignty which the
Constitution is argued to be predicated upon. Id.
78 HENKIN, supra note 56, 19-22.
79 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 315.
80 SUTHERLAND, supra note 72, at 55.
81 Lofgren, supra note 77, at 23 (quoting Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396
(1933), quoted in Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 318).
82 David Levitan therefore notes:
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2.2.2. Youngstown: Balancing Presidential and Congressional
Power in the Foreign Affairs Realm or Presidential
Prerogative as Primus Inter Pares
In Youngstown, the President issued an Executive Order
directing the government to seize and operate the nation's steel
mills during the Korean War in an attempt to avert a nation-wide
strike that the President believed would have jeopardized the
national defense.8 3 The steel companies brought the suit against
the government on the ground that the seizure was neither
authorized by Congress 4 or by the Constitution. The steel
companies argued that Congress, having established procedures
for resolving labor disputes, did not authorize the seizure of
private property under the authority of a Presidential order as one
way of resolving labor disputes. The Supreme Court declared that
the executive order was unconstitutional because it infringed upon
congressional legislative or lawmaking authority, which was
expressly reserved to the Congress under the Constitution. As
Justice Black's opinion pointed out, there was no legislative
authority for a Presidential seizure of steel mills. 85
Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory of the nature of the foreign relations
power represents the most extreme interpretation of the powers of the
national government. It is the furthest departure from the theory that
United States is a constitutionally limited democracy. It introduces the
notion that national government possesses a secret reservoir of
unaccountable power. In terms of democratic theory this represents an
unfortunate departure from the long accepted and cherished notions as
to the nature of the American system. Through the doctrine that this is a
government of enumerated powers had already undergone much
interpretation and expansion so that the doctrine was in fact little more
than a fiction, the basic theory had remained generally undisturbed.
Levitan, supra note 76, at 493.
83 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
84 To no avail, Truman approached Congress to pass legislation to supercede
his order.
85 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. In particular, Justice Black noted that:
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to
recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom
that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our
holding that this seizure order cannot stand.
Id. at 589. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion outlined legislation that had
previously authorized seizure of private property. Id. at 593-620. (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Jackson's concurring opinion underscored that the
nature of the foreign affairs power was "relativized" and
"institutionally balanced" between the President and Congress.
86
This approach differs from Justice Sutherland's view of
Presidential authority in Curtiss-Wright. Proceeding from this view
of the President's power as being relativized and institutionally
balanced, Justice Jackson laid down a three-point sliding scale for
determining the constitutionality of presidential actions in the
foreign affairs realm. On this sliding scale, where the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum for it includes all that he possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. When by
contrast the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distributions are uncertain. Finally, when the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.
87
While Youngstown involved the issue of analyzing presidential
assertions of inherent authority where there was congressional
silence,88 it also raised the broader issue of the exercise of executive
power in the field of legislative power. Several of the Justices in
the majority in Youngstown considered congressional silence as
"tantamount to a legally binding expression of intent to forbid the
seizure"8 9 of the steel industry and it was only the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Vinson that explicitly argued that absence
86 In Justice Jackson's own words,
[Wihile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Gott, supra note 64, at 195-97 is the source of
the quoted words ("relativized" and "institutionally balanced") in the main text.
87 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
88 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 674.
89 Id. at 672. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602-03 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 635-
40 (Jackson, J., concurring), 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
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of specific congressional authority to seize the steel mills to defend
the U.S. did not preclude the President from seizing them under
other bases of authority such as the power of eminent domain. 90
2.2.3. Dames & Moore v. Regan: Acquiescing to Executive
Legislation in Foreign Affairs
It was, however, in Dames & Moore91 that the Supreme Court
eventually affirmatively endorsed presidential assertions of
inherent authority in the face of congressional silence. In issue in
this case was an Executive Agreement with Iran, which facilitated
the release of U.S. citizens held hostage in Iran, directing the
termination of all legal proceedings in the U.S. "involving claims of
U.S. persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises."
The agreement further provided for the nullification of all
attachments and judgments obtained in such proceedings and that
any further proceedings would be resolved through binding
arbitration.92 Under this agreement, all Iranian assets that the U.S.
government had blocked, even those subject to writs of attachment
and preliminary injunctions, were to be transferred in a security
account to satisfy awards rendered by arbitration of the Iran/U.S.
Claims Tribunal.93
Dames & Moore, an American corporation, obtained a $3.4
million judgment with interest for breach of contract against
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, among other Iranian
institutions. The judgment was stayed and all prejudgment and
90 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 680, 667-710 (Vinson, J., dissenting). Edward S.
Corwin argues that the Taft-Hartley Act made Youngstown less a case regarding
congressional silence on an issue as the majority of the justices concluded (with
the exception of Justice Clark), but rather that Congress "having entered the field,
its ascertainable intention supplied the law of the case." Corwin, supra note 63, at
65.
91 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981).
92 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 224, 226 (1981).
93 The Tribunal was established by an Executive Agreement with Iran, for the
purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and
claims of nationals of Iran against the United States." Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning theSettlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 11(1), Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 230,
230-31 (1981). President Reagan subsequently ratified this and other agreements
that President Carter had entered into and issued an executive order suspending
all claims in other forums that were eligible to be resolved by the claims tribunal.
Exec. Order No. 12, 294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14, 111 (Feb. 24, 1981).
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attachments against the Iranian defendants were vacated. Dames
& Moore brought suit against the U.S. Department of the Treasury
("Treasury") to enjoin the enforcement of the Executive Orders and
the Treasury regulations alleging that these laws were not
authorized by the Constitution and were therefore
unconstitutional. The issues in this case brought before the
Supreme Court involved the authority of the President to suspend
legal proceedings instituted by American plaintiffs in U.S. courts,
his nullification of attachments obtained in such cases, as well as
his authority to transfer assets subject to attachment back to Iran.
Justice Rehnquist who wrote the decision for a unanimous
court found debatable authority for granting the President
authority to nullify attachments in the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 94 With regard to the transfer of
foreign property in the U.S., the Court found that the President had
power to permanently transfer such assets back to foreign citizens
even when U.S. citizens had rights over them although a plain
reading and the legislative history of section 1702(a)(1)(B) of the
IEEPA, which only allows the President to temporarily freeze such
assets. 95 On the question of the President's authority to suspend
the claims of American citizens on the foreign assets, the Court
relied neither on the Constitution or a congressional delegation
under statute such as the IEEPA,96 the Hostage Act 97 or under a
plenary power98 which are acknowledged as providing legal
legitimacy for the exercise of Presidential power. Rather, the court
94 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669-74. For doubts on the tenability of this
position, see Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic
Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 68, 80-83, 76-94 (1982).
95 Id. at 78-80. In particular, they note that such a conclusion "leads to the
anomalous result that if the President 'vests' foreign property during wartime
under the Trading with the Enemy Act ["TWEA"] he must distribute to American
claimants pursuant to a statutory claims procedure. However, the President may
also freely transfer property back to the foreign debtor under his supposedly more
restrictive International Emergency Economic Powers Act ["IEEPA"] peacetime
powers." Id. at 80.
96 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675, 677.
97 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000).
98 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654, 688 (noting the Court's unwillingness to
decide whether the President has plenary power to settle claims even where
foreign governmental entities were involved). This holding differentiates the
decision in Dames & Moore from Justice Sutherland's decision in Curtiss-Wright,
which was based on principles of extra-constitutionality. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 654.
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based its decision on the acquiescence of Congress to the exercise
of such and similar powers. To justify its doctrine of legislative
acquiescence, the Court relied on Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Youngstown 99 where the Court found that the failure of Congress
to question a "systematic, unbroken executive practice" known to
it "may be treated as a gloss on the Executive power vested in the
President by Article II Section 1."100 Justice Rehnquist argued that
even though past practice does not suffice to create such
Presidential power, a presumption that Congress had consented to
a practice may be raised where the practice was known and
acquiesced to by Congress. 01 That acquiescence by itself can
constitute congressional delegation to the President is debatable
especially with regard the suspension of valid judicial claims made
by U.S. citizens. 102 In other words, the Court held that the
President, through an Executive Agreement, "can change the
substantive law governing litigation in the United States," 103 a
rather broad power which as we saw above is hard to sustain. 04
In Dames & Moore therefore, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that congressional silence in the use of executive agreements
"could be construed to create a rule of customary constitutional
law legitimizing unilateral presidential agreements.'1 05 As Gil Gott
observes, Justice Rehnquist substantially altered Justice Jackson's
formula in Youngstown "by shifting metaphors, from 'pigeonholes'
99 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
100 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661-62.
101 Id.
102 See Marks & Grabow, supra note 94 at 84-92, 103, (noting that "[a]fter
Dames & Moore, absent congressional action, a President may, by executive
agreement, suspend and effectively terminate the enforcement agreement,
suspend and effectively terminate the enforceable claims of American citizens in
United States courts"). They further noted "[aidherence to this rule effectively
obliterates the rights of American claimants against Iran and creates an unwieldy
standard of congressional delegation by acquiescence." Id.
103 Id. at 97.
104 Professor Redwood argues that because an executive agreement has the
same legal status as treaties, it is "in effect an act of legislation." James Redwood,
Note, Dames Moore v. Regan: Congressional Power over Foreign Affairs Held Hostage
by Executive Agreement with Iran, 15 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 280 (1982). Therefore,
"allowing the branch which is to execute the laws the power to conclude
international agreements, which are admittedly laws of the land, gives the
President a legislative function which is clearly unconstitutional." Id. at 282.
105 Id. at 254.
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to 'spectrum."' 10 6 Rehnquist, who clerked for Jackson in the same
term as the Youngstown decision was made, re-characterized
Jackson's three-tiered classification in Youngstown as follows:
Although we have in the past found and do today find
Justice Jackson's classification of executive actions into
three general categories analytically useful, we should be
mindful of Justice Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice
Frankfurter in Youngstown (concurring opinion), that "[t]he
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of "black and white." Justice Jackson himself
recognized that his three categories represented "a
somewhat over-simplified grouping," and it is doubtless
the case that executive action in any particular instance
falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes [referring to
Jackson's three-tiered formula], but rather along a spectrum
running from explicit congressional authorization to
explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true
as respects cases such as the one before us, involving
responses to international crises the nature of which
Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in
any detail. 107
In effect, Dames & Moore seems rather similar in outcome with
the Curtiss-Wright decision to the extent that both upheld
Presidential authority inconsistently with accepted constitutional
axioms of Presidential power and authority.108 Dames & Moore, in
essence, legitimizes a form of constitutionalism that strays "from
requiring the President to obtain fairly explicit legislative
authorization for action he seeks to take." 0 9
106 Gott, supra note 64, at 198.
107 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
108 See id. at 654; TRIBE, supra note 23, at 674; Gott, supra note 64, at 198.
109 TRIBE, supra note 23, at 675-76.
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2.3. The Legal Status of GATT/IWTO Law Within the Foreign Affairs
Trade Doctrine
2.3.1. GATT's Early Years
In 1947, GATT was established as a provisional document that
"would have created an International Trade Organization ["ITO"]
to administer the GATT."11 0 However, because of the opposition to
the ITO in the U.S. "where the Marshall Plan had commanded
most of the country's interest in international economics,"
President Truman decided not to pursue the Senate's consent to
the ITO Charter"'l in order to ward off a tussle with the Senate over
its adoption. GATT, unlike the ITO Charter, did not seek to
establish an institution sought to enact a set of rules to liberalize
trade.1 2 In other words, the U.S. entered into GATT not under a
"direct act of Congress," but rather under an "executive agreement
and a proclamation of its effectiveness."" 13
In this period, the status of the GATT under the Constitution
and the domestic U.S. legal order was in limbo.114 For example,
Congress did not express an opinion on the validity of GATT." 5 It
is therefore clear that the validity of the GATT at the time could not
be said to arise from a Congressional-Executive Agreement"16
110 PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW
AND POLICY 74 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter STEPHAN].
111 Id. See also Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 479, 482 (1990)
("However, plans for the ITO were confounded when the Truman administration,
faced with a populace whose post-war approval of international organizations
was giving way to distrust, was forced to withdraw its request for Senate consent
to the ITO Charter.").
112 See id. at 482 ("Originally, the GATT was intended to be only an interim
agreement, effective until the establishment of a mere comprehensive institutional
arrangement under the Charter of the... [ITO].").
113 Id.
114 Brand notes that "[slince U.S. agreement to the Protocol of Provisional
Application in 1947, Congress has been careful to avoid explicit approval or
rejection of the GATT." Id. at 485. Notwithstanding this congressional
ambivalence, courts continued to regard GATT as valid. Id. at 486.
115 STEPHAN, supra note 110, at 75. See also Brand, supra note 111, at 482-83
(describing how an international agreement can become the law of the United
States according to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)).
116 Brand, supra note 111, at 485. See also Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of
GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
GATT 187, 202 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) (" [T]he Congress passed no statute
implementing the GATI'-, not then, nor at any time since then."). But see John H.
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although it certainly could be argued that at a minimum Congress
acquiesced to the Executive branch's participation in the
formulation of GATT. 117 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934 and the amended Act of 1945 did not expressly authorize the
President to negotiate or enter into multilateral agreements like
GATT perhaps because Congress only contemplated bilateral
agreements. In fact, all prior accords negotiated under the Act had
been bilateral.118
However, scholars have challenged the absence of explicit
congressional opinion on the validity of multilateral treaties as
determinative of the status of GATT by advancing the view that a
shift towards internationalism away from isolationism in U.S.
foreign policy in the 1940s, as reflected in the signing of the Charter
of the United Nations'1 9 and support for the adoption of the
Bretton Woods institutions, constituted an extra-textual
constitutional change in favor of Congressional Executive
Agreements such as GATT.120 According to Ackerman and
Golove, the historical record supports the view that Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2 is not an exclusive treaty-making clause to the
extent that the 1940s shift towards internationalism heralded a
constitutionally valid practice of Congressional approval by
majority vote of any international agreement that the President
could submit for two-thirds approval by the Senate under Article II
Section 2 of the Constitution.' 21
2.3.2. The 1974 Trade Act: Formalizing Congressional
Participation in Trade Negotiation
Although the House of Representatives (the "House") in 1944
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66
MICH. L. REV. 250, 312 (1967) ("GATT is a valid executive agreement, entered into
by the United States pursuant to authority of congressional legislation.").
117 Brand, supra note 111, at 483.
118 Id. at 484.
119 Both the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 and the Bretton Woods
Agreement Act reflected the shift not only towards internationalism, but also
acknowledged the Executive's broad competence in this area. See United Nations
Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (2000) (enacting the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization); Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C. §
286 (2000) (creating the International Monetary Fund and Bank for Reconstruction
and Development).
120 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, 861-87, 889-96.
121 For a critique of this position, see Tribe, supra note 43, at 1284-85. For a
response, see Golove, supra note 43, at 1935-42.
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passed a proposal to amend Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 that
would have given the House a role in treaty-making through
Congressional Executive Agreements"22, it was during the Tokyo
Round of the GATT negotiations which started in 1973 that led to a
formal recognition of legislative participation in treaty-making in
the trade context. In the 1974 Trade Act, Congress formalized its
participation by requiring a joint resolution of Congress to
authorize all international commercial agreements. 123 The 1974
Trade Act also empowered Congress for the first time to authorize
payment of the U.S. share of GATT expenses. The Act also
directed the President both to conform with GATT balance-of-
payment restrictions and to consider in import relief actions "the
international obligations of the United States." 124 Since the 1974
Trade Act, Congress also began to implement legislation with
respect to agreements negotiated under the GATT auspices,
beginning with the results of the Tokyo Round in 1979.125 Like the
Trade Act of 1974, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 ("OCTA") further confirms that status of GATT as a
Congressional-Executive Agreement. 126
The explicit recognition of the agreements negotiated under the
GATT's auspices as Congressional Executive Agreements in effect
implies that such agreements are not self-executing to the extent
that implementing Congressional legislation was formally
122 Amendment to the Constitution Relative to the Making of Treaties,
Hearings Before Subcomm. No.3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Comm.
on the Judiciary House of Representatives 78th Congress, Sec. Sess. on H.J. Res. 6,
H.J. Res. 31, H.J. Res. 64, H.J. Res. 238, H.J. Res. 264, and H.J. Res. 320, Proposing
an Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. Relative to the Making of Treaties,
Mar. 8, Nov. 29 and 30, and Dec. 1 and 2, 1944, Serial No. 21, Government Printing
Office, Washington 1944.
123 STEPHAN, supra note 110, at 147.
124 Brand, supra note 111, at 485.
125 Accordingly, a Senate Report on the 1974 Trade noted that the
"relationship between the trade agreements and U.S. law is among the most
sensitive issues in the Bill. As stated in the statement of proposed administrative
action, the trade agreements can only be achieved as is provided in the Trade Act
of 1974." Jackson, supra note 116, at 346 n.80 (quoting S. Rep. No.249, 96th Cong.
1st Sess. 36 (1979)). See also STEPHAN, supra note 110, at 75. On the status of the
self-executing doctrine, see NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ultrich Petersmann eds., 1993); Stefan A.
Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the
Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, in PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE
MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 261, 261-327 (Stefan
A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott eds., 1994).
126 Brand, supra note 111, at 508.
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regarded as an essential precondition to the negotiation and
approval of future GATT agreements. 127
Similarly, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 carries
forward this limitation that in effect prohibits the applicability of
the Uruguay Round Agreements "to any person or circumstance,
that is inconsistent with any law of the United States." 128 It is also
significant that since 1974 Congress seems to have fully acquiesced
to GATT as having legal status under U.S. law unlike in the period
prior to 1974. Hence, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 embraces GATT and calls for its expansion in a manner that
implies Congressional recognition of the potential of GATT law
becoming U.S. law with its blessings. 29
The process by which Congress would be involved in
negotiating and approving agreements until 2002 under the
auspices of GATT in the 1974 Trade Act was referred to as the "fast
track" process.130 Hence, Congressional-Executive Agreements are
the formal way in which GATT and WTO agreements become part
of U.S. law, and the "fast track" was the process of facilitating
Congressional participation in negotiating and approving trade
agreements. This process was in large measure necessitated by
Congressional concern over the Executive's unilateralism in
negotiating trade agreements without Congress' involvement.
131
127 JACKSON, supra note 23, at 211-13. John Jackson notes that Congress did
not approve the 1955 Draft Charter for the Organization for Trade Cooperation
under GATT auspices and that there were Congressional concerns regarding the
United States's participation in GATT without Congressional involvement until
1952 when Congress authorized the Kennedy Round of Tariff Negotiations by the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Id. For another view regarding parts of GATT 1947
that could have been construed as self-executing, see Brand, supra note 111, at 508.
128 STEPHAN, supra note 110, at 150 (quoting section 102(a)(1) of the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1)). In addition, the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 provides that trade agreements only become
U.S. law when implementing legislation is enacted by Congress. See 19 U.S.C §
2903(a)(1) (2000) (describing the implementation of trade agreements).
129 Brand, supra note 111, at 502.
130 In the 2002 Trade Act, this process has been revamped and renamed trade
promotion authority. See infra notes 142-66.
131 According to Lael Brainard and Hal Shapiro, prior to the twentieth
century, Congress alone seemed to have an exclusive authority over foreign
commerce. See Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority,
available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb91.pdf (Dec. 2001)
("Prior to the twentieth century, regulation of foreign commerce was almost
exclusively a congressional prerogative."). Since tariffs were considered to fit into
the part of domestic tax policy rather than that of foreign affairs, they "were
subject to change only by an act of Congress. Id. at 2. On the other hand, the
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As we shall see below, an immediate reason for the 1974 Trade Act
was the disappointment of Congress at the Executive's negotiation
of an International Anti-dumping Agreement in the 1967 Kennedy
Round without involving Congress.132 The fast track process
therefore serves the dual purpose of enabling Presidential
consultation with and accountability to Congress 133 while at the
same time enhancing the President's negotiating ability.134 Fast
track authority was also designed to overcome the weakness of
other mechanisms of domesticating international trade agreements.
The perceived weakness of Article II treaties was that the
supermajority requirement in the Senate would stand in the way of
the President's negotiating authority. Executive agreements by
contrast gave Congress no room to participate in negotiating or
entering into a trade agreements, while Congressional-Executive
Agreements gave Congress too little input into the process.135
The 1974 Trade Act required congressional approval at various
President had primary responsibilities on trade "to collect the tariffs set by
Congress and to negotiate bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, which extended to treaty partners the most favorable tariff rates
available." Id. The Great Depression brought "a major change in U.S. trade
policy" while the "Trade Act of 1934 effectively 'pre-approved' presidential
authority to lower U.S. tariffs within certain limits by authorizing the president to
enter into reciprocal tariff-reduction agreements." Id. In the Trade Act of 1962,
Congress authorized the President to eliminate certain U.S. tariffs in the Kennedy
Round under the GATT. Id. The conclusion of the Kennedy Round brought two
contradictory consequences. The successful array of tariff-reduction
commitments and "two controversial 'non-tariff' agreements governing
antidumping and customs valuation ... " Id. Some lawmakers refer to the latter
consequence by observing that "the president had overstepped his authority." Id.
By enacting the 1974 Trade Act, Congress then "decided to maintain final control
over non-tariff agreements" in the GATT Tokyo Round. Id. The Act saw the
legislation as the only means to implement non-tariff agreements and required the
President to "consult with Congress prior to entering into them." Id.
132 JACKSON, supra note 23, at 43-44.
133 Harold Hongju Koh argues that Fast Track authority as embodied in the
1974 Trade Act "was wreathed with provisions that manifested Congress'
pervasive post-Watergate, post-Vietnam distrust of unchecked executive
discretion in foreign affairs: specified negotiation objectives; sunset provisions on
presidential negotiating authority; extensive consultation, certification and
reporting requirements; dramatic 'judicialization' of trade remedies." Koh, supra
note 42, at 145.
134 Id. at 143.
135 Harold Koh notes that the immediate reasons for Fast Track arose in part
as a result of "skirmishes" between the President and Congress regarding the
balance between the role of Congress and the President in domesticating
international and bilateral trade agreements such as the Anti-dumping Code
following the Kennedy Round. Id. at 146.
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stages. For example, the President was required to notify the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee at least before entering into an international trade
agreement. Members of both Houses form part of the President's
negotiating team.136 Ultimately, both Houses are required to vote
up or down, within sixty days of their introduction, the agreements
negotiated together with their implementing legislation. 137 In 1984,
amendments to the 1974 Act enhanced Congress' role in
negotiating international trade agreements by requiring that the
President to notify and consult with the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee for "a period of
sixty legislative days before giving the statutorily required ninety-
day notice of his intent to sign an agreement." 38  In 1988,
Congressional control of the President's negotiating authority139
136 Trade Act of 1974 § 161, 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (2000).
137 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-93 (2004) (defining Congressional procedures with
respect to Presidential Actions). Koh notes that the policy advantages of the Fast
Track process are:
First, it allowed Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the
procedural obstacles that frequently prevent a controversial measure
from coming to a vote at all. Second, it controlled domestic interest
special group pressures that might otherwise have provoked extensive,
ad hoc amendment of a negotiated accord. Third, it bolstered the
Executive Branch's negotiating credibility with United States allies,
which had suffered serious damage during the Kennedy Round, by
reassuring trading partners that negotiated trade agreements would
undergo swift and non-intrusive legislative consideration. Fourth and
finally, it acted functionally like a one-house legislative veto to control
executive discretion, for it authorized either House to block passage of a
fully negotiated trade agreement simply by voting down the agreement
or its implementing legislation.
Koh, supra note 42, at 148.
138 Id. at 149.
139 The President's negotiating authority under the 1974 Trade Act included
entering into agreements reducing non-tariff barriers and other trade distortions.
Trade Act of 1974 § 102, 19 U.S.C. § 2112, § 2191 (2000). With regard to the
President's authority to enter into voluntary export agreements in light of the
Constitution's grant of that power to Congress, see infra Section 3.3.4 (describing
the fate of competition policy in foreign trade in the 1970s-1980s). 19 U.S.C. §
2902(a)(1)(B)(ii) empowers the President, within limits, to proclaim such
modification or continuance of any existing duty, duty-free or excise treatment, or
such additional duties, "as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry
out" certain trade agreements. Hence, Harold Koh argues that the Fast Track
process "does not legally bind the two branches so much as it erects a legislative
framework within which political accommodations can occur." Koh, supra note
42, at 159.
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was further enhanced by empowering either House to block the
extension of the chief executive's authority past the original
expiration period under the 1984 Act.140
The significance of the fast track procedure is perhaps best
illustrated by how it shaped the Uruguay Round. The negotiation
timetable for the Uruguay Round hinged very closely on the
availability of fast track authority. U.S. negotiators scheduled the
final meeting of the Uruguay Round in December 1990, ahead of
the March 1, 1991 deadline for introducing legislation in Congress
under the authority. 141 President George H. W. Bush then sought a
two-year extension to enable him to complete negotiations of the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA. To galvanize political support for
Congress' willingness to extend the authority, the President was
requested to submit an Action Plan illustrating how labor and
environmental issues were raised by the proposed NAFTA.
2.3.3. The 2002 Trade Act: Strengthening Congressional
Participation in Trade Negotiations
While Congress succeeded in making labor and environmental
standards a concern of trade negotiations in the 1990s, it was not
until the 2002 Trade Act ("the Act" or "2002 Trade Act") that
Congress gave these considerations traction. The unprecedented
re-approval of Presidential authority to negotiate trade agreements
after an eight year hiatus demonstrated the extent to which the
post-World War Two consensus on international trade in the U.S.
had frayed. The perceived and real adverse impact on U.S.
industries, jobs, and the environment made Congress reluctant to
empower the President to negotiate new trade agreements. The
Act seeks to address these concerns in a variety of ways in addition
to naming the process "trade promotion authority" as opposed to a
"fast track method." First, it expands the principle that
GATT/WTO law cannot supersede U.S. law by providing that
even oral, not just written, agreements not disclosed to Congress
cannot become effective within the United States.142
140 Id. at 151.
141 Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast Track for International Trade Agreements,
5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 471, 493 (1990). On September 25, 1990, President Bush gave
notice to the respective committees of both Houses of his intention to negotiate
NAFTA. Koh, supra note 142, at 153.
142 Section 2105(a)(4)(A) and (B) of the Trade Act of 2002 provides that any
trade agreement or understanding with a foreign government (oral or written) not
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Second, the Act establishes unprecedented opportunities for
consultation between Congress and the President in negotiating
trade agreements. For the first time, a set of negotiating objectives
in congressional authorization of presidential negotiating authority
specifically mandates consideration of a variety of issues. The
primary negotiating objectives include assuring "more open,
equitable and reciprocal market access," eliminating market
distortions and barriers, and strengthening the international
trading system.143 These objectives further require that future
trade agreements "ensure that trade and environmental objectives
are mutually supportive" and that they "seek to protect and
preserve the environment and enhance the international means of
doing so."1 44 The broadness with which these goals are stated
indicates the compromising nature of the Act. This in turn
suggests that it is the process of implementation and adjudication
that will give specific meaning to such ambiguities. The Act
requires that the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") keep all of
disclosed to Congress will not be considered "as being part of trade agreements
approved by Congress and shall have no effect under U.S. law or in any dispute
settlement body." See Trade Act of 2002 § 2105(a)(4)(A), (B) (noting the disclosure
of commitments); 19 U.S.C.A. § 3805(a)(4) (emphasis added). Notice that the
provision is very broad, encompassing both written and non-written agreements.
143 Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(a)(1)-(3), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(a)(1)-(3). In addition,
§ 2102(a)(5) of the Act also provides that fostering economic growth, raising living
standards and promoting full employment and enhancing the global economy to
overall objectives of U.S. trade.
144 Id. at § 2102(a)(5). Section 2101(a)(6) requires a respect for and an
"understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights." Notably,
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-
CIO") opposed the Act because it did not require the President to include
enforceable protections for the environment and workers' rights in trade
agreements. See AFL-CIO, John J. Sweeney, President, AFL-CIO - Remarks to Senate
Finance Committee Regarding Proposed Fast Track Legislation, at http://www.
aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/tm06202001.cfm (June 20, 2001). In addition, the
Sierra Club criticized the Act because it failed to encourage environmental
protection and to guard against weakening of environmental standards. See
Sierra Club, Responsible Trade: Oppose H.R. 3005, the Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2001: A Letter from 12 Environmental Groups, at http://www.sierraclub.org/
trade/fasttrack/12groups.asp (Oct. 16, 2001). According to the Sierra Club, the
Act also fails to "provide sufficient assurances to Congress that the administration
will bring back trade and investment agreements that meet congressional
negotiating objectives to safeguard the environment" because it only includes
"voluntary negotiating objectives on the environment." In addition, unlike the
Jordan Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA, Sierra Club criticized the Act for
doing nothing "to prevent countries from lowering their environmental standards
to gain unfair trade advantages, and fail[ing] to actively promote meaningful
improvement in environmental protection and cooperation." Id.
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them "fully appraised of the negotiations" at all times during
negotiations of trade agreements both "closely and on a timely
basis" with a newly established Congressional Oversight Group 145
as well as with "all committees of Congress with jurisdiction over
laws that would be affected by such agreements." 146  Section
2105(b)(1)(B) makes provision for a non-binding procedural
resolution in either House during debate on an implementing bill
in instances where the President "failed or refused to notify and
consult in accordance with the provisions of the Act."
With respect to entering into trade agreements relating to tariff
and non-tariff barriers, the President's authority begins on June 1st,
2005, and ends on June 1, 2007. Such an agreement must meet all
the negotiating objectives as well as the consultation and
assessment requirements provided for under the Act.147 The Act
provides that the President may apply for an extension of this
authority.148 The Act provides that a member of Congress may file
an "extension disapproval resolution" thereby precluding
extension of the President's negotiating authority. 149
As under the 1974 Act, the 2002 Act requires the President to
notify Congress ninety days before initiating negotiations 50 and
ninety days before the day on which the President enters into a
new trade agreement.15' The Act adds new layers of consultation,
145 Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(d)(2)(A). The Group is comprised of the
chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means including
three other members of that Committee, the Chairman and ranking member of the
Committee on Finance, and three additional members, provided, in both cases,
that no more than two are members of the same party and the Chairman and the
ranking members, of the House of Representatives, as well as of the Senate, have
jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade agreement. Id. Members of
the Oversight Group will be accredited by the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") "as an official advisor to the United States delegation in the
negotiations" for any trade agreement. See id. at § 2107(a)(4). The Act
contemplates the Group shall have "the closest practicable coordination" with the
USTR (§2107(b)(2)(C)) have access "to pertinent documents relating to
negotiations including classified materials (§ 2107(b)(2)(B)); get "regular, detailed
briefings ... regarding negotiating objectives ... beginning as soon as practicable
after the Congressional Oversight Group is convened, with more frequent
briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage (§ 2107 (b)(2)(A))."
146 See id. § 2102(d)(1) (emphasis added).
147 Id. § 2103(b)(2).
148 Id. § 2103(a)(1)(B)(i).
149 Id. § 2103(c)(5).
150 Id. § 2104(a)(1).
151 Id. § 2105(a)(1)(A).
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notification and certification regarding the negotiations to the
committees of jurisdiction in both Houses as well as to the newly
established Congressional Oversight Group. There are new and
extensive consultation and reporting requirements and meetings152
as well as a particular focus on the impact of new trade agreements
to specified industries and sectors of the economy. 53 In addition,
the International Trade Commission ("ITC") has a mandate to
perform an assessment of "the likely impact" of a trade agreement
ninety days before the President enters into it focusing on the
economy as a whole as well as a host of enumerated sectors. 54 The
Act also requires environmental reviews of future trade
agreements, 55 reviews on their impact on employment and labor
markets,156 and requires that the agreements take into account
"other legitimate" domestic objectives including the "protection of
legitimate health or safety, essential security and consumer
interests."157
The debating requirements on trade implementing legislation
in both Houses for the first time provides for non-binding
disapproval resolutions if the agreement is inconsistent with the
negotiating objective that precludes damming down U.S. trade
remedy laws under Section 2102(b)(14).158 This compromise
provision was formulated after a far more reaching Amendment,
the Dayton-Craig Amendment, was defeated. The Dayton-Craig
Amendment would have required a separate vote on any part of
an implementing bill that dammed down U.S. trade remedy
laws. 59
152 Id. § 2104 (a)(1)-(3).
153 For example with respect to agriculture, see § 2104(b)(1), (3), respectively;
with regard to import sensitive products, see § 2104(b)(2); with respect to textiles,
see § 2104(c). Generally with respect to consultation before Agreement is entered
into, see § 2104(d). With regard to trade remedy laws, see § 2104(d)(3). With
regard to specific reports to the House and the Senate, see § 2104(d)(3)(C), and
with respect to Advisory Committee reports, see § 2104(e).
154 Id. § 2104(f)(2).
155 Id. § 2102(c)(4).
156 Id. § 2102(c)(5).
157 Id. § 2102(c)(6).
158 Id. § 2104(d)(3)(c).
159 The Dayton-Craig Amendment would in effect have allowed "Congress to
debate parts of trade agreements that threaten the ability of U.S. industries and
workers to seek remedy for unfair trade" separately from the entire trade
agreement as negotiated by the President and thereby to block those parts. See
Larry Craig, The Truth About the Dayton-Craig Amendment, WASH. TIMES (May 28,
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Third, the reporting, certification, and consultation
requirements in the Trade Act of 2002160 are informed by the
principle that U.S. labor' 6' and the environment 162 are non-
derogable. The Trade Act of 2002 reinforces this principle by
establishing Trade Adjustment Assistance that authorizes the
President to provide relief to workers, farmers, communities, and
fishermen "seriously injured or threatened with serious injury due
to surges of imports." 163 The Act is therefore unprecedented to the
extent that it acknowledges the gains from free trade. It also
recognizes that free trade produces losers and therefore provides
for Presidential attention to such outcomes in addition to
authorizing the appropriation of monies for programs such as
worker re-training. The scope of those covered is far-reaching. It
includes secondary workers and self-employed persons such as
farmers and ranchers. It covers income support for two years as
well as a 65% tax credit for health insurance while these workers
are in re-training.
2002) (arguing in favor of the Dayton-Craig Amendment), at http://asp.
washtimes.com/printarticle.asp?action=print&ArticlelD=20020528-2173180.
The White House strongly opposed the amendment because "a key element of
TPA is the requirement for Congress to consider and vote on trade agreements as
a whole." See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGET, Statements of Administration
Policy, H.R. 3009-ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE EXPANSION ACT (REP. CRANE (R) IL
AND 29 COSPONSORS) (May 8, 2002) (expressing the Administration's views on the
Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/sap/107-2/HR3009-s.html. According to the White House, the
Amendment would have allowed Congress to remove "certain items from
consideration under TPA procedures," which in turn encourage trading partners
"to exclude issues of their own from future negotiations, particularly in areas like
agriculture that are of vital interest to U.S. exporters." Id. This, according to the
White House, would have had the potential of undermining the President's ability
to negotiate for America's best interest in trade agreements. Id.
160 For example, with respect to agriculture, see Trade Act of 2002 §
2104(b)(1). On reports to Congress regarding changes in U.S. trade remedy laws,
see id. § 2104(d)(3).
161 Section 2102 (c)(4) requires the President (by use of the term "shall"), to
"conduct environmental reviews of future trade and investment agreements,
consistent with Executive Order 13141 of November 16, 1999 and its relevant
guidelines, and report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on such reviews."
Id. § 2102(c)(4).
162 An overall negotiating objective in the Act provides that negotiators of a
new trade agreement ought to "strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce
protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an
encouragement for trade." Id. § 2102(a)(7).
163 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, on investment, the Act has introduced the "No Greater
Rights Than" principle under which foreign investors have no
greater rights than the U.S. citizen under the U.S. Constitution and
local laws. In effect, while a U.S. corporation abroad has the full
protections of an investor under the equivalent of Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, which enables corporations to challenge foreign laws
standing in the way of their investment opportunities, foreign
investors in the U.S. enjoy no such rights.164
Fifth, consistent with maintaining the competitiveness of U.S.
industries against foreign competition, the 2002 Trade Act also re-
authorized the Customs Service for five years. This re-
authorization strengthens the search procedures for goods entering
the U.S. thereby precluding entry of goods that would injure U.S.
industries inconsistent with WTO/GATT and U.S. law. The
Customs reauthorization in the 2002 Trade Act traces its origins to
the failed 1999 Bipartisan Steel Bill that passed in the House, but
164 This amendment, eventually included in the Trade Act of 2002 as a
negotiating objective, proposed by Senator Kerry was justified as "a modest
reform that guaranteed much-needed changes in the NAFTA Chapter 11
investment model in future trade agreements," so as to ensure that foreign
investors have no greater rights than the U.S. citizen under the U.S. Constitution.
Public Citizen, Defeat of Kerry Amendment Thwarts Trade Bill's Prospects in House:
Senate Rejection of Modest Reform of Investor Protections Reinforces House "Free Trade"
Democrats' Fast Track Opposition (May 21, 2002), at http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1115. Supporters of the bill noted that "the Kerry
Amendment will safeguard the regulatory authority of state, local and federal
governments." Id. The White House, nevertheless, opposed the amendment
arguing that its effect would "fundamentally weaken longstanding protection for
U.S. companies abroad, leaving our investors vulnerable to unfair treatment by
foreign governments." OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 159. An
immediate reason relating to the U.S. concern about Chapter 11 of NAFTA arises
from a suit filed against the U.S. by Methanex, a Canadian company claiming $970
million compensation for loss of business it would lose because of California's
plan to phase out the use of Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") -an oxygenate
that cleans gasoline because of concerns the additive was contaminating drinking
water supplies. Methanex argued that the ban was not based on scientific
evidence and the water pollution could be solved by fixing leaking underground
storage tanks at gas stations. California, the largest market for Methanex, was
important since it sets environmental standards that are adopted by other states.
Methanex alleged in the suit that the ban was necessitated by political
considerations, including the financial contributions to the campaign of Governor
Gray Davis of California by Archer Daniel Midlands Corporation, which
produces a competing oxygenate from corn. In August 2002, a bi-national panel
decided not to proceed with the case since there was inadequate evidence to make
a determination. Allen Dowd, NAFTA Panel Says Cannot Rule on Methanex MTBE
Case, REUTERs (Aug. 7, 2002), at http:// www.mindfully.org/WTO/Methanex-
MTBE7aug02.htm.
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failed in the Senate. A primary purpose of the bill was to empower
the Customs Service to seize imports, particularly of steel, before
they entered the United States.
The re-authorization of Customs and the non-binding
disapproval resolution on trade remedy in the 2002 Trade Act
largely reflects the successive efforts of the steel industry and other
domestic industries vulnerable to international competition to
make U.S. trade remedy laws impregnable against internationally
negotiated trade agreements. The steel industry in fact sought
more than it got. An example is an amendment proposed by
Senator Daschle (called the Daschle Substitute) whose effect would
have been to extend health insurance assistance for steel retirees.
The White House objected to this Amendment citing the excessive
estimated cost would bankrupt Trade Adjustment Assistance.1 65
Such an attempt to make the 2002 Trade Act somewhat of a
retirement program for retired steel workers166 demonstrates the
extent to which international trade has become imprisoned by
domestic imperatives and the protectionist dangers associated with
balancing free trade, on the one hand, and domestic policy goals,
on the other, as a platform for building a coalition in favor of free
trade.
3. THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND ANTI-DUMPING RULES: SOME HISTORY
AND CONTEXT THAT HAS SHAPED U.S. AND GATT/ WTO ANTI-
DUMPING LAW
3.1. The U.S. Steel Industry: A Brief Overview
By the middle of the last century, the steel and automobile
industries were the backbone of the U.S. economy. In the mid-
1960s, steel accounted for about 95% of the metals used by the
United States. Consolidation and price leadership within the U.S.
steel industry kept foreign competition at bay until the 1960's. The
U.S. was a net exporter of steel. However, circumstances changed
165 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 159.
166 The United Steelworkers of America ("USWA") opposed the Act due to its
potential effect in destroying jobs in the United States, and the loss of steel
industry retirees' health care benefits "following bankruptcies and liquidations
among their former steel company employers." See United States Steel Workers of
America, Steel Crisis Deepens as Job Losses Rise to 46,700: January Increase Largest In
More Than A Decade (Feb. 1, 2002) (documenting the increasing jobless rate of steel
workers), at http://www.uswa.org/press/steelcrisis020102.html.
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in the 1960s for a variety of reasons. A strike in the steel industry
in the 1950s, the opening of the St. Lawrence seaway which made
the industrial heartland of the U.S. accessible to foreign shipments
of steel, and competition from Japanese steel where steel
production outstripped consumption all contributed to a crisis in
the U.S. steel industry.167
By 1959, the United States became a net importer of steel. Steel
was an important ingredient in many other products and a major
source of employment in the country, as a congressional study of
the crisis demonstrated. One attempt at arresting the crisis was
President Truman's attempted seizure of the country's steel mills
in the wake of the nationwide strike in the 1950's. The justification
of the seizure was to arrest the deterioration of the national
defense.168 By an executive order, President Truman directed the
Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the country's steel
mills. The presidents of the mills were required to operate the
mills as managers of the United States. 69 Although Congress had
established statutory procedures for dealing with such situations, it
declined to authorize the seizure of the steel plants as a way of
resolving the labor dispute 7 0 The steel companies sued the
Secretary of Commerce in federal court where they sought
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.' 71 The Supreme Court
held that under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, Congress
was not divested of its exclusive constitutional authority vested to
it by the Constitution.172 According to Justice Black, in so far as
Congress had passed legislation providing a statutory scheme for
167 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952)
(providing the government's argument that actions were necessary in order to
"avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from stoppage of steel
production").
168 Id. at 583.
169 See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952) (directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate plants of certain steel
companies in the wake of a labor strike).
170 See Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (repealed 1966)
(stating the terms of national defense under which Congress allowed the
President to seize energy concerns); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947 (amended 1952) (authorizing the government to obtain an eighty-day
injunction against any strike perilous to national health or safety); Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (stating Congress view that national
security requires maximum effort to utilize the nation's critical manpower
resources).
171 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583-710.
172 Id. at 585-89.
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dealing with labor disputes, the President did not have any power
to seize the steel mills absent congressional authorization -in
essence there was no basis for "presidential power in a field of
congressional power."173
From the 1970s to date, the steel industry has continued to
experience difficulties in the face of steel imports. For example, in
the second half of the 1990s over 10,000 workers in the steel
industry lost their jobs while fourteen steel companies filed for
bankruptcy. At least two competing thesis have emerged
regarding the source of the steel industry crisis. First, the crisis is
traced to uncompetitive practices such as predatory pricing and
government subsidies which circumvent market pricing. 74
Among the countries most cited for these policies are Japan, Brazil
and Russia. A major theme of the steel industry efforts to get
government action to address the crisis has therefore been based
on the unfairness of the present global market for steel: That while
the U.S. plays by the rules of the markets, other countries which
have access to the U.S. market do not.175 Hence according to one
commentator,
[T]here may be isolated cases in which dumping is the
result of other factors, such as exchange rate changes, long-
run declines in marginal costs, and related factors." On the
whole, however, repeated dumping is a predatory practice
inevitably directly associated with mercantilistic practices,
such as a sanctuary home market, subsidies, and cartels. In
fact without the existence of one or more of these
conditions, repeated dumping is simply impractical. 7 6
Another response to the claims of unfairness has emerged from
economists who analyze industrial performance on the basis of
competitiveness and efficiency rather than on a criteria of fairness
or equity. These economists argue that U.S. anti-dumping laws
173 Corwin, supra note 63, at 57.
174 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON GLOBAL STEEL TRADE:
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS 2, 107-13 (2000).
175 See Statement of the Basic Steel Industry Conference, United Steelworkers
of America, Jan. 23 2001 (summarizing the problems facing the steel industry
today), available at http://www.naftalawsuit.uswa.org/SaveStee012201.htm.
176 GREG MASTEL, ANTI-DUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 137 (1998).
[Vol. 25:1
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 50 2004
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MINIMALISM
have adopted standards of margins of dumping and injury, such as
like grade and quality, that facilitate relief for U.S. products against
foreign products that are not directly competitive. This in essence
amounts to protection of U.S. industries against global
competition.177 These economists thus claim that to the extent that
anti-dumping laws in developed countries keep product prices
higher, they reduce consumer welfare because the price and cost
tests they use bear no resemblance to below-cost pricing.178
In response to the crisis, various administrations have sought
to respond to the growing urgency of the unfairness claims while
somewhat paying attention to the concerns raised by economists
regarding the shaky economic justifications of taking unwarranted
anti-dumping actions against foreign steel producers. 79  For
example, besides anti-dumping actions, the Clinton
Administration used diplomatic pressure to persuade Japan to cut
steel exports180 By a 289-141 margin, the House of Representatives
passed H.R. 975, the Bipartisan Steel Recovery Act of 1999 ("the
Bill"), on March 17, 1999. The primary purpose of the Bill was to
stop the "flood of illegal steel imports" dumped into the United
States in the second half of the 1990s. The Bill would have
authorized the Customs Service to "refuse entry into the customs
territory of the U.S. of any steel products that exceed allowable
177 Robert A. Lipstein, Using Antitrust Principles to Reform Anti-dumping Law,
in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 405, 425-28 (Edward M. Graham & J. David
Richardson eds., 1997) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY].
178 See Kalypso NicolaYdis & Raymond Vernon, Competition Policy and Trade
Policy in the European Union, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 177, at 271;
Graeme Thomson, Australia and New Zealand 271, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY,
supra note 177, at 385; see also Raj Bhala, Rethinking Anti-dumping Law, 29 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1995) (noting that in the 1980s other countries also
began using anti-dumping law as a potent protectionist weapon).
179 hi releasing the administrations steel plan on August 5, 1999, President
Clinton noted that: "[tihe administration will, first and foremost, continue to
vigorously enforce our trade laws to ensure that our trading partners play by the
rules." Statement by the President, The White House, Aug. 5, 1999 [hereinafter
The Steel Action Program], at http://www.naftalawsuit.uswa.org/whSteel
Action.html. He then immediately thereafter went on to say that, "Unfair trade has
been a significant factor in the [steel] import surge and recent cases show that
unfair trade remains a problem." Id. (emphasis added). The Clinton
Administration in this instance was therefore clearly cognizant of the unfair trade
claims, but was unwilling to go as far as embracing full-fledged protection of the
steel industry. Id.
180 Jonathan Peterson, Clinton Warns Japan Must Slow Steel Exports to Pre-Crisis
Level, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1999, at 1.
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levels of imports of such products."181 However, the Bill did not
garner sufficient support in the Senate. The Clinton administration
distanced itself from the legislation and instead released a 12-point
blueprint primarily focusing on elimination of unfair trade
practices through vigorous enforcement of U.S. trade laws. 182 As
noted earlier, much of the Bill passed more recently as part of the
2002 Trade Act.
Much more recently, the Bush Administration has initiated a
steel war with its trading partners after imposing 30% tariff
safeguards on major steel products as part of a three year plan to
give the steel industry an opportunity to restructure itself so that it
could compete effectively in the global steel market.183 On May 27,
2002, China filed a request to commence WTO proceedings against
the U.S. alleging inter alia that the measures undertaken by the
Bush administration are inconsistent with U.S. GATT/WTO
obligations. 84 On July 11, 2002, a WTO Panel ruled that the U.S.
had acted inconsistently with the Safeguards Agreement and
Article XIX:1 of the GATT.185 This adverse ruling created an
uproar in Congress and among the steel companies. 86 The USTR's
181 Id. The Bill proposed that to measure allowable levels of steel by ensuring
that the volume of imported steel does not exceed "the average volume of steel
products that was imported monthly into the U.S. during the 36-month period
preceding July 1997." Id.
182 The Steel Action Program, supra, note 179.
183 These measures were taken pursuant to § 201 of the 1974 Trade Act which
requires the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") to investigate if a
domestic industry has been materially injured by an increase in imports. Trade
Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000). If the Commission establishes that an
increase in imports has been a substantial cause of injury to domestic industries, it
reports to the President who in turn is authorized to take measures to protect the
industry for a temporary period of time in June 2002 indicating that the U.S. steel
industry had suffered from increased quantities of steel entering the country.
Proclamation 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 45 (Mar. 5, 2002). See also Press Briefing, U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (Mar. 5, 2002), at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-11.html.
184 See Request for the Establishment of Panel by China, Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WTO/DS252/5 (May 27, 2002).
Efforts to settle the dispute through GATT Article XXII consultations commenced
by China and Switzerland at the WTO failed. Other countries that joined in the
consultations included Japan and New Zealand.
185 WTO Final Reports of the Panel on United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003),
available at http://www.wto.org.
186 Politicians, Steel Workers and Companies Decry WTO Ruling, Bus. J. ONLINE,
July 2003, available at http://www.businessjournal.com/LateJuly03/WTO
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office then issued a statement outlining the grounds of its appeal
and the appeal was lodged. However, upon losing the appeal and
under the threat of EU sanctions on domestic steel producers, the
Bush administration withdrew the safeguards measures in
December 2003.187
3.2. The Purpose of Anti-Dumping Law Under GATT/WITO Law and
Its Attractiveness to the United States
The purpose of anti-dumping law is to counteract the effects of
price discrimination in sales by a foreign producer which results in
injury to the industry of the importing country. Unlike
countervailing duty law which aims to counteract subsidies given
to industries by governments, anti-dumping law is aimed at
protecting industries in importing countries from unfair pricing
policies or predatory competition engaged in by an industry in a
second country. The premise of anti-dumping law under the
theory of competitive advantage is that an industry in one country
is selling its products in a second country at below cost of
production, or less than fair value.188 Under this theory, such sales,
in turn, results in an injury to the industry in the second country
where the equivalent industry is not engaging in similar
anticompetitive practices. In essence, anti-dumping law compares
the open market of comparable products in the exporting and
importing country to determine if dumping is occurring. Although
dumping may be advantageous to consumers who pay lower
prices,189 the rationale of anti-dumping law under the theory of
ruling.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). See also U.S. House Representatives News
Release, Members of Congress Urge ITC to Dismiss Tainted Testimony in Steel
Tariff Review (July 23, 2003) (reporting the arguments of Congressional members
for foreign trade transfers), available at http://www.house.gov/strickland/
TaintedSteelTestimonyRel.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
187 Fary G. Yerkey and Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Will Appeal Final WTO Ruling on
Steel Tariffs Imposed Last Year, 20 INT'L TRADE REP., 1217 (2003); President's
Statement on Steel Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sectors/industry/steel20l/2003-12-04-president-statement.htm;
Christopher S. Rugabar, U.S. Steel Consumer Optimistic That Administration Will Lift
Tariffs, 20 INT'L TRADE REP., 1862-63 (2003).
188 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Section 1673 (b) provides that to obtain less than fair
value requires a comparison of "normal value" of the goods with their "export
price." Id.
189 The efficacy of anti-dumping law has often been challenged since its effect
for consumers in the export market might well benefit from lower prices. See, e.g.,
J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 132-47 (1966) (exploring
the consequences of dumping to the importing country); Bart S. Fisher, Dumping:
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comparative advantage is that efficient industries cannot compete
effectively against predatory industries abroad. The role of anti-
dumping law is therefore to remedy the injury caused to industries
that have suffered from unfairly traded imports.
However, not all low-priced imports constitute private acts of
international predation. 90 They could for example reflect a "pro-
competitive, pro-consumer response by producers abroad who
have market power at home and who face an overseas market with
greater elasticity of demand than their home markets."' 91 Under
such circumstances, lower prices in the foreign market do not
necessarily constitute an intent to engage in predatory competition.
This is one of the primary reasons anti-dumping, as opposed to
competition law, is a much more attractive remedy for domestic
producers whose sales are affected by low-priced imports.
Producers affected by low-priced imports may benefit from anti-
dumping relief even though the foreign competitors are not
engaged in predatory pricing. This can largely be accounted for by
the different aims and standards of review of anti-dumping and
competition law. Anti-dumping law is largely defined by the
norms of market access of the GATT/WTO regime specifically in
the context of predatory pricing.192 By contrast, competition policy
aims at consumer-welfare and arguably adopts more rigorous
scrutiny of industrial structure and policy than does anti-dumping
law.193 Indeed, that in part explains the reluctance of the U.S. to
introduce competition policy within the ambit of the
Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness and External Change, in ANTI-DUMPING
LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 11 (John Jackson ed., 1979). William Wares
argues that different prices in different countries merely reflect different demand
curves in those countries. See WILLIAM A. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 59 (1977).
190 A. Paul Victor, Anti-dumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies Be
Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 339, 350 (1983).
191 Eleanor M. Fox, Competition and World Markets: Law and Economics, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 229, 305 (1983); see also Janusz Ordover et al., Unfair
International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 323 (1983).
192 Studies have found that national anti-dumping regimes are biased
towards finding dumping and towards overstating dumping margins. See RANIER
M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTI-DUMPING
LAW (1990); DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
(Richard Botluck & Robert E. Littan eds., 1991).
193 Daniel K. Tarullo argues that to introduce competition policy into the
GATT/WTO would be "forcing the square peg of competition policy into the
round hole of trade policy." Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global
Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 479 (2000).
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GATT/WTO.194
There are other reasons intrinsic to the nature of GATT/WTO
anti-dumping rules that make them a very attractive remedy for
producers in the United States. First, the rules allow
discriminatory action, although by and large GATT/WTO norms
require non-discriminatory treatment relative to domestic goods
and services. Second, since GATT/WTO anti-dumping rules do
not concisely define anti-dumping and instead provide for
substantive and procedural safeguards that national regulators
should follow in anti-dumping investigations, they confer
enormous discretion to national regulators. 195 The investigatory
and administrative rules that countries such as the U.S. have
adopted, in the context of determinations of dumping and
measurement of injury, increases the legal and administrative costs
for foreign exporters under investigation. In addition,
investigations come with uncertainties that might require a back
dating of anti-dumping duties. 96 Third, as we shall see below, the
GATT/WTO's anti-dumping rules are very deferential to national
regulators so that even where a country adopts a methodology of
calculating dumping margins that is inconsistent with that
country's obligations under the rules, the dispute settlement
process only has discretion to order such a country to fix the
methodological problem but not to lift the order.197
3.3. The Administration and Application of Implementing Legislation
on Anti-dumping
3.3.1. An Early Shift in Anti-dumping Law: From the 1916 to the
1921 Act
The Anti-dumping Act of 1916 was the U.S.'s first anti-
dumping statute. This Act defined dumping in competition rather
194 Id. at 478 n.1.
195 The goal of the 1967 Anti-dumping Code is defined as being concerned
with the elimination of "the unfair trade practice of price cutting by exporters in
sales to one country." Eugenia S. Pintos & Patricia Murphy, Congress Dumps the
International Anti-dumping Code, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 180, 180 (1968).
196 J. M. Finger, The Industry-Country Incidence of "Less Than Fair Value" Cases
in U.S. Import Trade, in EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: THE
EXPERIENCES OF LATIN AMERICA 260, 260-79 (Werner Baer & Malcom Gillis eds.,
1981).
197 See infra Section 4.
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than unfair trade terms. Perhaps for this reason, as Paul Victor1 98
has argued, during the first half of the twentieth-century, the 1916
Anti-dumping Act was "essentially dead."199 To the extent that the
1916 Act has been adjudicated, courts generally treated it as an
antitrust rather than as an anti-dumping statute. Hence, for
example, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,2 00 Judge
Becker noted that the 1916 Act was "intended to complement the
antitrust laws by imposing on importers substantially the same
legal strictures relating to price discrimination as those which had
already been imposed on domestic businesses by the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914."201
The 1916 Anti-dumping Act was amended by the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921202 and again by the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,203 which for the first time made the U.S. a signatory of
GATT's Anti-dumping Code negotiated in the Tokyo Round
Agreement. 20 4 Relative to the 1916 Act, the 1921 Anti-dumping Act
and its progeny have been "viewed as more protectionist in nature
and have been administered without regard for the traditional
antitrust objective of promoting price competition." 205 The 1921
Act, unlike the 1916 Act, adopted a formula referred to as the
margin of dumping and abandoned the price competition model
that underpinned the 1916 Act. Hence, while the 1916 Act
addressed predatory practices very much like an antitrust statute,
the 1921 Act adopted the much broader ambit of combating price
discrimination. According to one commentator, present day U.S.
anti-dumping laws do not actually merely counter price
discrimination, but also profit discrimination to the extent that they
"force foreign sellers to earn the same profit, or return, on export
198 Victor, supra note 190, at 339-350.
199 Id. at 339.
200 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1197
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
201 Id.
202 The Anti-Dumping Act ch.14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in 19
U.S.C. § 160-71 (1976)).
203 Trade Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), amended by
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. V 1981).
204 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, MTN/NTM/W/232 (Apr. 9, 1979). It is reprinted in
Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 311 (1979).
205 Id. Victor, supra note 190, at 339-50.
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sales as on domestic sales." 206
It is this tension between price competition and the need to
combat unfair trade practices as the purpose of anti-dumping law
that will be discussed in greater detail in this part of the paper. My
aim is to demonstrate that this tension was, and remains, critical in
shaping the balance between congressional and executive roles in
negotiating and approving international trade agreements. To
restate this tension in other terms, it involves balancing between
the goals of free trade through competitive markets, on the one
hand, and domestic policy priorities like labor, on the other.
3.3.2. The 1960s and 1970s: Anti-dumping Law as a Backdrop to
Laying Down Executive/Congressional Roles in the Realm
of Foreign Trade
Once Congress added the unfairness mandate to anti-dumping
law, the Executive branch faced the ire of its trading partners for
translating its anti-dumping law into a mechanism to protect U.S.
industry against international competition.207 The deployment of
U.S. anti-dumping law away from its initial competition goals
partially explain the desire of the U.S.'s European trading partners
to draw up an international anti-dumping code.208 The United
Kingdom in particular criticized the uncertainties created by the
remedial provisions of the Act which it viewed as a major barrier
to free trade.209 As interpreted by the Tariff Commission, injury
was defined as "anything more than de minimis harm" a rather
broad definition lacking in precision for European trading partners
with the United States.210
The adoption of the Anti-dumping Code of the Kennedy
206 Lipstein, supra note 177, at 406.
207 Hence, while some recent commentaries regard the 1980s as the moment
when U.S. anti-dumping became protectionist, this in fact happened much earlier.
See Bhala, supra note 178, at 3-4 (noting "[i]n the 1980s the U.S. began to utilize
anti-dumping law as its weapon of choice .... Anti-dumping law also became a
potent weapon for protectionists in other countries in the 1980s.").
208 John R. Rehm, Development in the Law and Institutions of International
Economic Relations: The Kennedy Round of Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 427-28
(1968). See also Russell B. Long, U.S. Law and the International Anti-Dumping Code, 3
INT'L LAW. 464 (1968).
209 Rehm, supra note 208, at 428-29.
210 See Pintos & Murphy, supra note 195, at 189 (comparing the specific
provision of the Code to the more amorphous language of the Act); Long, supra
note 208, at 473.
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Round was therefore negotiated against the backdrop of European
dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s 1921 Anti-dumping Act and its
adverse application towards them. As negotiated, the 1967 Anti-
dumping Code sought to resolve these differences. Hence, the
Code provided for specific criteria to guide signatories regarding
what would constitute injury for purposes of justifying assessment
of dumping duties.211  The Code also included a provision
requiring a "rigid causal relationship" between dumping and
injury before anti-dumping duties could be imposed.212 The
provisions of the Code would in effect require the Tariff
Commission to abandon its much looser de minimis standard in
making injury determinations. In addition, under Article 5(b)(c) of
the Code, the U.S. would be required to have one agency make the
findings on dumping and injury simultaneously rather than under
the requirements of the 1921 Tariff Act that bifurcated the two
decisions between the Treasury Department and the Tariff
Commission.213
These and several other provisions of the Code at variance with
the 1921 Act and U.S. law in general214 were not well received by
211 See id. at 473-74 (discussing the specific criteria within the code for
defining injury).
212 Article 3 of the Code:
A determination of injury shall be made only when the authorities
concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably the
principle cause of material injury or of threat of material injury to a
domestic industry or the principle cause of material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry. In reaching their decision the
authorities shall weigh, on one hand, the effect of the dumping and, on
the other hand, all other factors taken together which may be adversely
affecting the industry .... In the case of retarding the establishment of a
new industry in the contrary of importation, convincing evidence of the
forthcoming establishment of an industry must be shown, for example,
as the plans for a new industry have reached a fairly advanced state, a
factory is being constructed or machinery has been ordered.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
213 Article 5(b)(c) of the Code:
Upon initiation of an investigation and thereafter, the evidence of both
dumping and injury should be considered simultaneously in any event,
and the evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered
simultaneously in the decision of whether or not to initiate an
investigation, and thereafter during the course of the investigation....
Id. at 478-79.
214 For details of additional differences between the two, see generally Long,
supra note 208; Rehm, supra note 208; and Pintos & Murphy, supra note 195.
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 58 2004
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MJNIMALISM
Congress or domestic producers such as the steel industry. The
response from Congress to the 1967 Anti-dumping Code therefore
became one of the initial post- World War II moments that shaped
the respective roles of Congress and the Executive branch in
negotiating future trade agreements. The Code was, however,
only one of several factors that signaled to Congress that the
application of the 1921 Anti-dumping Act by the Tariff
Commission had become problematic even before 1967.
For example, in the Wire Rod cases before the Tariff
Commission in the early 1960s, 215 the steel industry argued that the
Tariff Commission applied a narrow reading of U.S. anti-dumping
law.216 Hence, by distinguishing between foreign and domestic
competition within the steel industry in computing dumping
margins, the steel industry argued that the Tariff Commission
favored foreign competitors at its expense.217 The premise of the
commission's distinction was that unless the two could be
distinguished, U.S. anti-dumping law would constitute some
unfairness to foreign competitors. Several other issues were
unresolved such as: the extent of the industry, whether relief
should be granted under U.S. law if the domestic industry
expanded in absolute terms in the period in question, or if the
decrease of sales and/or profits by domestic industry from abroad
at less than fair value raised strong evidence of injury to others.
The inherent difficulties of calculating the margin of dumping
under the prevailing law at the time prompted the steel industry to
seek legislative change. The industry sponsored an amendment to
the Anti-dumping Act in the 88th Congress with a view to tilting
the balance in favor of domestic industries by lowering the high
standards of proof that the Tariff Commission had set for the steel
industry in showing sufficient impact on domestic industry to
warrant relief as well as the strict distinction between fair and
unfair competition.218
215 See, e.g., Amendment Notice, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368b (July 15, 1963)
(announcing the determination of no injury or likelihood thereof from the sale of
hot-rolled carbon steel wire rods from France).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 The Amendment to Section 201(a) of the Anti-dumping Code of 1921
would have read in part:
The Commission shall then determine . . . whether in any line of
commerce in any section of the Country an industry or labor in the
United States has been, is being, or is likely to be more than
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The International Anti-dumping Code therefore exacerbated
rather than addressed the anxieties of the steel industry regarding
the perceived disutility of the 1921 Anti-dumping Act in protecting
it against unfair foreign competition. Hence, just as Congress
opposed the International Anti-dumping Code for having been
negotiated without congressional consultation, domestic industrial
groups strongly opposed the International Anti-dumping Code for
imposing an even higher standard of proof of injury than the Tariff
Commission was already using and that they had already found
problematic. In the Senate, two objections were made against U.S.
adoption of the International Anti-dumping Code. A resolution on
the floor of the Senate summarizes them best:
It is the sense of Congress: (1) that the provisions of the
International Anti- dumping Code conflict with the [1921
Anti-dumping] Act; (2) that the International Anti-dumping
Code should be submitted to the Senate for approval as
provided by Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution; (3) that the International Anti-dumping Code
should come into effect in the U.S. only upon passage of
implementing legislation by Congress.219
Opposition to the International Anti-dumping Code was partly
based on the fact that President Lyndon Johnson committed the
U.S. to the 1967 Anti-dumping Code of the Kennedy Round by an
Executive Agreement without involving Congress. 220  Some
insignificantly injured (or prevented from being established), in whole or
in part, by reason of the importation of such merchandise into the United
States from the country or countries with respect to which the Secretary
has made [an] affirmative determination [of sales at less than fair value],
whether or not such merchandise is sold with predatory intent or at
prices equivalent to or higher than prices of such or similar merchandise
imported from other countries.
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 168 (2d ed.
1983).
219 See S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong. (1967). S. Con. Res. No. 38 was introduced
by Senator Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) on August 2, 1967. 113 CONG. REC. 20,894
(1967).
220 According to Senator Hartke, the President had therefore exceeded his
negotiating authority as provided in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Under the
former RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 144(1) (titled Effect on Domestic Law of Executive Agreement Pursuant
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Senators also regarded the President's signing of the International
Anti-dumping Code as a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers. 221 As we saw above,222 this sole exercise of Presidential
power eventually led to the fast-track process which involves
Congress in committing the U.S. to international trade rules. The
Code was also found objectionable for: making a determination of
injury only if dumping was a primary cause; narrowly defining
domestic industry; and its requirements of the consideration of
both injury and less than fair value sales in making determinations
on preliminary decisions on whether or not to conduct an
investigation. However, there were Senators who argued that the
International Anti-dumping Code was beneficial to the U.S. to the
extent that it sought to curtail the growth of restrictive anti-
dumping laws in the industrialized world which would open other
markets to U.S. goods. 23
Though the Senate prohibited both the Treasury and the Tariff
Commission from implementing the International Anti-dumping
Code, the House declined to follow the Senate.224 In a compromise
reached between the House and the Senate, the Code was
subordinated to the U.S. anti-dumping law. In other words,
to President's Constitutional Authority):
An executive agreement, made by the United States without reference to
a treaty or act of Congress, conforming to the constitutional limitations
stated in section 121, and manifesting an intention that it shall become
effective as domestic law of the United States at the time it becomes
binding on the United States (a) supercedes inconsistent provisions of
the laws of the several states (b) but does not supercede inconsistent
provisions of earlier acts of Congress.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
144(1). For a discussion of Executive Agreements, see infra Section 2.
221 Senator Hartke was its one of its most vocal critics. See Pintos & Murphy,
supra note 195, at 187 (discussing the inconsistencies between the Act and the
Code). According to Hodges, then Secretary of Commerce, the President
negotiated the Code under his constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs
as well as pursuant to § 241(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See
International Anti-dumping Code, Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 42-43 (June 27, 1968) (providing statement of William Roth, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations).
222 Infra Section 2.
223 Among them was Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY). See Pintos & Murphy,
supra note 195, at 185-86 (noting that Javits believed the Code would measurably
lessen future protective barriers against U.S. exports and intemational trade in
general).
224 Id.; Long, supra note 208.
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Congress directed the Treasury to disregard the International Anti-
dumping Code in so far as it was inconsistent with U.S. Law.225
This did not, however, improve the consistency with which the
Tariff Commission made determinations on dumping. For
example, while in cases construing the International Anti-dumping
Code it had declined to assess the impact on a segmented industry,
it did so in the post-Code era.
3.3.3. The 1980s and Beyond: Strengthening the Administration
of Anti-dumping
The problems facing the steel industry in the 1960s carried over
into the 1980s- as shown by administrative changes and judicial
interpretations of the U.S. anti-dumping law, perhaps intended to
address a growing sense within the U.S. steel industry and other
export industries that foreigners had an unfair advantage over
them. 226 As a result, towards the end of the 1980s anti-dumping
law became the U.S.'s "weapon of choice" in its trade wars.227
Administratively in 1980, the International Trade
Administration ("ITA"), which is part of the Department of
Commerce, replaced the Treasury Department in determining
whether imports are being brought into the U.S. at "less than its
fair value." The ITA also replaced the Tariff Commission in
225 The compromise amendment provided that:
Nothing contained in the International Anti-dumping Code shall be
construed to restrict the discretion of the U.S. Tariff Commission in
performing its duties and functions under the Anti-dumping Act, 1921,
and in performing their duties and functions under such Act the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff Commission shall (1) resolve any
conflict between the International Anti-dumping Code and the Anti-
dumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the agency
administering the Act, and (2) take into account the provisions of the
International Anti-dumping Code only insofar as they are consistent
with the Anti-dumping Act, 1921, as applied by the agency
administering the Act.
Renegotiation Amendment Act of 1968, 19 U.S.C.S. § 160 (1976) (repealed 1979).
226 See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM Gagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patricks eds., 1990)[hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM] (providing an excellent discussion of the
unfairness trade claims). For observations challenging the view that foreign trade
is directly related to labor shortages in the United States, see JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
TRADE AND WAGES: A MALIGN RELATIONSHIP? (Dept. of Economics, Columbia
University Discussion Paper Series No. 761, Oct. 1995) [hereinafter BHAGWATI,
TRADE AND WAGES] and DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR 1 (1997).
227 Bhala, supra note 178, at 3-4.
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conducting inquiries on whether or not the less than fair value
sales caused or threatened to cause material injury to a domestic
industry.228 The Customs Court Act of 1980 established the Court
of International Trade,229 whose powers are equivalent to a federal
district court, although most of its cases concern unfair import
practices by trading partners, which includes anti-dumping law,
customs duties and the classification and valuation of imported
merchandise. Appeals from the Court of International Trade are
directed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
"Federal Circuit"). However, according to Paul Stephan, the
establishment of a special court with exclusive jurisdiction over
foreign trade makes it susceptible to overstate its role as opposed
to empowering a federal district court to serve this role.230
This thesis can, however, be best explored by examining the
decisions of the ITC, especially when they come up for review by
the Federal Circuit. For example, in the 1989 decision in Algoma
Steel Corporation v. U.S., an anti-dumping dispute with Canada, the
Federal Circuit upheld a calculation of less than fair value that was
doubtful under the 1979 dumping codes and the U.S.'s obligations
under the Uruguay Round.231 The Federal Circuit held that in case
of a conflict between U.S. legislation and the U.S.'s, obligations
under the then 1979 dumping codes, U.S. legislation prevails.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld the U.S. International Trade
Commission's finding. In calculating what constitutes material
injury or less than fair value sales, it included lost sales to imports
even though those imports had been sold at fair prices. Such an
interpretation questions the efficacy of domestic enforcement of the
international trading regime to the extent that it fails to distinguish
between the presence of successful import competition, on the one
M See Custom Duties, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2003) (setting guidelines for
imposition of anti-dumping duties).
229 Nine judges sit on this court. They are appointed for life by the President
of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.
230 Paul B. Stephan, Further Reflections on the Implementation of Comparative
Advantage Principles in Trade Law, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 111, 115-117.
231 Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The
1994 Anti-dumping Agreement provides that a country determining whether or
not to impose an anti-dumping duty must isolate factors other than dumped
imports that have injured a domestic industry, that "the injuries caused by other
factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports." Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. 9650, 31 U.S.T. 4919, art. 3.4 [hereinafter Anti-dumping
Agreement].
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 63 2004
U. Pa. J. Int 7 Econ. L.
hand, and injury caused by imports, on the other.
To the extent that the 1994 Anti-dumping Code does not
prohibit taking into account lost sales to imports in the calculation
of the dumping margin, it implicitly leaves room for national
authorities to overstate the injury that exports have to industries.
Similarly, it leaves room for those accused of dumping to question
such over-inclusive calculations. The possibility of construing
legitimate export competition as dumping, in my view,
demonstrates the malleable nature of the trade regime. The regime
can be used to protect domestic values, such as jobs and the U.S.
steel industry, as Algoma Steel Corporation demonstrates, as much as
it can be contested from alternative points of view. In conclusion,
the lack of any firm requirement for distinguishing between
dumping and economic distress in WTO agreements provides
space for outcomes that obviously depart from the goal of
obviating dumping. In the context of the European Community,
the situation is not very different.232
3.3.4. The Fate of Competition Policy in Foreign Trade in the
1970s-1980s: Voluntary Export Agreements
If the 1921 Anti-dumping Act succeeded in distancing
competition policy, voluntary export agreements virtually eclipsed
it in the foreign trade policy realm. Voluntary export agreements
embodied negotiated quantitative restrictions of steel and
automobiles coming from other countries to the United States. In
the 1960s and early 1970s, the President entered into a variety of
quantitative restrictions with respect to fairly traded goods
including steel.233 Arguably, these voluntary export agreements
may be said to have arisen from the President's foreign affairs
power. However, since 1974, Section 201 of the Trade Act
expressly authorizes the President to enter into "orderly marketing
agreements." Voluntary export agreements were designed to help
industries facing distress 234 notwithstanding the fact that they are
232 See Case C-179/87, Sharp Corp. v. Council, 1992 E.C.R. 1-2069 (indicating
that the outcome of certain European policies also stray from their intended goal
of eliminating dumping).
233 That is in contrast to unfairly traded goods that have been dumped or
subsidized without any express congressional authority.
234 A fact not in dispute, "Steel imports into the United States increased more
than tenfold over the period between 1958 and 1968 .. " See Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F. 2d 136, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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arguably contrary to the GATT/WTO prohibition against
quantitative restrictions.235 Since the crisis in the steel industry
continued into the 1970s, in 1972 the Nixon administration
pursuant to pressure from the steel industry and union
representatives 236 extended the limitations on steel shipments into
the U.S. from 1972 to 1974.
In Consumers Union v. Rogers,237 a public interest group
challenged this extension arguing, first, that the voluntary restraint
agreements were a regulation of foreign commerce inconsistent
with Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution and Sections
232 and 352 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1961 and, as such, were
argued to be illegal since they were beyond the President's power.
Second, they argued that the agreements were contrary to U.S.
antitrust laws. Additionally, a federal district court held that the
President is not preempted from entering into agreements with
private steel concerns as he had done with the voluntary restraint
agreements, but that the President could not in so doing violate
legislation regulating foreign commerce such as the Sherman Act.
The district court was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (the "D.C. Circuit") finding that the
"exclusive congressional regulation of foreign commerce" under
Article I of the Constitution was not in conflict with "assurances of
voluntary restraint given to the Executive." 238 The Appeals court
also vacated the antitrust ruling since the issue had been
withdrawn in the district court and was not therefore properly
before it.239 Soon thereafter, Congress amended the 1974 Trade Act
to specifically exempt the participants in the steel voluntary
restraint agreements from antitrust liability where such
arrangement was at the request of the U.S. Secretary of State and
ended no later than January 1, 1975.240 As the dissent in this case
235 For complete schedules of Voluntary Export Agreements ("VEA") and
Voluntary Export Restraints ("VER"), see GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, supra note
177, at 477-78.
236 Kissinger, 506 F.2d at 139. The steel industry argued that additional time
within which it could enjoy less competition from abroad was necessary to allow
it to make changes necessary to enable it to be more competitive.
237 Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-24 (D.D.C. 1973),
vacated in part by 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
238 Kissinger, 506 F. 2d at 143.
239 Id. at 140, 143.
240 Sections 6-7 of the Trade Act of 1974 provide that:
No person shall be liable for damages, penalties, or other sanctions under
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 65 2004
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
noted, the Court's opinion did not address whether the agreements
were inconsistent with the congressional delegation of the foreign
commerce power to the President to limit imports only under two
circumstances: to negotiate orderly marketing agreements 241 and
on the basis of national security with the consent of foreign
producers.242 In other words, Justice Leventhal's dissent, while
recognizing the role for an inherent role for the Executive,
nevertheless found that the agreements were inconsistent with this
scheme since Congress had established a "comprehensive scheme
occupying the field of import restraints." 243
This issue arose again in the 1980s when the Reagan
Administration negotiated further restraint agreements with Japan
particularly in the area of automobiles. The automobile import
restraints were necessitated by a sense that Japanese automobile
manufacturers were unfairly competing with U.S. automobile
manufacturers. This sense within the U.S. automobile industry
was however found wanting by the ITC in a 1980 case brought
before it under Section 201 of the Trade Act. In Certain Motor
Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies,244 the ITC on a 3-2 vote
found that Japanese imports were not the primary cause of injury
to American manufacturers. With no affirmative finding of injury
the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77] or the Antitrust
Acts (as defined in section 4 of Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 441), or under any similar State law, on account of his negotiating,
entering into, participating in, or implementing an arrangement
providing for the voluntary limitation on exports of steel and steel
products into the United States, or any modification or renewal ......
19 U.S.C. § 2485 (2003).
241 Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 352, 19 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
242 Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994). According to
Justice Leventhal, there is a distinction "between executive actions that rest
wholly in the domain of appeals and exhortations, and executive actions that
culminate in obligations. A good faith agreement with the kind of specificity
present here puts an obligation on the foreign producer, in any realistic
assessment. Accordingly, . . . the executive negotiation and acceptance of these
undertakings are activity in a field that has been preempted by Congress, and can
only be engaged in by following the procedures set forth in the Congressional
enactments." Kissinger, 506 F. 2d at 152.
243 Id. at 146. Justice Leventhal relied on Justice Jackson's judgment in
Youngstown to the effect that "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id. at 149.
244 2 I.T.R.D. 5241 (1980).
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to the U.S. automobile industry, this case in effect closed the door
on the Reagan Administration to exercise its power to negotiate an
orderly marketing agreement with Japan as provided by Section
201 of the 1974 Trade Act. The only other power available to the
administration was to negotiate with Japan under the President's
foreign affairs powers. This time, the central issue was no longer
whether or not the President was so authorized to act, but rather,
whether in so acting, the President could immunize Japanese
automobile companies from antitrust liability.
To dodge this issue, the U.S. administration advised the
Japanese government to be centrally involved in "ordering,
directing, or compelling any agreement restraining exports into the
U.S. in terms as specific as possible" 245 to avoid Japanese
companies from being exposed to private antitrust suits. The
Japanese government did eventually give written directives
specifying the details of the export controls. This in essence
amounted to some form of compulsory compliance with
government directives which in essence immunized Japanese
companies from antitrust liability. 246
Thus in the 1980s, the President's inherent authority in the
foreign trade realm continued to solidify, but not without
challenge in the courts and from Congress. Most prominent of
these problems was of course the place of competition policy in the
context of voluntary export agreements, an objective at odds with
protecting domestic industries and social values. Both anti-
dumping law and presidential constitutional and legal authority
over foreign commerce were increasingly deployed to protect
domestic industries. These protections and social values formed
the legal backdrop against which the era of managed trade
emerged in the 1990s.
3.3.5. The 1990s: Managed/Strategic Trade and Its Impact on U.S.
GATT/IWTO Commitments
While the emerging framework of trade remedy law laid a
245 Attorney General William Smith of the Reagan Administration in writing
to then-U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock as cited in Joel Davidow, Cartels,
Competition Laws and the Regulation of International Trade, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 351, 372-73 (1983).
246 According to Davidow, one way of dealing with the problem the Reagan
Administration faced in this instance would be to expand the state action defense
to include voluntary, and not just compulsory, compliance. Id.
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basis for the emergence of a regime of managed or strategic trade
in the 1990s, other factors played a role as well. A primary impetus
was a widespread perception, especially in various hi-tech sectors
and the steel and automobile industries, that imports from Japan
and the newly industrializing countries of South East Asia (and
with those of developing countries) were responsible for the
market share loss of U.S. products, slowing economic growth rates
and the attendant loss of jobs or the inability of U.S. workers to
maintain their standards of living. One variation of this theme was
based on the spectacular economic growth of the Japanese and the
East Asian economies without the type of nineteenth century
industrialization that either the U.S. or England underwent. In
another variation of the theme, labor 247 and industry groups
claimed that while the U.S. had progressively opened its borders to
international trade, its trading partners had not reciprocated in
opening their borders to U.S. goods. One consequence of this era
of trade debates was the quest by the U.S. to pry open foreign
markets perceived as closed to U.S. commerce. 248
247 See generally PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: How AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1998) (describing the history of labor in the U.S.). Robert Kuttner notes
that "[t]he system we have today is a far cry from either free trade or common
rules. And the de facto rules we live with profoundly disadvantage the United
States economy." KUTTNER, supra note 5, at 116.
248 According to Peter F. Cowhey and Jonathan D. Aronson, the emerging
regime was less about removing barriers to trade at international boundaries but
more about demanding access for investment and the international review of
domestic policies to ensure fair market competition. See generally PETER F.
COWHEY & JONATHAN D. ARONSON, MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE ALLIANCES (1993).
Robert Kuttner describes the outcome of the debate within the Carter
Administration in the following terms:
The economists and their laissez-faire allies in the State Department and
the Treasury won the ideological debate: free trade remained official
American dogma. However, the industrial nationalists at Commerce,
Labor, USTR, Pentagon, and CIA won at least half a loaf when it came to
actual policies. Unfortunately, because of the ideological dissembling, it
was the worse half of the loaf.
KUTrNER, supra note 5, at 125. See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 226;
ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM (1992); Robert B. Reich, Who is Us? HARV. BUS. REV. 53-64 (Jan.-Feb.
1990); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still
Matters, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1991, at 37 (addressing Robert Reich's question,
"Who is us?," she suggests five propositions about foreign firms operating in the
U.S.); Robert B. Reich, Rejoinder: Who Do We Think They Are, AM. PROSPECT, Winter
1991 No.4, at 50 (responding to Tyson's propositions and stating that "the object
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While it is arguable that foreign competition has hurt the U.S.,
it is inaccurate to attribute the loss of low scale jobs and the
lowering of wages entirely to developing countries.249 There are a
variety of factors that need to be taken into account in this context
other than foreign competition, such as demographic factors in
conjunction with domestic economic practices. Scholars like
Jagdish Bhagwati have suggested that it is not entirely clear that
the low wages in developed countries can be accounted for by
labor saving technologies and skills. 250 The effects of globalization,
in and of themselves, cannot account for the loss of these jobs.
However, Dani Rodrick has argued that there is a probable
relationship between the loss of labor's bargaining power in the
U.S. and globalization because the latter makes the substitutability
of labor across national boundaries much easier. 251 In addition, as
Jagdish Bhagwati has demonstrated, there are few sound economic
arguments for suggesting Japanese imports into the U.S. are
dumped merely because Japan practices industrial policies that are
uncommon in the United States. If anything, Japanese producers
are much more efficient than U.S. industries at various stages of
production and what are often depicted as indicia of industrial
policy are simply superior methods of industrial production than
those of the United States.252
4. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MINIMALISM IN ACTION: AN INCISIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE HOT-ROLLED STEEL PRODUCTS CASES
4.1. Anticipating the Case: International Minimalism and the Uruguay
Round Fallout
The legal issues presented to the WTO and litigated in the U.S.
in the hot-rolled steel products cases were largely anticipated.253
These legal issues included: captive production; price comparison
of American industrial policy should be to enhance the value that American
workers can add to the world economy, not to increase the profitability or global
market share" as there is a "crucial, and growing, difference between the two").
249 See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996) (writing about
international trade).
250 BHAGWATI, supra note 226.
251 See RODRIK, supra note 226, at 4 (noting the sources of tension between the
global market and social stability).
252 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 13-57 (1991).
253 Holmer, supra note 12, at 484.
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methodology; use of facts available and adverse facts available, as
well as the issue of causation and non-attribution; and the
calculation of the all others' rate. The debate within the U.S. on the
extent to which it implemented legislation of the Uruguay Round
on the Agreement Implementing Article VI did not resolve
differences within the U.S. regarding the exact scope of the
legislation. 2 4 Partly to steer clear of the objections to various WTO
agreements, the U.S. "took a minimalist approach to
implementation: if the provisions of its law were not clearly in
violation of the WTO agreements as the U.S. interpreted them, the
U.S. took no legislative action."255 This approach is a central part of
the U.S. attitude towards international law. There are at least five
aspects that characterize this approach: (1) there is a less
pronounced attention to matching domestic implementing
legislation to reflect formally international rules in a rigorously
formal manner; (2) the attention given to policy considerations
counterbalances the attention given to the formal clarity of rules;
(3) there is some ambivalence regarding the normative authority of
rules of international law, 25 6 which is more accommodating of
relative degrees of bindingness as opposed to a formal approach of
characterizing U.S. obligations under international law as strictly
categorical; 257 and for these reasons, (4) adjudications in the WTO's
DSB are often unpredictable; and (5) the implementation of the
DSB recommendations is not entirely driven by compliance to the
extent that it provides room for negotiation, compromise and
accommodation in view of implementation difficulties within a
WTO member's legal system.
This Section of the Article will demonstrate how the U.S.'s
policy of international minimalism in the context of the foreign
trade power plays out. To do so, I discuss how the negotiating
history of the Uruguay Round as well as that of the implementing
legislation (particularly on the Agreement to Implement Article VI,
254 The semiconductor and automobile industries, for example, vigorously
objected to the Agreement's restriction of the scope of start-up costs that could be
exempt from dumping calculations. See id. at 486.
255 Leebron, supra note 9, at 234.
256 For a discussion of normative authority of rules of international law in
related context, see James Thuo Gathii, Neo Liberalism, Colonialism and International
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1996, 2027-34 (2000).
257 For further discussion, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International
Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 9, 19-22 (1999).
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the anti-dumping code) foreshadowed the hot-rolled steel products
cases at the WTO and within the U.S. federal judiciary.
4.1.1. Captive Production
Although this was not an issue negotiated during the Uruguay
Round, the steel industry seized upon the debate on implementing
legislation following the completion of the round to raise the issue.
An immediate reason for the steel industry seizing the moment
was its loss on that issue in the Flat-rolled Carbon Steel case before
the ITC in 1993.258 The claim in that case by U.S. steel producers
was that in failing to distinguish between captive production and
merchant sales in identifying U.S. industry, the ITC's practice
double-counted upstream steel products. Captive production
occurs in situations where an industry has vertically integrated
manufacturing stages so that one stage of the manufacturing
process produces goods for the next stage. These goods are
referred to as "captive" products in the sense that they are
primarily intended for reuse towards a final product within a
vertically integrated manufacturing process. Since they are
manufactured for internal reuse rather than for sale to third
parties, captive products often raise the question of double-
counting. Using the Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products case as an
example, U.S. steel manufacturers claimed that hot-rolled steel was
counted twice because it also counted again once transformed into
cold-rolled steel.259 However, as ITC Commissioner Askey stated
in the Hot-Rolled Steel Products investigation: "significant captive
consumption effectively protects the domestic industry by providing
integrated producers with a guaranteed market in which they do
258 Certain Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, Investigation Numbers 701-TA-319-332, 334, 336-42, and 347-53
(Final) and 731-TA-573-579, 581-92, 594-97, 599-609, and 612-19 (Final), USITC
Pub. 2664 (Aug. 1993), Vol. 1 (finding that the U.S. steel industry was not
"materially injured" or "threatened with material injury" by reason of the imports
of flat-rolled carbon steel products that the U.S. Department of Commerce found
to be subsidized by the governments of the nations subject to this investigation).
259 See Holmer, supra note 12, at 490 (citing the ITC's decision: "Petitioner's
proposal to exclude internal transfers of upstream or 'semi-finished' products
from calculations of apparent consumption, market share and financial
performance relating to such products similarly is not supported by the statute,
commission or practice or judicial precedent where investigations involve more
than one industry.").
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not compete with imports or with non-affiliated domestic
producers."260
The implementing legislation, however, included a new captive
production provision261  which effectively and legislatively
overruled the ITC's Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products case. In its
statement of administrative action, the U.S. required the ITC to
consider the production of the domestic-like product sold in the
merchant market generally to be used in the production of the
downstream products if a significant portion of the production that
enters that merchant market is actually processed in the same
downstream product as the product that is produced from the
internally transferred captive market.262
It is noteworthy that consistent with its policy on international
minimalism, the U.S.-implementing legislation on the Uruguay
Round, particularly with regard to the standards to be used by the
ITC in making determinations on captive production, was also
contained in a Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"). This
manner of committing to international obligations -through a
statement of administrative action as opposed to implementing
legislation- raises the question of the legal authority of the
statement under GATT/WTO agreements. 263 Congress authorized
the SAA in the Uruguay Round Amendments Act ("URAA"), and
it has already received a WTO panel acknowledgement as a source
260 U.S. International Trade Commission, Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
From Japan, Investigation No. 731-TA-807 (Final), USITC Pub. 3202, June 1999,
available at http://www.usitc.gov/er/n11999/ER0611W.HTM.
261 The administration initially opposed the amendment but "caved in to
political pressure." Later, it cited a similar Canadian practice to justify the
amendment. See Holmer, supra note 12, at 490-91.
262 The Uruguay Round Agreements Statement of Administrative Action 167,
in Message from the President of the U.S. Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade
Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative
Action and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, Vol. 1, 103d
Cong., 656, 837 (1994). The Statement of Administrative Action in relation to anti-
dumping is authorized by Section 771(7)(E)(ii) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(E)(ii).
263 In the Indian Pharmaceuticals case, an administrative basis, as opposed to
a sound legal basis, to protect a product's novelty, was ruled to be insufficient to
create legally binding obligations to protect such novelty as required by the TRIPS
Agreement. See WTO Appellate Body Report on India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). The
point expressed in the text was also made by Petros Mavroidis in response to a
question in the 2000 American Society of International Law Annual Meeting on a
panel titled, The WTO and a Constitutional Framework for the World Economy, 94 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L LAW PROC. 291, 292 (2000).
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of U.S./WTO-implementing obligations.264 Under the URAA, the
ITC's determinations of captive production does not "necessarily
give decisive guidance with respect to the determination by the
Commission of material injury."265 This is pertinent since it formed
an important part of the U.S.'s argument in defending its captive
production provisions in the Hot-Rolled Steel Products case at the
WTO as we shall see below.
In Hot-Rolled Steel Products, the Japanese claimed that the
captive production provisions in the U.S. legislation "biased,"
"distorted," or "skewed" the ITC's anti-dumping determinations
or that these provisions led the ITC to ignore the "shielding
effects" of captive production in its injury determinations. 266 The
"shielding effect" referred to here is that, when applied, the captive
production provision segments the domestic industry by
distinguishing between those segments that are selling their like
products to third parties and those that use the like products for
their own consumption. This in turn understates the extent of
domestic industry for purposes of determining injury in a manner
that might potentially distort injury calculations against second
countries and in favor of the United States.267
Japan therefore argued that the captive production provision
under U.S. law was inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement. Specifically, Japan argued that to the extent
to which the captive production provision required the ITC to
"focus primarily" on a segment of an industry was contrary to the
264 See Section 301 Case, supra note 14. In the Panel Report, the Panel
observed the statement of administrative action is "an authoritative expression by
the Administration regarding the interpretation and application of the Uruguay
Round agreements, both for purposes of U.S. international obligations and
domestic law.., it is the expectation of Congress that future Administrations will
observe and apply the interpretations and commitments set out in this
Statement." WTO Panel Report on United States -Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, para. 7.198, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28,
2001) [hereinafter Panel Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products].
265 Tariff Act of 1930, § 771(7)(E)(ii), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(ii). Similarly,
Article 3.4 of the Anti-dumping Agreement states that its list of considerations in
the determination of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry "is
not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance." Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 231, art 3.1.
266 See WTO Appellate Body Report on the United States - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Japan, paras. 27-28,
WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Hot-
Rolled Steel Products].
267 This was also alluded to by Chile. See id. para. 41.
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requirement under Article 3.4 of the Anti-dumping Code that
requires "an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry."268 Brazil argued that
the captive production provisions in the U.S. legislation foreclosed
the ITC from considering the captive portion of the market under
the conditions specified in the legislation thereby heightening the
risk that the ITC "may attribute to imports the effects of other
causes, since an industry may itself have chosen to decrease its
merchant market shipments in favour of captive shipments to
downstream production that reap higher profits." 269 The essence
of the complaint against the U.S. was that its captive production
provision permits the U.S. to examine only a portion of domestic
producers of like products rather than all of them as a whole-a
policy that is inconsistent with its obligation to undertake an
objective assessment. 270
In its defense, the U.S. in part argued that to succeed in
demonstrating that its provisions were WTO inconsistent, Japan
had to show that the provision "itself mandates WTO-inconsistent
action," which it had failed to do.271 Besides arguing that the
captive production provision was inconsistent with Articles 3.1,
3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.1 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, Japan
also argued that the ITC's application of the provision was
inconsistent with the same provisions of the Agreement. 272 The
Appellate Body ("AB") found that the requirement of examining
the effect of dumped imports on the domestic market in Article 3.1
of the Anti-dumping Agreement is subject to an objectivity
requirement, meaning that it "must conform to the dictates of the
basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness." 273 In
268 Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 231, art. 3.4.
269 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para.
34.
270 Article 3.1 of the Anti-dumping Agreement provides that an injury
determination "shall ... involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume
of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports
on domestic producers of such products." Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note
231, art. 3.1. Article 17.6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement provides that a WTO
panel in determining whether national authorities' establishment of facts in anti-
dumping actions were proper have to consider whether the evaluation of facts
was unbiased or objective. See id. art. 17.6.
271 Id. para. 27.
272 Id. para. 182.
273 Id. para. 193. Hence the AB ruled that "in short, an 'objective examination'
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addition such an examination must be based on "positive
evidence," or "the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective
and verifiable character, and that it must be credible." 274
While the AB concurred with the U.S. that Article 3.4 of the
Anti-dumping Code opened up the possibility of examining a
segment of an industry in assessing the state of the industry as a
whole, 275 it nevertheless observed that "investigating authorities
are not entitled to conduct their investigation in such a way that it
becomes more likely that, as a result of the fact-finding or
evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry
is injured." 276 In essence, the AB upheld the captive production
provision since as the U.S. argued, it did not mandate any
particular interpretation since its meaning has not been decisively
determined even within the United States.277 According to the AB,
the captive production provision is useful in enabling investigating
authorities in comparing segments of the industry to "make an
appropriate determination about the state of the domestic industry
as a whole." 278 Hence, to the extent that the AB found that the
captive production provision was not per se exclusive,27 9 it was not
inconsistent with the U.S.'s obligations under the Anti-dumping
Agreement. Thus the U.S. prevailed in its argument that the
captive production provision did not mandate an inconsistent
outcome with GATT/WTO. This outcome continues a WTO
jurisprudence tradition that sustains discretionary authority to
executive officials that might be used in a WTO- inconsistent
manner, while only prohibiting measures mandating WTO
inconsistent action.280
However, although the AB upheld the captive production
requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any
interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation." Id.
274 Id. para. 192.
275 See id. paras. 194-95, 198 (finding that evaluation of certain sectors in order
to assess the state of an industry as a whole is an acceptable requirement).
276 See id. paras. 196 (noting the obligation to "examine the impact").
277 See id. para 200 (presenting the finding of the Appellate Body that there is
not currently any definitive interpretation of the captive production provision).
278 Id. para. 207.
279 See id. para 208 (finding no necessary inconsistency between the captive
production provision and the Anti-dumping Agreement).
280 This mandatory-discretionary distinction was upheld in the Section 301
Case. See Section 301 Case, supra note 14.
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provision as not being inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement,28l it nevertheless found the provision
application in this case inconsistent with the objectivity
requirement of Article 3.1. According to the AB, the ITC had to
examine all other parts of the industry as it had examined the
captive production segment "or, in the alternative, provide a
satisfactory explanation as to why it is not necessary to examine
directly or specifically the other parts."2 82 Thus the strongest
ground on which Japan could stand on this issue was less its
formal inconsistency with GATT/WTO law than its application.
Japan therefore prevails but the challenged provision is left
standing thereby opening the door to future similar applications
and challenges.
4.1.2. Price Comparison Methodology and Sales "in the Ordinary
Course" of Trade
The methodology of price comparison was an issue in the
negotiations of the 1994 Uruguay Round because countries sought
to have fair comparisons of prices in the import and in the foreign
market. The use of different price comparisons and individual
sales versus weighted average sales increased dumping margins
favorably towards the United States.283  Having agreed to these
changes to the Anti-dumping Agreement on the pretext that they
were necessary to obviate targeted dumping,284 the U.S. sought to
limit their effect of these changes on the prior practice of increased
margins. To do so, the U.S. argued that Article 2.4.2 limited
average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction comparisons to
the investigation phase (when the ITC determines whether or not
dumping is occurring) and not to the review phase (when anti-
dumping duties are assessed). Thus in its implementing
legislation, the U.S. read ambiguity into Article 2.4.2 of Anti-
281 Thereby the AB upholding the panel decision on this point. See Appellate
Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 263, para. 219.
282 Id. para. 211. See also id. para. 214 (restating that all parts of an industry
should be examined in a like manner barring satisfactory explanation otherwise).
283 See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, How THE GATT AFFECTS U.S. ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
POLICY (1994).
284 Holmer, supra note 12, at 492. According to Stewart, the outcome that is
obviated here is "preventing the windfall to those buying dumped merchandise
having some part of the dumping duties that should be paid to those importers
paying fair value." Id. at 494.
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dumping Agreement as a basis for continuing its prior practice.
This practice, some have argued, is inconsistent not only with
Article 2.4 but also Article 18.3 of the Anti-dumping Agreement.285
Moreover, this practice is also inconsistent with clear
Congressional authority since 1984 that average-to-average price
comparisons be used both in the investigation as well as review
phases.286
While the U.S.'s practice of comparing individual sales in the
import market to weighted average sales in the foreign market was
not challenged in Hot-rolled Steel Products from Japan, Japan
nevertheless challenged another aspect of the U.S.'s price
comparison methodology: the determination of sales "in the
ordinary course of trade" under the 95.5% test or the "arms length"
test. The U.S. uses this test with respect to home market sales to
determine if home market sales to affiliated customers by an
exporter affected the pricing of the product. Pursuant to this test,
sales are made at arm's length where the prices to affiliated
customers are, on average, at least 99.5% of the price charged to
unaffiliated customers. 287 The DOC first determines the weighted
average selling price for the product by the exporter to each
affiliated party. Then it calculates the weighted average selling
price for all the non-affiliated parties, as opposed to individual
selling prices in the case of affiliated parties. Where "the weighted
average price for sales to an individual affiliated party is 99.5%, or
more, of the weighted average price of sales to all non-affiliated
parties, all of the sales to that affiliated party are treated as being
made 'in the ordinary course of trade.' 288 If the weighted average
sales price for sales to an individual affiliated party falls below the
99.5% threshold, all of the sales to that affiliated party are treated
as being made outside 'the ordinary course of trade' and are
disregarded in calculating normal value. "289
The U.S. defended excluding sales below the 99.5% threshold
285 Id. at 493; Leebron, supra note 9, at 236-37.
286 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (2000).
287 Section 771(33)(E) of the Tariff Act of 1930 defines the term "affiliated
persons" as including "[a]ny person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or
holding with power to vote, 5 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock or
shares of any organization and such organization." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E).
288 The term "in the ordinary course of trade" was adopted by the AB from
the U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") policy.
289 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para.
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in calculating normal value on several grounds. First, the U.S.
argued that such sales to unaffiliated customers are "generally
recognized" as being outside the ordinary course of trade.290
Second, the 99.5% rule eliminates the "distort[ing]" effect of
artificially low-priced sales to affiliates. 291 Third, the U.S. argued
that the test was "not mandated" by any U.S. law or provision of
the code, but was a "consistent" DOC practice as "reflected in
certain federal notices issued by the U.S. Government." 292
Hence, as with the case regarding captive production, the U.S.
advanced informal or open-ended administrative agency praxes in
responding to attacks of formal GATT/WTO inconsistency by
other countries. Here the U.S. exploited WTO jurisprudence to the
extent that it allows executive authorities to exercise discretion in
trade matters without spelling out in detail the constraints
imposed by GATT/WTO agreements.293
Rather than directly challenging the 99.5% test, Japan
challenged its application as inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement. According to Japan, the effect of the
test in excluding low-priced sales to affiliates inflated the normal
value.294 In addition, Japan argued the test was an "arbitrary
threshold that did not take account of the usual variation of prices
in the marketplace." 295 The Panel report had indicated that the
99.5% test had the effect of establishing only lower than 99.5% sales
to affiliated customers, but not sales above that margin to affiliated
customers.296 Hence, rather than comparing differences in prices
between affiliated and non-affiliated customers, the 99.5% test only
targeted lower sales to affiliated customers with a resulting
tendency of excluding them thereby "skew[ing] the normal value
upward." 297 The AB upheld the panel's determination that the
99.5% test did not rest on a permissible interpretation of Article 2.1
290 Id. para. 14.
291 Id. para. 15.
292 Id. para. 133.
293 See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address
Public Health Crisis: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. 71, 84 (2001) (discussing
the invocation by the U.S. of WTO jurisprudence in its arguments).
294 See Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266,
paras. 134, 144.
295 Id. para. 134.
296 See id. para. 135 (citing the Panel Report on Hot Rolled-Steel Products found
supra in note 264 under paragraph 7.110).
297 Id. para. 136.
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of the Anti-dumping Agreement, or within the meaning of Article
17.6(ii) thereof.
According to the U.S., the 99.5% rule was a "'bright-line' test"
that operated "automatically" to exclude all low-priced sales
without giving exporters a right to show that such sales were made
in the ordinary course of trade.298 By contrast, the U.S. had no
similar bright-line rule for testing for high-priced sales to affiliates,
nor did it test for them systematically like it did in the case of low-
priced sales.299 Instead, the U.S. only tested for low-priced sales
and excluded them in calculating normal value while including
high-priced sales.300 According to the AB:
In our view, there is lack of evenhandedness in the two tests
applied by the United States, in this case, to establish
whether sales made to affiliates were "in the ordinary
course of trade." The combined application of these two
rules operated systematically to raise normal value,
through the automatic exclusion of marginally low-priced
sales, coupled with the automatic inclusion of all high-
priced sales, except those proved upon request, to be
aberrationally high-priced. The application of the two tests,
thereby, disadvantaged exporters. 30'
298 Id. para. 149.
299 Id. para. 151.
30 Id. para. 152. The U.S. argued it had a practice of excluding aberrationally
high priced sales. Id. In this case, the U.S. argued that none of the exporters had
sought to avail themselves of the exclusion of high-priced sales, and in any event
this did not prejudice them. However, the AB noted that:
We are not persuaded by this argument. The rule applied to high-priced
sales, in this case, was not contained in any guidelines, or other
document conveyed to the interested parties. It is, therefore, not clear to
us that exporters would have known of the rule applied to high-priced
sales. Moreover, even if exporters knew of the rule itself, there seems to
have been no means for them to ascertain which of their sales might
satisfy the particular threshold of "aberrationally" high-prices applied by
USDOC in this case. Viewed in this light, we cannot attach significance
to the absence of formal requests in this case for the exclusion of high-
priced sales from the calculation of normal value. In addition, the lack of
even-handedness in the rules applied, in this case, to low-priced and
high-priced sales might, in itself, have created prejudice to exporters.
Id. para. 155.
301 Id. para. 154.
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For these reasons, among others, the AB affirmed the Panel's
finding that the 99.5% test does "not rest on a permissible
interpretation of the term 'sales in the ordinary course of trade...
!"302
4.1.3. Use of Facts Available - Rigid or Flexible Submission
Deadlines?
In both the captive production and price comparison
methodology issues, the U.S. primarily exploited the
discretionary/mandatory distinction especially in showing how
the exercise of administrative discretion did not prejudice
exporters. However, with regard to the issue of facts available, the
U.S. construed the Anti-dumping Agreement as imposing a rigid,
as opposed to an open-ended, submission deadline for
questionnaires. This would in turn preempt the DOC from
proceeding only on the basis of facts available. In a sense,
therefore, the U.S. defended its decision to decline accepting
questionnaires after the deadline it imposed on the basis of a
bright-line rule that did not give the Japanese respondents much
flexibility. In short, it is reasonable to suppose that the U.S. in this
case defended its captive production provision as well as the
calculation of dumping margins by arguing that its administrative
practices did not mandate or amount to GATT/WTO illegality or
an application inconsistent with the U.S.'s GATT/WTO
obligations, though when it came to the conduct of foreign
respondents, the U.S. argued that they had violated bright-line
rules.303
The facts at issue in this case relate to the rejection by the DOC
of information on "weight conversion factors" supplied by the two
Japanese respondents, NKK Corporation ("NKK") and Nippon
Steel Corporation ("NSC"), at the investigation stage. The DOC
rejected the information because it was submitted after the
deadlines for responses to the DOC's questionnaires. 3 4 NKK
alleged "that it was 'impracticable or impossible' to calculate the
requested weight conversion factor" while NSC alleged that "it
had no way of calculating a weight conversion factor, because it
302 Id. para. 158.
303 Japan in fact argued that the U.S. was asserting "mechanical deadlines"
that would "eliminate any need to consider the facts and circumstances of a case."
Id. para. 17.
304 See id. para. 63.
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did not know the actual weight of the steel products sold on a
theoretical weight basis."305 The companies were given eighty-
seven days to respond to the questionnaires. NSC submitted its
weight conversion information fourteen days before verification,
while the Kawasaki Steel Corporation ("KSC") did so nine days
before the verification date. NSC alleged that it had discovered
this information separate from its main sales database in a
production facility southwest of Japan. NKK submitted its "best
estimate" as a surrogate for an actual weight conversion factor
upon the DOC's acceptance of KSC's "best estimate."306 The DOC,
however, rejected the weight conversion information submitted as
untimely3 7 because it was submitted "after the relevant deadlines for
questionnaire responses" established by the DOC.308
The legal issues at stake therefore related to whether the U.S.'s
application of adverse facts in the dumping margin calculations
were inconsistent with the U.S.'s obligations under Articles 2.4, 6.1,
6.6, 6.13, 9.3 and Annex II of the Anti-dumping Agreement with
respect to NKK and NSC, and Articles 2.3 and 9.3 with respect to
KSC.309
The U.S. defended having to make "adverse inferences to
uncooperative parties" and further sought to have this practice
declared consistent with the Anti-dumping Agreement as a
"substitute for information not provided by uncooperative parties"
because lack of such an interpretation would "encourage exporters
to be uncooperative in anti-dumping investigations, and allow
them to benefit by doing so."310 For the U.S., Article 6.8 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement enables investigating authorities to use
information submitted by exporters where it is submitted in a
timely manner, and as such within established deadlines vhere it
is verifiable and can be used without undue difficulty.311
305 Id. para. 65. However, both Nippon Steel Corporation ("NSC") and NKK
Corporation ("NKK") avoided giving the information during the investigation.
See id. para. 65 n.44.
306 Id. para. 68.
307 Id. para. 69.
308 Id. para. 71 (emphasis added).
309 See id. para. 49(f)(ii), (iii).
310 Id. para. 30. The U.S. further argued that "such an interpretation would
seriously undermine the object and purpose of the entire Anti-dumping
Agreement." Id. For a similar point raised by Canada in its conditional appeal,
see id. para. 37.
311 Id. para. 71.
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Korea, a third party supporting Japan's case, by contrast
argued that the U.S. advanced the view that "regulatory deadlines
per se define the 'reasonable period,' as opposed to an approach
that that takes into account 'the totality of the facts and
circumstances'" 312 and is therefore flexible. The Panel found that
the application of the facts available by the DOC was inconsistent
with the U.S.'s obligations under Article 6.8 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement, 3 3 a finding that the U.S. appealed on the basis that
Articles 6.8 and 6.1.1 require investigating authorities to establish
and enforce reasonable deadlines for submission of information.314
The U.S. had further argued that such deadlines were necessary to
"ensure a rules-based, transparent, and predictable administration
of anti-dumping law."315
The AB first observed that Article 6.1.1 "does not explicitly use
the word 'deadlines"' but rather anticipates that investigating
authorities "may impose appropriate time limits on interested
parties for responses to questionnaires." 316 However, the AB held
that once imposed, such time limits are not "necessarily absolute
and immutable." 317 Although "timeliness" is not defined, the AB
noted that Article 6.8, paragraph 1 of Annex II indicate that, "upon
cause shown," investigating authorities could extend set
deadlines.318 Paragraph 3 of the Annex further supports flexibility
in the deadlines by making reference to "reasonable time" or
"reasonable period." 319 The DOC had rejected the information
supplied by NSC and NKK for the sole reason that it was
submitted after the deadline and, according to the AB, the DOC
did not "consider any other facts and circumstances- even though
several were raised,"320 as contemplated in Articles 6.1.1 and 6.8
312 Id. para. 44.
313 Id. para. 70.
314 Id. para. 71 (noting that Article 6.1.1 specifically provided for the use of
pre-established deadlines for questionnaire responses).
315 Id. para. 10.
316 Id. para.73.
317 Id. para 74.
318 Id. para. 82.
319 Id. para. 83. The AB noted that "what constitutes a reasonable period or
reasonable time, under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-dumping Agreement,
should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific circumstances of
each investigation." Id. para. 84.
320 Id. para. 87.
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and Annex II of the Anti-dumping Agreement.321 The AB therefore
upheld the Pane 3 22 without finding that the DOC "could not,
consistently with the Anti-dumping Agreement, have rejected the
weight conversion factors submitted by NSC and NKK." 323 Hence,
the DOC's rejection of the questionnaires was held not to have
rested upon a permissible interpretation of Article 6.8 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement. In other words, submission of the responses
after the deadline by itself could not be a justifiable reason under
the Anti-dumping Agreement to reject the information. 324
At the end of the day, the U.S. failed to have the Anti-dumping
Agreement construed to set a bright-line rule for exporters in
submitting information. Rather, the AB construed Articles 6.1.1
and 6.8, and Annex II of the Anti-dumping Agreement as "striking
and requiring a balance between the rights of the investigating
authorities to control and expedite the investigating process, and
the legitimate interests of the parties to submit information and to
have that information taken into account." 325  This outcome
contrasts with the argument that characterized the U.S. arguments
with reference to issues of "captive production" and "ordinary
course of trade." On those issues, the U.S. argued that anti-
dumping rules ought to be construed to allow play for
administrative discretion, yet on the issue of facts available the U.S.
argued that the rules called for "strict deadlines." While such
litigation strategies may be typical, what is striking is that differing
attitudes towards the anti-dumping rules in question demonstrate
the potential for inconsistent yet plausible interpretation of these
rules.
4.1.4. Adverse Facts Available with Respect to KSC- Contrasting
the AB and the USCIT
Besides the application of "adverse" facts available to both
NKK and NSC, the DOC further applied "adverse" facts available
as against KSC for failure to submit information it was unable to
obtain. The information the DOC requested from KSC concerned
sales that its joint venture partner in the United States, California
321 Id. para. 88.
322 Id. para. 90.
323 Id. para. 89 (emphasis added).
324 Id.
325 Id. para. 86.
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Steel Industries, Inc. ("CSI"), had on products it resold after
purchasing from KSC. This information was necessary to construct
an export price of KSC's U.S. export sales.326
KSC was unable to obtain the information from CSI over a
thirteen-week period, even after writing five letters to CSI. CSI
even declined to entertain a visit by KSC's lawyers to obtain the
information.327 Japan did not request its joint venture partner in
CSI to help it obtain information, or even exercise rights under the
joint venture agreement that might lead to the production of the
information. 328 Japan, however, maintained that the application of
"adverse" facts available as against KSC on the basis of its failure
to "cooperate" "went far beyond any reasonable understanding of
any obligation to cooperate" under the terms of paragraph 7 of
Annex II of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 329 Japan used the same
anti-formalist argument it made with reference to NSC and NKK
that the U.S. improperly asserted mechanical deadlines without
referring to the facts and circumstances surrounding the inability
of KSC to produce the information requested by the DOC.330
Japan further asserted that cooperation was a two-way street
that while KSC did as much as it could to provide the DOC with
the information, the DOC did nothing to help it obtain the
information notwithstanding the fact that Article 6.13 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement anticipates the necessity of such help where
"an interested party is experiencing difficulties providing
requested information." 331 For this reason, Japan argued that the
DOC failed to cooperate.332  The AB agreed with Japan in
upholding the Panel's finding on this point.333 The AB defined
cooperation as:
326 Id. para. 91-92.
327 Id. para. 92.
328 Id. para. 93.
329 Id. para. 19.
330 See, e.g., id. paras. 17-18; see also supra notes 301-23 and accompanying text.
331 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para.
19.
332 For the AB's agreement with the Japanese argument, and a statement that
is consistent with Articles 6.1 and 6.11 of the Anti-dumping Code, see id. para.
106.
333 Id. para. 109. The AB concluded on the basis of Article 6.13 of the Anti-
dumping Code that 'cooperation' is "indeed, a two-way process involving joint
effort." Id. para. 104.
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[A] process, involving joint effort, whereby parties work
together towards a common goal. In that respect, we note
that parties may very well "cooperate" to a high degree,
even though the requested information is, ultimately not
obtained. This is because the fact of "cooperating" is in
itself not determinative of the end result of the cooperation.
Thus investigating authorities should not arrive at a "less
favourable" outcome simply because an interested party
fails to furnish requested information if, in fact, the
interested party has "cooperated" with the investigating
authorities, within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II
of the Anti-dumping Agreement.334
As in the decision of the DOC, declining to receive information
submitted after the deadline, the AB found that the DOC's finding
that KSC failed to cooperate did not reflect the balance presumed
in the Anti-dumping Agreement between the effort a respondent
like KSC can be expected to make in responding to a questionnaire
and the "practical ability of those interested parties to comply fully
with all demands made of them by the investigating authorities." 335
By contrast, when KSC challenged the DOC's non-cooperation
finding before the U.S. Court of International Trade ("USCIT"),336
KSC lost on the basis that commerce's application of the adverse
inference in calculating dumping margin for KSC's sales to CSI
was in accordance with law and supported by substantial
evidence. 337 Though the USCIT proceeds on the basis of U.S.
legislation, while the AB proceeds on the basis of GATT/WTO law,
both forums serve to implement the U.S.'s anti-dumping mandate
in different ways. While the USCIT may seem to perfectly fit
within the U.S.'s policy of international legal minimalism, as in the
KSC case, the U.S.'s policy of international legal minimalism can be
334 Id. para. 99.
335 Id. para. 101. The AB further invoked the principle of good faith as under-
girding this balance particularly in restraining "investigating authorities from
imposing on exporters burdens which, in the circumstances, are not reasonable."
Id. The AB inferred this balance from paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Anti-dumping
Code. Id. para. 102.
336 See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. United States., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2000) ("KSC claims that Commerce erroneously concluded that KSC
did not cooperate to the best of its ability in the investigation.").
337 Id. at 1037.
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said to succeed with similar legal fancy footwork as the domestic
and international regime before the GATT/WTO's dispute
settlement system.
4.1.5. Causation and Non-Attribution
Another important issue before the AB concerned the ITC's
failure to examine the effect of other causes on the problems
relating to the domestic hot-rolled steel industry. Japan appealed a
finding by the WTO panel ("Panel") that attributed injury to the
domestic industry to dumping from Japan. Japan's basis for
appeal was the finding's inconsistency with prior AB rulings on
this issue, since these rulings interpreted the Anti-dumping
Agreement as requiring proof that dumping caused material injury
before the imposition of anti-dumping duties.338 In particular,
Japan argued that the Panel set a lower standard than that required
by the Anti-dumping Agreement by failing to find that the ITC did
not "separate" and "distinguish" other factors and their impact on
the domestic industry contrary to Article 3.5 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement. 339 Japan alluded to four factors in particular: increase
in production capacity of mini-mills; a 1998 strike at General
Motors; declining demand from the U.S. pipe and tube industry; as
well as the effects of prices of non-dumped imports.340
The U.S. by contrast contended that the ITC was not required
to isolate and exclude or even to quantify the effects of other causes
from effects of imports. Rather, its obligation was to "examine
other causes to ascertain that injury caused by those other factors is
not attributed to dumped imports." 341 Further, the U.S. argued
338 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266,
paras. 25, 218-19. The prior AB reports on which the Panel relied are WTO
Appellate Body Report on United States -Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R
(Dec. 22, 2000) and WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand
and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org. See also Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel
Products, supra note 266, para. 47 (pointing out that Korea has, like Japan, sought
reversal of the Panel's findings).
339 The AB affirms this view. See Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel
Products, supra note 266, paras. 25, 223 (noting Japan's argument and supporting
it by stating the importance of assessing the injurious effects of all potential
factors).
340 Id. para. 216.
341 Id. para. 29.
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that the standard of review proposed by Japan was inapplicable to
the Anti-dumping Agreement and that the cases relied on by Japan
were more applicable to the Agreement on Safeguards. The U.S.
further defended the Panel's reliance on the U.S. -Atlantic Salmon
Anti-dumping Duties case ("Atlantic Salmon"),342 which expressly
disallowed the requirement of identifying or separating and
distinguishing the injurious effects of other factors as opposed to
those caused by dumping.343 The U.S. strategy here was therefore
that of differentiating the arena of dumping from that of
safeguards in terms of the applicable interpretive authority. The
U.S. argued the requirements of separation and distinction of other
factors was foreign to the anti-dumping context, and as such
,previously decided cases on the Agreement on Safeguards was
inapplicable in the context of the Agreement on Anti-dumping.344
Indeed, as the AB conceded, the analogous sections of the Anti-
dumping Agreement (Article 3.5) and the Agreement on
Safeguards (Article 4.2(b)) are "by no means identical." 345 The AB,
without overruling the U.S. on this point, observed that all the
cases relied on by Japan and the U.S. were "persuasive." To justify
reliance on the cases on the Agreement on Safeguards that require
identification and separation of other factors, the AB noted the
"considerable overlap" between the two agreements. 346
Ultimately, the AB found that the Panel erred in its determination
that Article 3.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement did not require the
ITC to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of other
known factors.347
The AB was unable to complete the analysis of the four other
342 WTO Panel Report on United States -Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties
on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, B.I.S.D. 41S/Vol.
1/229 (Apr. 27, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org.
343 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para.
226.
344 The U.S. argued that the provision interpreted in Atlantic Salmon, "closely
tracks the wording of Article 3.5 of Anti-dumping Agreement," and that the AB's
"interpretation in U.S. - Wheat Gluten Safeguard and U.S. - Lamb Safeguard does
not, and cannot, govern the interpretation of non-attribution in the Anti-dumping
Agreement." Id. para. 29. See also id. para. 228 (noting and disagreeing with the
U.S. position on whether investigating authorities must attempt to identify and
asses factors separately).
345 Id. para. 230.
346 Id.
347 Id. paras. 233-34.
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factors since no evidence was taken at the panel,348 making this a
somewhat pyrrhic victory for Japan. However, the interpretive
authority arrived at by the AB is sure to form the basis of future
anti-dumping cases between the U.S. and its trading partners. The
AB's legal interpretation also raises another related legal
implication: the manner in which the AB approached its task of
defining the meaning of Article 3.5 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement. This is important since there was a sound legal basis
for the Panel's interpretation of Article 3.5 although Atlantic Salmon
suggested otherwise. The arrival at a different result from that in a
prior decided case resulted in a favorable outcome for the United
States. In short, the AB's departure from the Atlantic Salmon
holding illustrates how "the argumentative tools that legal culture
makes available to judges trying to generate the effect of legal
necessity" 349 might turn out to be more contested than settled.
Hence, there seems to be no single unassailable argument that the
U.S. or another GATT/WTO contracting party can make without
the possibility of a valid counter-argument being made, even when
it is made by analogy as was the case here between the Agreement
on Safeguards and the Anti-dumping Agreement.
Thus, what the non-attribution issue in this case most aptly
demonstrates is how a GATT/WTO party seeking a favorable
determination can prod and provide an interpreter an opportunity
to deploy her training, skill, and insight, as well as to allocate her
intellectual energies to arrive at a decision that is acceptable within
the prevailing legal culture even when prior precedent suggests
otherwise. 35 0
4.1.6. Calculation of "All Others Rate" Under the Tariff Act
Found GATT/TO Inconsistent
While the U.S. sought to avoid findings that its anti-dumping
laws are inconsistent with the Anti-dumping Agreement on the
other issues, the AB found the provision of the U.S. statute
34 Id. para. 236.
349 See Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 797 (addressing the role of political ideology).
350 According to Karl Kare, The Politics of Duncan Kennedy's Critique, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 1073, 1087 (2001), the choices that an interpreter makes in turn
depend on the political sensibilities and convictions of the interpreter, since it is
often the case that the meaning and constraining power of the legal materials is
unknown or uncertain without the intervention of legal work. At the WTO, the
lack of a system of precedent further facilitates such outcomes.
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providing for the calculation of the all others' rate and its
application to be inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement.351
Section 735(c)(5)(A) of the U.S.'s Tariff Act of 1930,352 as
amended, provides a method for calculating a rate of anti-
dumping duties for those exporters who were not individually
investigated in a DOC anti-dumping investigation. Hence, in this
case, such a rate would apply for exporters besides NKK, KSC, and
NSC. Under this method, exporters who were not investigated are
subject to anti-dumping duties, or margins, 353 on the basis of the
information gathered by the DOC from the representative sample
of exporters. However, according to Japan, the DOC had acted
inconsistently with Article 9.4 of the Anti-dumping Agreement by
351 Article 9.4 of the Anti-dumping Agreement in part provides:
When the authorities have limited their examination... [to a sample of
exporters or producers], any anti-dumping duty applied to imports from
exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:
(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to
those selected exporters or producers... provided that the authorities shall
disregard for the purposes of this paragraph any zero and de minimis margins
and margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of
Article 6.
Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 231, art. 9.4 (emphases added).
352 Section 735(c)(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides:
(A) General rule: For purposes of this subsection and section 733(d) [19
U.C.S. § 1673b(d)], the estimated all-others rate shall be an amount equal
to the weighted average of the estimated weighted average dumping
margins established for exporters and producers individually
investigated, excluding any zero and de minimis margins, and any
margins determined entirely under section 776 [19 U.S.C. § 1677e]. (B)
Exception: If the estimated average dumping margins established for all
exporters and producers individually investigated are zero or de
minimis margins, or are determined entirely under section 766 [19 U.S.C.
§1677e], the administering authority may use any reasonable method to
establish the estimated all-other rate for exporters and producers not
individually investigated, including averaging the estimated weighted
average dumping margins determined for the exporters and producers
individually investigated.
19 U.S.C. § 1673d (2000) (emphases added).
353 The AB interpreted margins under Article 9.4 to be as it appears in Article
2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and specifically as meaning "the individual
margin of dumping determined for each of the investigated exporters and
producers of the product under investigation, for that particular product. This
margin reflects a comparison that is based upon examination of all of the relevant
home market and export market transactions." Appellate Body Report on Hot-
Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para. 118.
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including de minimis and zero margins based on facts available in
determining the all others rate (that is the anti-dumping rate for
exporters who were not individually investigated). The central
legal issue here was whether Article 9.4 prevents or permits the
inclusion of margins based partially on facts available. The U.S.
argued it did. Japan by contrast argued that Article 9.4 did not
permit the inclusion of margins based partially on facts available in
the calculation of the all others' rate, but rather on real information.
In essence, Article 9.4 prevented the U.S. from basing its
calculation of the all others' rate on facts available. According to
Japan, the U.S. could have avoided being in violation of Article 9.4
by using a composite "consisting of those portions of the
investigated companies' margins that were not based on facts
available." 354 Further, Japan contended that the use of de minimis
and zero margins based on facts available "dramatically inflated"
the all others' anti-dumping margin.355 For all these reasons, Japan
sought to have the AB uphold the panel's decision holding section
735(c)(5) of the Tariff Act inconsistent with Article 9.4 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement.
The U.S., by contrast, argued that the panel erred in so holding
because the requirement of excluding any margin containing even
the smallest amount of facts available under Article 9.4, when read
together with Article 6.8 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, was not
entirely based on facts available. According to the U.S., margins
under Article 6.8 "are 'founded' upon facts available, but not
margins that include only minimal amounts of facts available." 356 In
other words, the U.S. drew a distinction between partial and entire
facts available by contending that, to the extent that section
735(c)(5) calculated dumping margins for the "all others" rate
partially - as opposed to entirely - based on data submitted by the
investigated exporters, it was consistent with Article 9.4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement. To find otherwise, the U.S. argued
would "render it impossible to calculate an 'all others' rate in most
cases, and for that reason frustrates the purpose of Article 9.4."357
The European Communities ("EC") supported this reading of
Article 9.4 as opposed to the panel's "rigid" interpretation arguing
that "such facts are used simply to fill gaps in the information
354 Id. para. 20. For similar arguments by Chile, see id. para. 39.
355 Id. para. 20.
356 Id. para. 12.
357 Id. para. 13.
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supplied by a cooperating exporter and the investigating authority
has drawn no adverse inferences." 358
The AB dismissed the U.S.'s appeal on the basis that section
735(c)(5)(A) requires the inclusion of facts available in the
calculation of the all others rate which results in an all others rate
in excess of the maximum allowable rate under Article 9.4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement.359 As such, the AB like the Panel, read
Article 9.4 to require the exclusion of all margins calculated in part
using facts available thereby dismissing the U.S. distinction
between partial and entire facts available as a permissible
interpretation of Article 9.4.360 The AB further disagreed with the
U.S. that the Panel erred in applying the appropriate standard of
review under Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-dumping Agreement.
Under this standard of review, the DSB is required to use multiple
permissible interpretations consistent with the Agreement in the
assessment of the factual determinations of national authorities.
361
Hence, the U.S.'s interpretation of Article 9.4 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement was found to be an impermissible interpretation under
this very broad and deferential standard of review. The U.S. may
have won on other issues, but it lost on the calculation of the all
others rate on both the question of statutory inconsistency (section
735(c)(5)(A)) with GATT/WTO law (Article 9.4 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement) as well as on the question of its application
being inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Article 9.4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement.
This appeal however left open a lacuna in Article 9.4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement. This lacuna arises where in calculating
the all others rate Article 9.4 mandates the exclusion of all margins
from the calculation thereby leaving no margins to arrive at an all
others' rate.362 Since the AB found the U.S.'s approach under
section 735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act to be inconsistent with Article
9.4 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, this leaves further room for
358 Id. para. 42. The European Communities ("EC"), however, argued that the
Panel had correctly found section 735(c)(5) to be inconsistent with Article 9.4 of
the Anti-dumping Agreement. Id.
359 Id. para. 128. The AB found that Article 9.4 of the Anti-dumping Code
"establishes a prohibition, in calculating the ceiling for the all others rate, on using
'margins established under circumstances referred to' in Article 6.8." Id. para.
122.
360 Id. para. 129.
361 Id. paras. 57-60, 130.
362 Id. para. 126.
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the U.S. to amend its law to achieve a favorable result for its
producers as long as it does not violate the provisions of Article
9.4.363
4.2. U.S. Compliance with the AB's Decision in the Hot-Rolled Steel
Case: Can the VVTO's DSB Change U.S. Law?
"I must say, the very idea that the creation of the World
Trade Organization-an international governance body
with real powers over the United States, whose sanction
decisions against the United States we cannot veto-the
very idea that would not require approval as a treaty is
frankly mindboggling."364
"No ruling by a dispute panel under this new dispute
settlement system, [the WTO's DSB], . . . can force us to
change any Federal, State or local law of the U.S.. Not the
City Council of Los Angeles, nor the Senate of the U.S., can
be bound by these dispute settlement rulings, and I think,
that is critical for the American people to understand
that." 365
The AB's findings recommended that the U.S. bring its
measures found inconsistent with the Anti-dumping Agreement
and the WTO Agreement into conformity with its obligations
under those Agreements. 366 There were two main categories of
measures that the U.S. had to bring into conformity with the Anti-
dumping Agreement and the other WTO Agreements: legislative
and administrative. Legislatively, AB's Hot-rolled Steel decision
recommended that the U.S. amend § 735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act
in connection with anti-dumping margin determinations for
363 The AB recommended that the U.S. "bring its measures found ... to be
inconsistent with the Anti-dumping Agreement and the WTO Agreement, into
conformity with its obligations under those Agreements." Id. para. 241.
364 Testimony of Lawrence Tribe to the Senate Committee on Science, and
Transportation, Hearings on S.2467 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the U.S. Senate, 103d Congress, 295 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings].
365 Hearings, supra note 364, at 37 (citing testimony of Michael Kantor).
366 Id.
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exporters not individually investigated. Administratively, the U.S.
was required to review the DOC's:
* application of "facts available" to NSC, NKK and KSC;
* exclusion from the calculation of normal value, as
outside the "ordinary course of trade," of certain home
market sales to parties affiliated with an investigated
exporter on the basis of the 95.5% or arms length test;
and
* application of § 771(7)(c)(iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
otherwise referred to as the captive production
provision, in the determination of injury sustained by
the U.S. hot-rolled steel industry.
Critics of the WTO in the U.S. immediately pointed to these
requirements of conforming to GATT/WTO rules as evidence of
how changes to U.S. law "at the behest of an international
organization" thwarts America's democratic process. 367 These
367 See Letter from Robert E. Lighthizer, Deputy, U.S. Trade Representative,
Reagan Administration, and Alan Wolff, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative,
Carter Administration, to Gloria Blue (Executive Secretary of the Trade Policy
Committee in the USTR's office) (July 10, 2000) (following request for public
comment on U.S. objectives and proposals for improving the functioning of the
World Trade Organization). In the 1994 Hearings on the Implementing
Legislation on the Uruguay Round, Senator Breaux wondered aloud to the then-
USTR, Michael Kantor:
Let me ask another question ... It is the question of the fact that if we
have a World Trade Organization somehow running the trade rules and
regulations, they are the umpire. They are the referee. If the group that
serves as the referee is 120 nations or what-have-you, and the U.S. has 1
vote, I mean, are we not giving up our legitimate interest? I mean, it
always disturbs me in international meetings when countries that are the
size of this building have the same vote as the U.S., I am not saying
anything derogatory against them because of their size, but to give them
in these international organizations the same weight as the U.S. or
another developed country seems very unfair. Can you comment on
that?
Hearings, supra note 364, at 50.
In legal parlance, those who worry about GATT/WTO law and rulings over-
riding U.S. law and democracy also argue that all agreements constraining U.S.
sovereignty must be subjected to the requirements of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2
which provides for Senate approval as a pre-condition of manifesting U.S. consent
to such agreements. Tribe, supra note 43. At the Senate Hearings on the Uruguay
Round's implementing legislation, Tribe argued that it is not enough, as the USTR
had argued, that GAT/WTO panel reports finding U.S. law and GATT/WTO
inconsistent would not immediately override U.S. law because they provided the
U.S. with wiggle room. Tribe stated:
[that] amounts to an assurance that we might just decide to violate our
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critics in particular pointed to the legalization or thejuridfication368 of GATT under the WTO's Uruguay Round
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") as evidence of U.S.
laws being subjected to legal scrutiny by an external adjudicatory
body with the power of sanction.369 The DSU is authorized to
resolve disputes between members under the WTO agreements
and members are obliged to abide by its rules and procedures.370
solemn commitments under the WTO agreement. Well, what kind of
argument is that? If that kind of reply could justify circumventing the
treaty clause, then it seems to me the only thing that would count as a
treaty would be a pact in which the United States solemnly turned over
all of its military power to a foreign body that could then simply force us
to do its bidding. But clearly the treaty clause encompasses vastly more
than that.
Id. at 292-93. Also according to Tribe,
the treaty clause's provision for supermajority approval is an
independent guarantee of especially serious deliberation and especially
strong national consensus for those international agreements that
significantly constrain American sovereignty by seriously implicating
normal State or Federal lawmaking processes. It seems plain to me that
the characteristics of the WTO agreement plainly qualify it as the sort of
agreement that... warrants a high degree of consensus and solemnity.
Id. at 294-95. By contrast, Bruce Ackerman countered Tribe's position by stating:
an effort to limit Article I might be justified [since Tribe's position was
largely premised on the view that the legislative power under Article I
and the treaty power under II are not coextensive or inter-changeable -
in effect that that which the Constitution requires to be accomplished
through a treaty cannot be accomplished through mere legislation] if the
Constitution had explicitly said that "only" the Senate could give its
advice and consent to fundamental international agreements [Tribe
would be correct]. But the text of Article II does not contain the word
only. It simply creates an alternative route which the President and the
Senate may use if in their judgment it is appropriate ....
Id. at 313. See also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 801 (pointing out that
although the Constitution requires two-thirds Senate approval for treaties, many
have been approval for treaties, many have been approved by simple majorities of
both Houses).
368 Dr. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International
Trade Relations, 17 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775 (1997).
369 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, pt. 2, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994)[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. The Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") is annexed to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Apr. 15, 1994). See WTO, WTO
Legal Texts, at http://www.wto.org/english/ docs-e/legal-e/legal e.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2004). The DSU establishes the Dispute Settlement Body.
370 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 364 art. 23.1. In the Section
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 94 2004
2004] INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MJNIMALISM
Article 19.1 provides that where, pursuant to the DSU, a panel or
the AB "concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring
the measure into conformity with that agreement." 371  The
withdrawal of non-conforming measures is in fact the first
objective of the WTO's dispute settlement process. 372 Where these
recommendations to withdraw non-conforming measures or bring
non-conforming measures into consistency with GATT/WTO law
are not implemented within a reasonable period of time,
373
compensation and the suspension of concessions or other
obligations are temporary options available against such a WTO
member.374  To give the dispute settlement process certain
guarantees of fair process and to prevent delay, the DSU has
elaborate time limits within which the dispute settlement process is
required to proceed from the initial consultations 375 prior to the
formation of a panel;376 to the appellate stage at the AB;377 to the
301 Case, the finding of consistency between Section 301 of the U.S.'s Trade Act of
1974 as amended and GATT/WTO law raised the possibility that Article 23 of the
DSU is not the exclusive means of determining the nullification and impairment
of benefits under the GATT/WTO Agreements. See Section 301 Case, supra note
14. The primary issue in the Section 301 Case was whether Article 23 of the DSU
was the exclusive dispute settlement process of the WTO, and if so, whether
Section 301 was inconsistent with it. The EC had attacked Section 301 as
inconsistent with Article 23 of the DSU because it authorizes the U.S. to make
unilateral determinations of injury based on GATT/WTO law and to take
countermeasures which can only be undertaken pursuant to the GATT/WTO's
dispute settlement understanding. In Shrimp-Turtle II, the AB upheld a U.S.
measure providing that unilateral trade measures directed at other countries'
policies are not, in principle, excluded from justiciability under Article XX. The
AB pointed out that this finding, which also legitimated the fact that unilateral
trade measure could be used to used to protect the environment consistently with
the requirements of GATT, was not dicta but intended to give guidance to future
panels. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States -Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, paras. 107, 137-38, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); see also, B.S.
Chimni, WFO and Environment: Shrimp-Turtle and EC-Hormone Cases, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., May 13, 2002, at 1752-61.
371 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 359, art. 19.1.
372 Id. art. 3.7.
373 Prompt compliance with DSU recommendations or rulings is considered
"essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
Members." Id. art. 21.1.
374 Id. art. 22.1. However, such temporary compensation and suspension are
not preferred to bringing the infringing measure into conformity under Article
22.1 of the DSU. Id.
375 Id. arts. 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11.
376 Id. arts. 12.5, 12.8, 12.12, 15.3, 16.1, 16.2, 16.4.
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compliance or implementation stage.378 Where there is a dispute
regarding the deadline set by the parties or by the Dispute
Settlement Board ("DSB") for implementing the recommendations
of a panel or the AB, the parties may under the DSU resort to
binding arbitration under the DSU.379 Critics of the Uruguay
Round commitments the U.S. made in 1994 specifically point to the
possibility of the DSB authorizing retaliatory sanctions against the
U.S. for failing to implement its recommendations as evidence of
how the new dispute settlement regime would undermine U.S.
sovereignty. 380 According to these critics, this possibility removes
377 Id. art. 17.5.
378 Id. art. 21.3(c). The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") also has a
surveillance responsibility over the implementation of recommendations and
rulings under Article 21 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Id. art. 21.6.
379 Id. art. 26.1(b)-(c).
380 Id. arts. 26.1, 22. 1 (presenting the argument by Steve Charnovitz that the
mandatory nature of the DSU procedures, and particularly Article 22.8, provides
that suspension actions "shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such
time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been
removed... " and that Article 23.2(c) which provides that suspension actions are
"in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the
recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time" amounts to
a WTO-authorized sanction and that this departs from the practice under Article
XXXII:2 of GATT 1947 which was construed as merely allowing compensation
equivalent to the value of damages assessed for a party's failure to carry out its
obligations under the Agreement). See Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth Be
Pulled?: An Analysis of VITO Sanctions, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT HUDEC 602-35 (Daniel L.
M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW]. Charnovitz further argues that the
WTO's dispute settlement system changes the regime of compensation under
GATT 1947 whose central goal was to re-equilibrate (or to restore the balance of
benefits and obligations) in the trading system with a system based on sanctions
and retaliation. He gives examples of the authorization of trade sanctions in the
EC Bananas case (Decision by the Arbitrators, WTO, European Communities-
Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999)) and the EC Beef Hormones case (Decision by the
Arbitrator, WTO, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) - Original Complaint by the U.S., Recourse to Arbitration
by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999)) to illustrate where this new
direction in dispute settlement has been effectuated. See JACKSON, supra note 23, at
167 (arguing that WTO rules are binding in the "traditional international law sense
... although not always in a 'statute like' sense .... However, the international
law 'bindingness' of a [panel] report certainly can and should have an important
effect in domestic U.S. jurisprudence, as in the jurisprudence of many other
nation-states."). But see David Palmeter & Stanimir A. Alexandrov, "Inducing
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the flexibility the U.S. or any other country had under the 1947
GATT dispute settlement process to block the adoption of panel
recommendations which in effect makes them inutile.
381
By contrast, Ambassador Michael Kantor told a congressional
hearing on the Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation that the
fears that American democracy and sovereignty would be
sacrificed "have no foundation."38 2 Kantor also pointed out that
Compliance" in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra, 650-59 (disagreeing with Charnovitz and
advancing the view that the DSU, unlike the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures which provides for special remedy rules, continues
GATT 1947 practice of re-equilibrating concessions as opposed to imposing
sanctions).
381 Article 16.4 of the DSU requires the DSB to adopt a panel report within
sixty days from its publication unless there is no consensus to adopt it. See
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 369, art. 16.4. This differs from the
practice of unanimous adoption under GATT 1947 which gave any one member
the unilateral power to stand in the way of adoption. To strengthen the case for
the bindingness of panel reports under international law, consider John H.
Jackson (who is otherwise critical of the view that the WTO would limit U.S.
sovereignty) to the effect that examining the language of various provisions of the
DSU "in the light of the practice of GATT, and perhaps supplemented by the
preparatory work of the negotiators... strongly suggests that the legal effect of an
adopted panel report is the international law obligation to perform the
recommendation of the panel report." John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding -Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 62-63 (1997). But see Judith Hippler Bello, The IATO Dispute
Settlement Understanding: Less is More," 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996)
(expressing a different view on this point). Ambassador Kantor argued:
[Failure to implement a panel report that finds a member's law
inconsistent with GATT/WTO Agreements] within an agreed time, offer
satisfactory trade compensation, or reach some other mutually
acceptable solution, the DSU provides for automatic authorization of
retaliation on request .... That said, dispute settlement panels formed
under the new agreement will not have the power to change U.S. law
order us to change our laws. We will remain free, as we are under GATT
today, not to implement panel reports.
Hearings, supra note 364 at 42.
382 See Hearings, supra note 364, at 41 (providing the prepared statement of
Ambassador Michael Kantor entitled The Importance of the Uruguay Round).
Senator Rockefeller noted that, in addition to § 102, the Bill also provided other
safeguards such as congressional review of the U.S. commitment to GATT/WTO
every five years and the safeguard of state and other local laws from the
GATT/WTO challenge, which together led him to conclude that he could "not
imagine how we could have protected our sovereignty more than we have under
this agreement." Id. at 55 (providing opening statement of Senator Rockefeller).
By contrast, in a letter to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter (then at Harvard Law School)
argued that "[w]here an international agreement effectively supercedes or directly
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U.S. law takes precedence over WTO Agreements, 3 3 a principle
that is further expanded in the Trade Act of 2002.384 According to
John H. Jackson, sovereignty critics failed to appreciate the fact that
GATT/WTO agreements did not have a direct effect on U.S. law
and the fact that the U.S. could choose to withdraw from the WTO
if it was opposed to implementing adverse recommendations.
This, among other arguments of sovereignty critics in Jackson's
view, gives the U.S. a buffer zone against GATT/WTO
agreements. 385  Robert E. Hudec, another leading trade law
specialist, argued that the process of negotiating trade treaties and
follow-up implementing legislation provides a setting within
constrains ordinary state and federal law-making authority, the people have in
effect agreed to delegate their sovereignty not to the state or federal governments,
but to the federal government acting in concert with a foreign government or
governments." Letter from Prof. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Professor, Harvard Law
School, to Senator Ernest F. Hollings 3-4 (Oct. 18, 1994), reprinted in GATT
Implementing Legislation: Hearings, 302-11.
383 Section 102(a)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements ("URA") provides:
"No Provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of
any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any
law of the U.S. shall have effect." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000). See also supra
Section 2.3 (discussing the effect of intemational trade agreements on U.S. law).
3m Section 2105(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 2002 provides that any trade
agreement or understanding with a foreign government (oral or written) not
disclosed to Congress will not be considered to be part of trade agreements
approved by Congress and shall have no effect under U.S. law or in any dispute
settlement body. See Trade Act of 2002 § 2105(a)(4), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3805(a)(4)
(emphasis added). Notice that the provision is very broad, encompassing both
written and non-written agreements.
385 See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 367-95. A review of Jackson's founding role
in the U.S. of the field of international economic law summarizes Jackson's view
of the relationship between domestic and international trade law as follows:
Jackson's academic achievement was to displace international business
transactions and the tradition of transnationalism by capturing the
intellectual energy and hope for international public law and the felt
necessity of dealing with the "foreign" without losing the basic
American legal materials and the national private law order. By focusing
largely on the reciprocal interaction of national governmental and
legislative institutions, he imagined an international "trade constitution"
which brought international trade into the domestic public order to
revitalize it as an international system .... He recast clashes between
national regimes not as political disputes awaiting international
regulatory harmonization nor as deeply estranged cultural differences to
be compared, but as an imperfect "interface" mechanism through which
different legal cultures related to one another.
David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, UTAH L. REV. 7,
62 (1994).
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which affected constituencies could participate and therefore
confer legitimacy on the outcome.386  Notwithstanding these
reassurances, the Trade Act of 2002 requires the Secretary of
Commerce, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and
Treasury, the Attorney General, and the USTR, to report to
Congress regarding whether or not the DSB has added to the
obligations or diminished the rights of the United States.387
The debate between those that thought American sovereignty
and democracy would or would not be limited by the Uruguay
Round Agreements replicates an old dichotomy between
formalism and anti-formalism in international law.38 8 Critics of the
U.S. for joining these agreements proceed from a sovereignty-
centered conception of obligation in international law. For these
critics, by consenting to be bound to an international legal
obligation, the U.S. is giving up its sovereignty. By contrast,
Ambassador Kantor and others who are agnostic about the U.S.
giving up its sovereignty by joining in the WTO Agreements,
proceed from a different premise than the formalist stance of the
significance of consent. This alternative school of thought holds
the view that the WTO's dispute settlement procedures should be
seen as part of a larger informal structure of open-ended and at
times conflicting policy goals among trading partners whose
economies are integrated with that of the U.S., and that this
structure has been negotiated through consensus (as opposed to
consent) such that it gives the U.S. broad discretion in protecting
its rights and interests.389 John H. Jackson also argued that panel
386 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
219-20 (1999). Hudec further notes that domestic protectionist measures taken by
state legislatures in the U.S. express electoral or democratic preferences and as
such they are not any more legitimate than the "democratic" expression of
"electoral will achieved by the process of international negotiations plus
implementing legislations." Id. at 320.
387 See Trade Act of 2002 § 2105(b)(3) (detailing the procedure for failure to
meet other requirements).
388 For excellent elaboration on this debate, see Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-
Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782-91 (1966)
(elaborating on the debate over the competence of the General Assembly in their
quasi-legislative capacity).
389 The USTR's office has therefore asserted:
[The U.S.] government was careful to structure the WTO dispute
settlement rules to preserve our rights. The findings of a WTO dispute
settlement panel cannot force us to change our laws. Only the United
States determines exactly how it will respond to the recommendations of
a WTO panel, if at all. If a U.S. measure is ever found to be in violation
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 99 2004
100 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:1
decisions are not legally binding on the U.S. to the same degree as
formal interpretations of the WTO Agreement which are based on
the super-majority requirements of a three-fourths majority of the
highest body in the WTO, the Ministerial Conference. 390
To examine the tension between critics of the WTO's
encroachment on American sovereignty and democracy, on the
one hand, and administration support of U.S. participation in the
WTO, on the other hand, I next explore U.S./Japan negotiations in
the compliance stage of Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan case,
particularly by examining the arguments and counterarguments
advanced at the WTO Arbitration hearing by both parties. 391
Having been unable to agree on what time period the U.S.
would implement the DSU's recommendations, it joined with
Japan in seeking a binding arbitration under Article 21.3 of the
DSU. In this arbitration, the U.S. argued that it would implement
the DSB's findings and that it would need a "reasonable period of
time" to do so as provided in Article 21.3 of the DSU.392 The U.S.
of a WTO provision, the United States may on its own decide to change
the law; compensate a foreign country by lowering tariff barriers of
equivalent amount in another sector; or do nothing and possibly
undergo retaliation by the affected country in the form of increased
barriers to U.S. exports of an equivalent amount. But America retains
full sovereignty in its decision of whether or not to implement a panel
recommendation.
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, AMERICA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 13
(1999) (releasing this report ahead of the Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/wto-usa.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
390 JACKSON, supra note 23, at 388. Jackson emphasizes that the consensual
character of the WTO circumscribes its ability to override U.S. domestic law and
policy. Id. 382-83. Similarly, Jackson has described the regime of international
economic law of the WTO as presenting themes and problems such as the
"dilemma of rule versus discretion," and the "'effectiveness' of the trade rules,"
among others, rather than as a seamless legal web. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 25
(1989). Jackson further argues in this pre-WTO book that in the implementation
of the Tokyo Round Agreements, the U.S. government (the Judicial and Executive
branches as well as Congress) departed from theories of "strict sovereignty." Id.
at 197-98. See also Kennedy, supra note 384, at 67 (noting Jackson's discussion on
the unanswerable dilemmas raised among individual nations attempting to
implement international agreements).
391 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States -Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (award of the Arbitrator Florentino P. Feliciano), WT/DS/184/13 (Feb.
19, 2002) [hereinafter Arbitration on Hot-Rolled Steel Products].
392 Id. para. 1.
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argued that eighteen months would be a reasonable time period
within which to implement the recommendations notwithstanding
that Article 21.3(c) of the DSU calls for a period of fifteen months
and that Article 21.1 requires "prompt compliance" while Article
21.3 requires "immediate" compliance.393 Hence, a primary issue
in the arbitration was whether the fifteen-month implementation
period in Article 21.3(c) is a fixed or non-extendable period. 394
According to the U.S., the needed statutory changes to section
735(c)(5)(A) of the Tariff Act would take fourteen months "in the
light of the United States legal system and prior experience."
395
The U.S. argued that this complex and unpredictable legislative
process necessitated that period of time. In addition, the U.S.
argued that administrative changes, required pursuant to the
DSB's recommendations (especially the recalculation of the all
others' rate) required certain due process safeguards including
preparation of a new methodology, preparation of a draft re-
determination, and a comment period by interested parties
required by the Anti-dumping Agreement;396 the issuing of the
final determination with accommodation for correction of errors
would require a period of four months after the enactment of the
amending legislation.397
Japan, by contrast, argued that experience shows shorter
periods for legislative changes upon DSB recommendation were
possible 398 and that not all the administrative recalculations
recommended were contingent upon the legislative changes. 399 In
effect, that prompt and immediate compliance would not be met if
the U.S. was allowed an eighteen month implementation period.
In addition, Japan noted that previous arbitrations on
393 Id. para. 5.
394 Id. para. 25.
395 Id. para. 10.
396 Id. para. 13. The Arbitrator declined to be drawn into making a
determination on this reliance of the Anti-dumping Agreement that would have
necessitated giving the U.S. more time but made observations on the applicable
U.S. law. Id. para. 35.
397 Id. paras. 13-15.
398 Id. para. 20 (arguing that an amendment within a seven-month period was
possible, given that the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations legislation was enacted in
three and a half months).
399 Id. para. 23 (noting that two weeks only would be necessary for changes
contingent upon the new law). Japan also argued that only forty-five days were
required for those changes not contingent upon legislative changes. Id. para. 22.
2004]
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implementation had shied away from considering the complexity
of the issues involved or even their contentiousness, since these
were non-legal issues in establishing implementation schedules
under Article 21.3(c). In Japan's view, a ten-month period was
adequate.400
The arbitrator first began by finding that the fifteen-month
period found in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU was a guideline that
called for a reasonable period of time as opposed to being a strict
legal requirement, especially when immediate compliance is
impracticable.401 The arbitrator then very interestingly borrowed
from the AB's finding of reasonableness in its decision in this case,
on the unrelated issue of Article 6.8 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement. Here, the AB found that Article 6.8 did not require a
strict deadline in the submission of questionnaires because
reasonableness implied a degree of flexibility as well as
consideration of all the circumstances of a particular case.402
The arbitrator made several observations regarding the
submissions of Japan and the United States. First, the dispute
between them indicates that there is a lack of clarity, at least
between the U.S. and Japan, regarding whether or not Article 21 of
the DSU provides strict time guidelines for implementation in the
same way that there is bindingness of previous arbitrations
interpreting Article 21 on subsequent cases.403 This observation is
consistent with the AB's general approach in the main dispute
between Japan and the U.S. -that the Anti-dumping Agreement is
more a general guideline to be interpreted in context rather than a
strict code of rules. This perspective of the WTO's DSU therefore
contributes to a view of both the substantive as well as the dispute
settlement rules of the WTO as open to contestation with differing
interpretations of doubtful precedential value. It is a legal regime
whose outcomes are not therefore easily predictable.
Proceeding from the view that he was unconstrained by
precedent and taking into account the various submissions of the
U.S. and Japan, the arbitrator determined that a period of fifteen
months from August 23, 2001, was the reasonable period of time
within which the U.S. would be required to comply with the
400 Id. paras. 16-23.
401 Id. para. 25.
402 Appellate Body Report on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 266, para.
84.
403 Arbitration on Hot-Rolled Steel Products, supra note 391, para. 39.
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recommendations and rulings of the DSB.404 This period expired
on November 23, 2002. On December 5, 2002, the DSB agreed to
extend the reasonable period of time for implementation until
December 31, 2003, or the end of the first session of Congress,
whichever is earlier.405 This extension confirms the assertion above
of the possibility of endlessly elongating dispute settlement,
thereby curtailing the utility of the DSB to effectively check WTO-
illegal action.
The Trade Act of 2002 also provides that trade authorities
cannot apply any implementing legislation with respect to an
agreement negotiated under the auspices of the WTO unless the
Secretary of Commerce has issued a report to Congress before
December 31, 2002, addressing the concerns of Congress on
whether or not the DSU has either added or diminished the rights
and obligations of the U.S. under GATT/WTO agreements.40 6 The
Secretary of Commerce transmitted that report to Congress on
December 30, 2002.407 It allayed congressional fears that the DSU
was heavily biased against the U.S. by systematically marshalling
evidence to demonstrate that the rulings had benefited a wide
array of U.S. industries and that in those cases in which the U.S.
had lost, the "findings involved technical or procedural elements
of a law or regulation, or its application, and the U.S. was easily
able to implement the DSB recommendations without affecting the
underlying law or regulation." 40 8
5. CONCLUSION
As the GATT/ WTO legal system becomes all the more complex
and subtle, especially in its open-endedness, governments such as
the U.S. are better able to balance tensions between competing
interests at the domestic and international levels as well as increase
their propensity to devise ingenious methods that "beat" the rules
404 Id. para. 40.
405 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UPDATE (Sept.
29, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/update.html. See
generally Daniel Pruzin, U.S. and Japan to Agree Further Delay for Compliance with
2001 WTO Steel Ruling, 20 INT'L TRADE REP., 2004 (2003).
406 The Trade Act of 2002 § 2105(b)(2)(D)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(2).
407 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH STRATEGY
REGARDING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANELS AND THE APPELLATE BODY: REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS TRANSMrITED BY THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE (Dec. 30, 2002),
available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf.
408 Id. Sec. III, Part C, at 6.
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or to adopt a policy of international minimalism.409 In so doing,
the U.S. consolidates, rather than weakens, its sovereignty. This
has largely been achieved because of the malleable way in which
trade rules are crafted, applied, implemented and adjudicated.410
After all, these rules are bargained-for outcomes as opposed to
strict rules etched in stone.
This play in the crafting, application, implementation, and
adjudication facilitates the accommodation of divergent
interpretations which in turn encourages policy balancing between
invariably conflicting polices both at the domestic and at the
international level. The adjudication and implementation of cases
before the GATT/WTO's dispute settlement bodies is further
subject to negotiation through arbitration and diplomacy. The fact
that the sanctions of the GATT/WTO system are for the most part
compensatory rather than punitive go towards making it more
open-ended, and flexible, also lead to consequences which the
system is intended to reign in.411
Since the dispute settlement system of the WTO is coming
under the intense scrutiny of Congress, a central issue in the debate
is whether the plasticity of WTO anti-dumping rules is an
advantage or disadvantage. As we have seen with regard to the
Hot-rolled Steel from Japan case, the use of standards as a baseline for
the anti-dumping regime of the WTO results in a measure of
uncertainty in the outcomes of the dispute settlement process. To
avoid this uncertainty, WTO members could negotiate more
specific rules. However, game theory predicts that some degree of
uncertainty - or unpredictability - may enhance the parties'
incentives to bargain to a lower-cost solution under circumstances
of high transaction costs for formal reallocation.412 This would
disadvantage poorer countries who are unable to be repeat players
409 For an analogous point made by John H. Jackson, see JACKSON, supra note
23, at 123-31.
410 James Gathii, Fairness as Fidelity to Making the WTO Fully Responsive to All
Its Members, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 157,160-62 (2003).
411 Kenneth Dam therefore argues that "because of the economic nature of
tariff concessions and the domestic politics sensitivity inherently involved in trade
issues, a system that made withdrawals of concessions impossible would tend to
discourage the making of the concessions in the first place." DAM, supra note 8, at
80.
412 Cf Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (comparing two alternative property regimes -definite,
ex ante entitlement versus contingent, ex post entitlement-and applying game
theory to show that ex ante regimes may induce immediate ex post agreements).
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in the DSU.
This study therefore shows in a detailed fashion that neither
the sovereignty critics nor the supporters of U.S. participation in
the WTO are entirely correct. Rather, there is a wide degree of
latitude enjoyed by the U.S. in acquiescing to and rejecting WTO
DSB recommendations. In other words, not all WTO DSB
recommendations are automatically implemented nor are all
automatically rejected. The process of negotiation on how the U.S.
would implement recommendations requiring legislative and
administrative changes gives the U.S. room to carefully craft its
compliance thereby ensuring that it maximizes its best interests
while maintaining international leadership in the integrity of a
dispute settlement process based on the rule of law. The
opportunity provided by this process of negotiation is in part what
produces a minimalist approach to international legal governance
as a safeguard to maintaining the various tensions international
trade produces within and beyond the United States. 413 Ultimately,
these outcomes are further conditioned by a background of
constitutional and legal constraints that impose requirements
which counterbalance the perceived effects of international trade
rules on priorities of domestic policy such as labor, the
environment, and specific industries.
413 The GATT/WTO agreements are indeed regarded at times as helpful to
governments to overcome domestic special interest groups. The WTO argues that
"governments need to be armed against pressure from narrow interest groups,
and the WTO system can help." WTO, Ten Benefits of the WTO Trading System, No.
9, available at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/lOben-e/lOb9_
e.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). See also STEFANIE ANN LENWAY, THE POLITICS OF
U.S INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PROTECTION, EXPANSION AND ESCAPE 54 (1985) (arguing
that trade regime rules constrain the influence of domestic pressure groups); see
generally C. MICHAEL AHO & JONATHAN DAVID ARONSON, TRADE TALKS: AMERICA
BETTER LISTEN! (1985). However, the findings in this study demonstrate that this is
not an unassailable argument.
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